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ABSTRACT 
A professional liability claim need not portend an inevitable disaster resulting in an unfavorable 
verdict, the loss of a professional reputation and payment of a huge monetary judgment. Proper 
recordkeeping, upholding the standards of the "prudent practitioner" and general common sense 
can make a long stride toward a successful defense. Incorporation of these elements in your 
everyday practice, long before a claim is ever made, can help provide the most defensible 
position should a claim, in fact, be made. This paper attempts to give the reader some general 
ideas and practice hints to help avoid malpractice situations in the first place or at least make 
them more defensible if litigation ensues. However, it does not purport to discuss every aspect 
of optometric practice that can result in a claim, to have reviewed every case on the subject or 
present a final definitive statement or law in any given jurisdiction. On the other hand, the 
paper does hope to help the reader understand the general legal theories that are applicable, the 
major areas for potential claims, along with a presentation of illustrative cases, and provide the 
reader with some suggestions to help avoid or minimize any potential litigation. 
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Introduction 
Malpractice -- the very word brings forth to mind a nasty courtroom battle, sleepless nights, 
the toss of a professional reputation or perhaps even shame and guilt. In short, it evokes the vision 
of a living nightmare. On the other hand, there are those who feel that it cannot happen to them; 
only the "bad" doctors have to deal with this. Well, let's face it. Realistically, any optometrist no 
matter how competent can find himself named in a malpractice claim; however, that is no reason to 
despair. If a practitioner has conscientiously maintained proper documentation, exercised due 
caution and upheld the standards of the "prudent practitioner" in the provision of professional eye 
care, then he has already made a substantial step towards a successful defense. Of course, in the 
event of an actual act of "malpractice" the optometrist will be held liable, but the judgment can be 
held to a minimum. In order to build a good defense, the process starts long before a claim is ever 
even made. It is incorporated into the day-to-day practices in an optometric office. This will in no 
way totally eliminate the stress incurred should one be named in a claim; however, it should help 
relieve the panic, despair and the temptation to alter records which could destroy a defense. With 
the knowledge of having taken all the proper precautions in order to provide the most defensible 
position before the claim was even made, the optometrist will be in a better frame of mind and 
better able to assist his insurance company and lawyer to develop the most advantageous defense 
possible, given the circumstances of the particular case. 
Scope and Purpose 
The approach of this paper is primarily a literature review, along with an examination of some 
of the more relevant cases. This paper does not purport to review all the cases on the subject nor 
does it purport to present a final definitive statement or law in any particular jurisdiction. It is 
hoped that it will give the optometrist some general ideas and practice hints to help avoid 
malpractice claims or at least make them more defensible if he is unfortunate enough to have a 
claim or suit brought against him. An attempt is made to examine areas that frequently cause 
claims, as well as others which have a greater potential for claims and suits such as contact lenses 
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and pharmaceutical agents. Non-technical areas which have caused malpractice suits like 
abandonment of patients during a continuing course of treatment, failure to refer in a timely 
manner and liability for the acts of employees, technicians and other professionals will also be 
explored. 
Malpractice is a subject that evokes a great deal of subjectivity and emotionalism, as well as, 
unfortunately, a certain amount of what can only be called ignorance arising from the lack of 
proper perspective. Some articles in optometric and medical journals have been written with the 
assumption that whatever happened to that particular practitioner is the only thing likely to 
happen to anyone with a similar claim or suit. This has prompted literature such as "How I Won 
My Malpractice Case"; the optometrist lives through the nightmare, but is not in control of the 
defense of the case. 1 The outcome is primarily a product of the work by the investigators, lawyers 
and insurance companies. 
Other articles indicate that malpractice simply cannot be a problem for optometrists because 
the area of risk is much narrower than the general practice of medicine. 2 One article took the 
position that since the oldest jurisdiction permitting use of therapeutic drugs by optometrists had 
only two or three tried cases in the eight years since the law was passed, this area of practice is not 
a problem for malpractice. This is fallacious because it fails to take into consideration the 
following normal delays. Most large plaintiff's personal injury firms who file malpractice suits 
against professionals do not actually file a lawsuit until just before the statute of limitations has 
run, usually two or three years after the occurrence is known to the patient. In many 
jurisdictions, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the patient realizes he is 
injured, instead of the day the act took place (although there are exceptions). 3 After the filing of 
the suit there are delays that can range from one to five years before trial depending on how 
crowded the local courts are. In addition, only 10% of the suits filed are actually tried. After the 
case is tried, the decision, although readily available for public inspection at the courthouse, is not 
published in the law libraries and thus considered in legal literature and briefs for other cases. 
Only appellate decisions are published in the law books. Some insurance companies do circulate 
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copies of part of the cases that they feel are unusual to their own employees, but on the whole, the 
"law books" represent the appeals from those cases. Furthermore, very few of the cases are 
appealed, as it is an expensive process. Insurance companies usually pay the judgment if it is not a 
totally outrageous amount. The appeal process itself takes another one to two years. 
Add to these factors the fact that of all medical malpractice cases filed, typically two-thirds are 
won by the defendant doctor and the result is that if you add up the time delays and the percentage of 
cases that are likely to show up in appellate court reports in a law library, one can soon see that 
there are perhaps only two or three percent of filed suits that will ever appear in the law books.4 
Additionally, these will only appear five to nine years after the injury has been discovered which 
may be some time after the act of malpractice actually occurred. Therefore, articles taking solace 
in the fact that TPAs have been in effect for eight years in a small population state and from the fact 
that there have been only three reported lawsuits, simply do not have a valid sample from which to 
draw the conclusion. It will take time to determine the effect that therapeutic drugs have on the 
number and type of claims filed. 
The contribution the optometrist can make to reducing his own malpractice problem, and the 
problems of the profession in general, fall into two or three areas. Optometrists should make sure 
that they adhere to the standards of treatment, especially in the area of therapeutic drugs. They can 
avoid another classic mistake made by the medical profession in the early days such as cover-ups 
and altering records, which is always fatal when it comes out in the courtroom. As a wise judge 
once said, "fraud vitiates all". 4 If you are caught in a lie during a trial, you are almost in a 
situation where you might as well hand the other party a blank check. 
Malpractice is a matter of state law and will differ from state to state in the details. As was 
stated earlier, it is not the purpose of this paper to define the law in any particular jurisdiction, 
nor is it to write a detailed legal book or define the bottom line of the case law in a particular 
jurisdiction. The reader should resist the temptation to use this paper to "solve" a particular 
pending claim or case. Nevertheless, it is essential that the optometrist do a little "thinking like a 
lawyer" in understanding the basis of the legal system in order to be better prepared should he be 
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named in a claim. 
Different Types of Legal Theories That Can Result 
In a Malpractice Judgment Against an Optometrist 
As is true in the general field of medical malpractice, the fact that a procedure is not successful 
or that it leads to horrible results such as death or blindness, does not in and of itself impose 
liability on the professional attempting the procedure. 4 The question is whether the professional 
carried out the treatment in a non-negligent, professionally competent manner within the 
standards imposed by the law on professionals of all types. It is also important to note that the legal 
standards are somewhat like the Bible. They are a little vague so that they remain flexible, and 
they are dependent upon the facts of each particular case. Nevertheless, they are standards, 
although they are not black and white. 
It should also be remembered that the standards of legal liability are set by the legal system and 
the constitutional principles applied through the judicial system. No profession or any other group 
of people is allowed to get together and decide itself what its own legal standards will be. The 
standard is negligence (plus some others which will be discussed later). Negligence is basically a 
matter of the "due care" a reasonable person, qualified in the profession, would exercise under the 
circumstances. 3 However, in order for you to be negligent, it must be foreseeable that an injury 
to someone could occur, if you did not act reasonably and exercise the due care required by the 
circumstances. 
These points become particularly evident in a case like Helling v. Carev 83 W.2d 514, 519 
P2d 981 (Su. Ct. Wash., 1974). The injured plaintiff first saw the defendant ophthalmologists, 
who were partners, in 1959, when she was 22 years old and the diagnosis was myopia. There were 
a total of 11 visits between October of 1959 and October of 1968. At that time, the plaintiff, then 
32 years old, was diagnosed as having primary open angle glaucoma. She had essentially lost her 
peripheral vision and her central vision was reduced to approximately five degrees vertical by ten 
degrees horizontal. Her lOP had never been tested during all this time. 
At trial, the defendant ophthalmologists attempted to defend on the basis that the standard of 
practice under which ophthalmologists operated at the time was that patients under 40 need not 
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have their lOP checked because the incidence of glaucoma below that age was one in 25,000, 
whereas it was 2-3 percent of the population above that age. This was virtually the only issue 
when the case was appealed before the Washington Supreme Court. 
The specific issue as stated by the Supreme Court of Washington was: 
The issue is whether the defendant's compliance was the standard of the profession 
of ophthalmology, which does not require the giving of routine pressure tests to 
persons under 40 years of age, should insulate them from liability under the 
facts of this case, where the plaintiff had lost a substantial amount of vision due 
to the failure of the defendants to timely give the pressure test to the plaintiff. 
Several doctors testified that this was in fact the standard for ophthalmologists at the time. The 
Supreme Court of Washington stated, however: 
The one person, the plaintiff in this instance, is entitled to the same protection 
as afforded to persons over 40, essential for the timely detection of the evidence 
of glaucoma where it can be arrested to avoid the grave and devastating result 
of this disease. It's a simple pressure test, relatively inexpensive. There's no 
judgment factor involved, and there's no doubt that by giving the test that the 
evidence of glaucoma can be detected. 
The Court relied on the 1903 United States Supreme Court case of Texas & Pac. Rv. v. Behvmer 
189 U.S. 468, at 470, 23 S. Ct. 622, at 623 (1903), where that court stated: 
What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought 
to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence (negligence in 
professional care) whether it usually is complied with or not. 
The court also relied on the case of LJ. Hooper 60 F.2d 737, at 740 (U.S. Circuit of Appeals--
2nd Circuit, 1932): 
... a whole calling may be unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices. 
It never may set its own tests .... Courts must in the end say what is required; there 
are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse 
their omission. 
The Washington Supreme Court in the Helling case held: 
Under the facts of this case, reasonable prudence required the timely giving of the 
pressure test to this plaintiff. . .. , it is the duty of the courts to say what is 
required to protect patients under 40 from the damaging results of glaucoma. 
This case is widely cited in non-legal literature as being the first time in which a court has 
imposed a specific practice standard. The real point is that the profession cannot by its own actions 
decide, in effect, to write off a certain group of potential patients (in this case, glaucoma patients 
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under the age of 40) and do it without any potential liability. The legal standard of care applies to 
examination and care of all patients, even though, it is a relatively weak standard. 
In the Helling case a large factor was the ease of giving the test and the fact that no great 
professional acumen was required in order to interpret the results. As for it being the first case 
imposing a professional standard of practice, that is not true either. The case of Shives v. 
Chamberlain 168 Or 676 126 Pac. 2nd 28, involved similar facts where a patient over 50 was 
suffering from glaucoma. Testimony as to the professional practice standard in court stated that the 
approved method at that time of testing eyes to determine whether glaucoma is present was by use of 
a tonometer, and the defendant made no such test. 
As in the Helling case, there had been an extended period during which the symptoms of 
glaucoma in the form of blurring and impaired vision had been apparent, and the plaintiff's eyesight 
was growing steadily worse. There were repeated visits for 14 months to the defendant. Six 
months after the last visit to the defendant, the plaintiff consulted a second ophthalmologist, who 
diagnosed his condition as glaucoma and was able to arrest the progress of the deteriorating 
condition. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 
The lesson to be learned from all this is twofold. Do not ignore past history or one may be 
doomed to repeat prior mistakes at great expense and the best defense is high quality practice, 
reasonableness, and common sense with respect to the patient's rights. Note the emphasis that the 
Washington Supreme Court placed in the Helling case on the simplicity of the test, the lack of 
unusual expertise required to interpret its results, and its low cost. With respect to malpractice, 
one can learn from the mistakes made by the physicians over the last 25 years rather than go ahead 
and make all the mistakes again. 
Let's now examine the legal standards of care and theories which can result in a malpractice 
judgment being imposed upon an optometrist. The normal negligence rule concerns "that degree of 
care that an ordinary man would use under substantially the same or similar circumstances" (i.e., 
reasonableness) and in fact, these standards apply to every member of society. 3 The basic concept 
is that of fault and the fact that there is no liability without fault. Fault arises from an intentional 
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or negligent act which causes an injury, with a few exceptions like agency liability. 
Aaencv Liability -- In general, that which a person can legally do himself, he can legally do 
through another, called an agent,3 except that he cannot "lend" a professional license to another 
unlicensed person to permit him to practice the profession. An agent is essentially an employee, or 
a partner or someone whom one authorizes to do something in one's place who is not a true, 
independent contractor as defined by law. Insofar as optometrists are concerned, the courts can 
impose liability on the person, known as a principal (the optometrist), who employs an agent in 
several potential areas. There can be an agency relationship between the optometrist and other 
professionals such as another optometrist, a partner, an optician or technician. In the agency 
situation, a principal or employer is liable for any mistakes which constitute malpractice or 
negligence made by his employee or agent, even though the principal himself has done nothing 
wrong. He may also be directly liable for his negligence in hiring an imcompetent agent, failing to 
supervise adequately, or knowingly permitting non-professional agents to carry out professional 
activities. Agency liability concerning non-professionals and employees refers to people outside 
the profession, such as the receptionist. Serious legal problems can arise when these 
non-professional individuals are improperly delegated professional functions. A common situation 
is the receptionist who, with or without the knowledge of her optometrist employer, gives 
professional advice to patients or tells patients that she is sure they do not have an emergency and 
can wait until the optometrist comes back from vacation instead of being referred to another 
optometrist or ophthalmologist. 
In many jurisdictions, the professional duties themselves are regarded as "non-delegatable 
duties," which, if they are in fact delegated to a non-professional, automatically makes the 
optometrist liable for the consequences. 3 The employee will also be liable for the same injury, but 
that does not make the employer optometrist any less liable. Furthermore, since the person who 
wins a lawsuit against two defendants can collect from whomever he pleases (not 50-50, but in 
whatever portions he desires), he will usually collect from the person who is more able to pay the 
judgment--namely the optometrist. 
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If there is actual or apparent authority on the part of the employee or agent, even in a situation 
where he is not actually authorized, this will impose liability on the optometrist. Apparent 
authority arises from, in effect, clothing the person with the trappings of being a professional. The 
trappings may be nothing but the professional office itself. If the subject matter of the negligent 
act or omission is within the scope of the profession, then there may be "apparent authority".3 
However, if the activity of the agent is so far beyond the scope of what could be apparent authority, 
then the employer or principal will not be liable. 
The great legal trap which the medical profession has fallen into in the past was that if you have 
something which is clearly beyond the apparent authority of the receptionist, but not so far beyond 
the subject matter of the treatment given in the office, and in fact that advice, recommendation, or 
other act of negligence is given without review by the doctor or optometrist, it will become 
authorized if subsequently the optometrist or the physician engages in a cover-up. In one of these 
situations, candor and prompt action by the professional to rectify the situation is the only solution. 
It will at least hold down the size of the claim. The agency situation, then, is one of liability without 
personal fault on behalf of the professional, if sued. When you authorize someone to do something 
for you, you in effect make their mistakes, yours. 
Product Liabilitv -- Other exceptions to the "no liability without fault" principle arise in the 
product liability field where there is warranty liability. Such product liability or warranty 
liability is usually limited to defective products. Thus, the fact that a product is "defective" is 
sufficient to impose liability. The injured patient does not have to also prove the defect was caused 
by someone's negligence. 3 ·5 Therefore, this product liability is sometimes called "strict 
liability". 3 The "strict liability" for defective products may be applicable to the optometrist 
when he is dispensing glasses and other products. A very minor and rare exception is the so-called 
warranty of workmanlike conduct, which has practically never been seen in malpractice cases.3 
Therefore, one can probably safely conclude that the primary area of liability for an optometrist, 
when it comes to services, as distinguished from products is negligence or professional liability 
{the normal malpractice standards). 
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Strict Liability -- "Strict liability" without reference to "defective products" is the third 
exception to the no liability without fault principle. It relates to certain extremely hazardous 
activities such as the keeping of explosives, building a dam to hold water, etc. 3 It is almost never 
applicable to malpractice, although Judge Utter of the Washington Supreme Court in the Helling 
case suggested that that was what the court was really doing in that case. 
Professional Liabilitv -- Liability with proven fault includes, of course, liability for 
professional services. The professional standard of care includes the normal elements of negligence 
with one modification. In general, negligence requires that the defendant failed to exercise ordinary 
care (namely, that "due care" which a reasonable person would exercise under the same or similar 
circumstances), that the failure to do so was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and that 
the injury caused damages. 3 There are occasions where negligence exists, but no one is really 
injured. In the case of professional liability, the first element is modified to use one of two common 
rules. The first is the so-called community standard of care and is in reality a weak standard. The 
second is the so-called "prudent physician" standard and it is not limited to the local community. It 
has been adopted in Washington in the last several Supreme Court cases, and it is the trend in many 
other states. For example, a statement of the standard based on the so-called community or locality 
rule by the California Appellate Court was as follows: 
[A physician has the] duty to possess that degree of learning and skill ordinarily 
possessed by physicians and surgeons of good standing, practicing in the same or 
similar locality and under similar circumstances. 
It is his further duty to use the care ordinarily exercised in like cases by 
reputable members of the profession, practicing in the same or similar locality, 
under similar circumstances, and to use reasonable diligence and his best 
judgment in the exercise of his skill and the application of his learning in an 
effort to accomplish the purpose for which he was employed. 
Rainier v Buena Vista Community Hospital 18-Cal. App 3d 240 (Cal. 1971). 
This rule is the majority rule and has been for many years. However, in some jurisdictions, 
instead of switching to a more definitive and practical standard such as the Washington rule (or the 
so-called prudent physician rule) which applies statewide, the courts have retained the old rule 
but expanded the definition of the community or locality to include at least the whole state and 
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occasionally the entire nation. For example, in the West Virginia case of Hundley v. Martinez. 158 
S.E.2d 159 (W. Va., 1967}, the community rule was established in West Virginia by the testimony 
of a New York ophthalmologist as to what was good practice during cataract surgery. The details of 
what constitutes the practice standard within these duties of care for the exact test or procedure at 
issue in the case, is always presented by the expert testimony of somebody within the profession 
during the case. Thus, it is not dependent on things such as written practice standards, although 
they are evidence leading to what the local standard is, as in the Helling case. 
One trap to watch out for is that some courts, again instead of shifting like Washington has to 
the prudent physician standard, have no longer confined the definition of the practice standard to the 
opinion of someone in the same profession. For example, pathologists have been allowed to testify 
as to what is good surgical practice when they have actually had experience observing operations 
and testing tissue afterwards in cases involving surgeons. 4 
The State of Washington in three recent Supreme Court cases has adopted a new standard, that of 
the so-called "prudent physician". The standard is the failure to exercise that degree of care that 
would be exercised by a "prudent physician" anywhere in the State of Washington and it is not 
limited to the local community. Since the "prudent man" standard is the standard for negligence for 
anything other than professional liability, the prudent physician standard is practically the same 
thing. It also avoids many of the traps and problems that arose under the old community rule. 
Let's look at it realistically. In some remote communities which are unattractive to live in and 
which have a difficult time attracting doctors, the community standard of care can be rather poor 
simply because no one with experience might ever stay for more than a year or two. A second 
bizarre problem is a community with only one doctor in the particular specialty. Who do you 
compare his practice to in order to determine whether or not he was negligent? These situations 
have helped to shift the standard away from the old community rule. 
WarrantY LiabilitY -- As noted above, this is another legal theory under which one may be 
liable for a portion of one's practice. With only one small exception, which is rarely used, 
warranty liability arises from and only from the sale of a product. 3 This, of course, can affect 
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the optometrist if he engages in the direct sale of glasses, frames, contact lenses, solutions, etc. 
One should assume that if one sells products as a part of one's practice, one may be subject to 
warranty liability, because as negligence applies to all activities of an individual that might result 
in injury or damage, so also does warranty liability apply to the sale of virtually any product. It is 
virtually never applied to the sale of services, although in some jurisdictions a case-law-developed 
or common law "breach of warranty of workmanlike services" has occasionally been imposed. 3 I 
have not seen this in medical malpractice cases or in a case involving an optometrist. However, 
this paper does not purport to have researched every last case. 
Breach of warranty simply means allowing a defective product to reach the marketplace. The 
manufacturer, the wholesaler and the retailer are equally liable. It does not matter how careful the 
parties were in trying to prevent a defective product from reaching the marketplace. If, in fact, 
the defective product did reach the marketplace and as a result someone was injured, then there is 
liability. 3 The exact types of defects which violate specific warranties, imposed by law, is beyond 
the scope of this paper. In the case of an optometrist dispensing glasses in his own office instead of 
simply providing prescriptions the patient fills elsewhere, he is exposing himself to some degree of 
warranty liability. This type of liability was first developed from case law to protect the innocent 
purchaser from hidden defects in products that he purchased. With respect to the matter of 
dispensing products, the professional standard of care is irrelevant. The care used by the 
optometrist, if the defective product actually reached the patient, is also irrelevant. There is only 
one major defense in a warranty case and that is misuse of the product itself, or simply 
establishing that the product is not defective. 
There are several types of warranties in different jurisdictions, but basically the common 
ones include "merchantability" (whether the product is generally salable or not) and 
"fitness-for-purpose warranty" (which is relevant in a situation where the wrong product is sold 
to the customer). 3 The Uniform Commercial Code statutes added the so-called "descriptive 
warranty" wherein any representation, description or appearance from a sample shown prior to 
purchase of the product by the patient provides a guarantee that the product will meet those 
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specifications, description or sample when he receives his ultimate product. Failure to meet those 
exact descriptions or representations or to be substantially the same as the sample will lead to 
breach of warranty liability. 3 A particular product sold with an optometric service could 
potentially be deemed as a product subject to the warranty laws. 
A brief comment needs to be made with respect to the joint liability of the retailer, wholesaler 
and manufacturer. The optometrist is, in effect, the retailer if he dispenses the product; if he does 
not dispense the product, but simply furnishes a prescription. there probably is no warranty 
liability except in the rare exception of the states that impose a warranty of workmanlike services. 
The injured party can sue any or all of those three defendants; and once one is sued, assuming that 
the proper procedural maneuvers are made within the right timetables of the local court rules, the 
other two can be brought in. For example, if a claim was made based upon the dispensing of a 
defective pair of frames (sold for industrial or sport purposes and did not meet federal standards) 
and only the optometrist is sued, the manufacturer can be brought in if the case involved an 
inherent defect in the product. 
Large responsible manufacturers generally are well prepared to defend these types of cases, 
and do so in order to protect the salability of their products. They generally take over the defense 
on behalf of all parties, so the optometrist, though he may have been the first and only defendant, 
may find himself to be almost a sideline witness in the case. if for example, a major ophthalmic 
manufacturer becomes the defendant and the allegation is that their product has an inherent defect 
which, when given to a patient, breaches the warranty (since it is a defective product). 
It should be remembered that because one of the parties subjected to joint liability is liable, 
does not automatically prevent the others from being sued. Anyone can be sued for anything, and 
then has to undertake the burden of going into court and trying to defeat the lawsuit, either by 
dismissal through motions to dismiss or summary judgment, or actual trial of the case. 3 If a case 
is concluded in favor of an injured party, and that party receives a verdict and judgment against 
more than one defendant, the law does not stipulate from whom the injured party, who now holds a 
judgment, can satisfy his judgment. In short, he can get all from one party, jointly from two or 
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more parties, or however he pleases. 
Naturally, in a warranty case if the manufacturer is held liable, along with the retailer and the 
wholesaler, most successful plaintiffs will collect the judgment from the manufacturer, especially 
if it is a large sum. They know the company has enough money to satisfy it, frequently has 
insurance and it does not involve potentially having to liquidate property at greatly reduced prices 
in order to satisfy the judgment, which can be a self-defeating process and run further legal fees. 
The latter could happen if a plaintiff went after an optometrist who has little or no assets (just 
started in practice or something of that nature) and for some unknown reason ignores his option of 
simply collecting from the manufacturer who put out a defective product. Many people think that if 
they are held liable with another party in a malpractice case that the successful plaintiff is 
restricted to getting 50 percent from each party, but generally, this is simply not true, absent 
special statutes, limited to a few specific types of cases in some states. 
A good practice hint for an optometrist who dispenses optical materials, when the materials 
themselves injure a person and it is claimed that there is an inherent defect in the materials (not 
necessarily a situation where the only injury was caused by a modification made by the 
optometrist), is that he would be well advised to get his own lawyer, aside and apart from the 
insurance company lawyers (especially if the claim is large), and immediately consider putting the 
manufacturer on notice that he intends to bring them into any potential lawsuit. In most instances, 
with a responsible manufacturer, this will provide free legal services and expert witnesses that 
the individual could not afford in order to defend the case. In some cases it may produce a successful 
"tender of defense", which is a situation wherein the defendants agree among themselves that the 
party who was first sued is not liable and therefore one of the other parties completely takes over 
all of the liability of the person (the optometrist in this instance) who was initially sued. 3 
In a bad case (one with very serious permanent injuries) or in a case where there is a risk 
that the recovery could exceed insurance limits, do not rely solely on the attorneys provided by the 
insurance company. This is especially true in a bad case at the very beginning because some of 
these maneuvers have to be made long before a trial begins. This does not mean that all of the legal 
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work is duplicated all the way through. Have a competent trial attorney review your situation 
initially and advise you as to what should be done. 
Insurance -- One aside at this point is necessary and that pertains to the subject of insurance. 
This paper does not involve an exhaustive analysis of professional "errors and omissions 
insurance" and the conflicts of interest that can develop between the optometrist and the insurance 
company after an injury has occurred. A situation can occur where the case is clearly one of 
liability and there is really no defense whatsoever, but the insurance company may want to go to 
trial because the last settlement demanded by the injured party is so high that they view it as 
outrageous, even though it is well within the policy limits. In this instance, the policy rarely is 
worded in such a manner as to allow the optometrist to insist on a settlement and a very high payout 
in order to avoid the bad publicity of a prolonged trial. At the other extreme, a conflict of interest 
between the optometrist and his insurance company can also arise in a situation where the claim is 
fairly small {the injured party has offered to settle for a few thousand dollars), but there is no 
real ground for liability. Insurance companies are notorious for settling these kinds of cases. 5 
The problem is especially evident when it involves a case that could easily have been won and the 
insurance company is solely trying to avoid $10,000 or $15,000 of attorney's fees on a case that 
they can settle for $5000. This can, of course, result in damage to the reputation of a perfectly 
innocent optometrist. 
In general, insurance companies do have the right to settle over the objections of the insured, 
since it is their money that is involved. There is some trend towards better insurance policies and 
in a few instances where a professional medical society has formed its own insurance company only 
to insure its members, the problems are greatly diminished. 4 
The other major danger area with respect to insurance for professional liability is the 
situation where the case has a potential for exceeding the limits of the policy. In a lawsuit, the 
injured party has his "day in court" or trial only once (which of course is not literally one day) 
and he must recover, on that occasion, for all the damages caused by the injury including future 
medical costs, lost wages, any special care that is required because of the injury, etc. 3 He cannot 
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come back after a judgment has been entered and get a second trial because there were further 
medical costs. If those numbers added together, plus some allowance for pain and suffering allowed 
in the particular jurisdiction, come anywhere near the policy limits, the optometrist should hire 
his own lawyer immediately, because his interest and that of the insurance company will soon 
diverge with disastrous results. 4 An old rule of thumb that has been used by some defense lawyers 
(which may or may not work in a particular case) is to add all of the so-called damages listed above 
and multiply by three. If the number is close to the policy limits, then it is highly advisable to 
obtain your own defense, in addition to the insurance company's. This will cost additional money, of 
course, but otherwise things can happen during the trial of the case that will cause a huge burden to 
fall on you which the insurance company will not resist very much because their liability is 
limited and yours is unlimited. 
In summary, some specific areas which have imposed liability for defective products or 
warranty liability upon ophthalmologists and optometrists include: failure to use appropriate 
materials (like frames) for a person who in the case history informed the doctor that he 
participates in high-risk sports such as racquetball and tennis which do not actually meet the 
applicable ANSI standards even though they may be advertised as "sporty" or appropriate for 
sports; failure to inspect materials actually dispensed; and, of course, failure to actually dispense 
safety glasses in compliance with ANSI standards. In these cases, be sure to recall what was said 
about the trap of the descriptive warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code. "Sports glasses" 
and "safety glasses" must meet the ANSI standards or they are defective if they are used in these 
areas. 
Battety Liability -- Another possible area for liability involves "battery" which is defined as 
any non-consensual contact with a person's body or any extensions thereof, such as clothing or even 
an automobile, with the exception of ordinarily accepted contacts in society. 3 One cannot sue 
someone for battery on a crowded sidewalk because their coat brushed yours. This form of liability 
is relevant in the context of this paper in that any non-consensual procedure involves battery 
liability, as does the use of drugs. 
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A doctrine of informed consent in medical situations defines when the battery becomes 
consensual and therefore no longer a battery. Basically, in any procedure or drug situation it is 
essential that the patient be fully informed of all of the common risks, complications and possible 
side effects that he may be exposed to in language that he can easily understand (not technical 
jargon). In addition to disclosing the risks, the patient should also be given some idea of the 
probability for their occurrence and be made aware of any individual characteristics that may 
increase the risks to that patient. 4 This is one of the major areas where optometrists can avoid 
massive problems if they do not make the mistakes that medical doctors have made in the past. Even 
today true informed consent, in an understandable and realistic manner so that the patient can make 
a conscious decision with full knowledge of the facts, is still seldom accomplished in a medical 
situation. Frequently there is little or no disclosure of the side effects of medications or definition 
of the scope of the particular side effect problems for the particular patient in light of his medical 
condition. 4•7 In the states with therapeutic drug laws this is a very important point. Optometrists 
need to be careful and make sure that informed consent is provided concerning TPA drugs, as well as 
diagnostic drugs. The medical profession has definitely made mistakes in this area of informed 
consent and has had liability imposed in situations where there was really no problem with the 
competency of the procedures otherwise. Let's not make the same mistakes. 
Some professional articles and lectures with respect to the doctrine of informed consent have 
stated that informed consent need not be given in regard to some procedures (such as contact lens 
fitting or the type of lens used for a particular patient) as to risks because others in the community 
do not. Full disclosure and informed consent will have to be given as to any substantial risks. 8 It 
is already true, regardless of the standard applied, that in the area of drugs there are no exceptions 
to the informed consent rule. Basically, the safe assumption is that there are no exceptions in any 
area of practice unless the risk is such that it simply has never occurred or is very insignificant in 
its consequences. 
It should be noted that battery liability is the only area of liability that is both civil and 
criminal that has been discussed in this paper. 3 In other words, if a battery such as a 
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non-consensual procedure or drug is used, it is possible in a case of a very severe injury that the 
optometrist could go to jail, as well as having to pay monetary damages in a civil suit, although this 
is highly unlikely to occur. A drug case with no disclosure of risks whatsoever, where one of the 
risk factors was unusually high for the patient because of a known particular condition the patient 
had, and that results in total blindness, could be such a bad case, especially if the injured party 
were a young person or a professional who could not continue to perform in his profession if he 
were no longer sighted. In theory, there may be a reckless disregard for the safety of the patient. 
Breach of Contract Liabilitv -- This is yet another area that can concern the optometrist. A 
contract is basically any agreement or representation upon which the parties may agree or upon 
which the other party may justifiably rely to his detriment. Implied-in-fact contracts arise even 
though neither party intends them to be "contracts". 3 Of course, contracts may be oral as well as 
written. In short, any oral representation or promise as to benefits of the treatment, or any end 
results of the treatment, impose contract liability on the person making such representations and 
may also create a descriptive warranty liability under the Uniform Commerical Code as described 
earlier, if products are involved. 3 
In addition to these quasi-contractual representations that cannot be fulfilled, there are 
ancillary matters with respect to the practice that can impose breach of contract liability, such as 
unauthorized release of patient medical data or records. The optometrist, of course, should be sure 
that he has any authorization to release in writing from the patient himself, or in the case of a 
minor, his guardian. 
These quasi-contractual liabilities also can arise in the reverse context, that is, where the 
patient is not suing the optometrist, but he desires to prevent the optometrist from testifying in a 
suit that the patient is involved in with a third party with respect to his medical condition. This 
occasionally arises when the other party to a lawsuit subpoenas the optometrist or his records in an 
effort to use some pre-existing condition in the vision record to show that the visual injury in the 
third party accident was not caused by the accident itself. 
Commonly these issues will come up in third party cases involving automobile accidents or 
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workmen's compensation cases. The law is a little muddy on this subject of preventing the 
optometrist from testifying. 9 Some states purport to claim that an optometrist does not have the 
same privilege to refuse to testify, or the patient the right to compel him not to testify, as medical 
doctors. This is a matter that has to be researched currently on the basis of the law in each case, 
and is a changing situation. 
Ancillarv or Third-Par(v Liabili(v -- These cases involve situations where property or 
another person, other than the patient, is injured because of a defective visual product, negligence 
or malpractice on the part of the optometrist. A clear example would be an optometrist brought 
into a suit by the driver of a car who was injured when the patient, who attempted to drive with 
dilated eyes, collided with the other party's car and injured him, and the claim is made that the 
patient was not properly warned not to drive an automobile in this condition. There are also 
third-party cases where property damage may be the result of vision defects not properly 
corrected. 
Statute of Limitations -- This is the maximum period between the time when one is injured by 
malpractice or the time one discovers or should have discovered the injury (depending on the type 
of statute} and the last day you can file suit for that injury. 3 •9 Without a discovery type of 
statute, if a treating doctor causes injury to an eye on a given day and the state has a two-year 
statute of limitations, the patient has exactly two years from that day to file suit or forever be 
barred from filing suit and not be able to recover for the injury. 
The so-called discovery type of statute of limitations is one which runs not from the act that 
caused the injury, but instead from the time of discovery of the injury or the time period within 
which one should have discovered the injury. 3 The reason for this statute of limitations is based on 
the fact that certain injuries may take years before a diagnosis is made, such as for example, a 
carcinogenic chemical or drug that does not result in cancer symptoms until 5-10 years later. 
Obviously, without this type of statute of limitations no one could ever file in these cases; 
practitioners could be as negligent as they wanted to because the statute of limitations would run 
before the symptoms would appear. 
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There are two types of discovery statutes. Some depend on actual discovery, whereas others 
state that it is based on the time period within which one should have discovered the injury. 3 The 
latter type starts running when symptoms are apparent to a layman, even though he may not go to a 
doctor for diagnosis. The former type does not begin to run until the patient is told by a doctor what 
is wrong with him and has had sufficient information to relate it to the act of malpractice. 
In addition, the matter of statute of limitations is complicated by two other factors. In the case 
of malpractice, some statute of limitations which are not the discovery type presume that when a 
long course of treatment is involved, the injury occurred during the last visit to the doctor, if that 
visit involved treatment of any type. 4 This is particularly important in failure to diagnose cases. 
It also has important aspects for optometrists because many states have held that if the patient 
comes back for any purpose other than for treatment and there was no legal duty to treat on that 
visit, then the visit does not count. The statute runs from the previous visits. In many cases 
involving optometrists or physicians, when the patient returns to have glasses fitted a few weeks 
after a vision exam and does not complain of pathology, the doctor probably will not be held liable 
for failure to discover pathology on that visit. On the other hand, during a routine vision exam, you 
need to find any existing pathology or you may well be found liable for failure to diagnose. 
All statutes of limitation, whether or not they involve malpractice, are subject to tolling 
statutes. A tolling statute defines the period of time in the middle of a regular statute of limitations 
that does not count and is subtracted for instance, from the two years in the example stated 
earlier.3 The list of items that tolls a statute of limitations includes non-residence in the state and 
the period of time during which the person is a minor. This, however, is not the gospel in every 
state, but it is typical of many statutes. If a person moves out of the state six months after an 
injury, lives outside the state for one year and then returns to the same state, he may have three 
years to file a suit even though the statute of limitations says two years. In states with a minority 
type of statute of limitations, it may not start to run for a very long time. For example, if a 
pediatrician causes an injury to a six-year-old child, the statute of limitations is two years and a 
person is of age at 18 in that state, it would be 14 years before the statute of limitations runs. Due 
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to the complications and details of various types of statutes and what evidence deems that a condition 
should have been discovered, it would be wise not to count on a statute of limitations before a lawyer 
reviews it and the facts pertaining to the particular case you are facing. 
Further Concerns with Case Examples 
Informed Consent -- Typically, the doctrine of implied consent is thought of in terms of 
written consent forms for major surgical procedures. Actually, the doctrine applies to any form of 
professional health care services, including optometry, and any form of examination, treatment or 
the significant risks of a prescribed drug or certain procedures. 3 .4 While the patient cannot tell 
the optometrist how to practice his profession, the patient is the final arbiter of what is to be done 
to his body. If he insists on omitting items necessary to good optometric practice, the optometrist 
does have the right to suggest that he continue his treatment with another health care professional, 
as long as this is done in a proper manner so as not to constitute abandonment of the patient. 
The "informed" portion of this legal doctrine means the patient must be given all relevant 
information sufficient to have a good factual basis upon which to consent or make a health care 
decision, before he must decide.3.4·5 The relevant information must be explained in layman's 
terms, and all material risks or further tests must be explained to him. An absence of informed 
consent can impose malpractice liability, even if all procedures are properly carried out. One 
simply cannot impose tests, risks, treatment and procedures on a patient without first telling him 
what one is going to do and the potential risks. The patient must have all the necessary information, 
and know to what he is consenting. This was illustrated in the case of Koeaan v. Holv Familv 
Hospital 95 W.2d 306 at 312-321, 622 P.2d 1246 {1980). 
Today, the doctrine has expanded beyond consent to tests and procedures. The optometrist has a 
duty to disclose any abnormality which may indicate risk or danger, as soon the optometrist is 
aware of it {95 W.2d 306 at 314). If the abnormality is indicative of a systemic problem, the 
related condition must be explained to the patient in a timely fashion. Timely means as soon as it is 
discovered. Do not wait until it becomes the "official diagnosis"; just say the matter discovered is 
one which could indicate the condition "x". In the case of Wills v. Klinqenbeck 455 S.2d 806 (Su. 
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Ct. Ala., 1984), which is reviewed elsewhere in this paper in connection with failure to refer to an 
ophthalmologist, the optometrist noticed papilledema, but did not tell the patient that it could be an 
indication of a brain tumor, with disasterous results. The immediate disclosure of abnormalities 
must be made even if the symptoms are "inconclusive". Koegan v. Holv Familv Hospital 95 W.2d 
306 at 315. 
Failure to obtain an informed consent prior to the event, or failure to disclose discovered 
abnormalities immediately upon discovery is not forgiven by the fact that other professionals do not 
disclose until a later time or the old excuse that it was not in the patient's best medical interest to 
disclose a risk. 4 K eagan 95 W.2d 306 at 318 Generally, the disclosure of an abnormality that 
presents any risk or danger requires the disclosure of the risks of the condition, as well as the 
risks of any tests, treatment, and alternative tests or treatment. Koeaan 95 W.2d 306 at 319 
Timeliness of the disclosure is crucial. 
The case of Evers v. Buxbaum 253 F.2d 356 (C.A.D.C., 1958) is illustrative of some of the 
legal requirements. It also illustrates that the optometrist must never let economic or competitive 
factors result in the withholding of material facts from the patient which could put him at risk for 
injury. In that case the plaintiff was "having trouble with his eyes" which he equated to a need for 
glasses. He went to an optical chain for examination and fitting. Their regular optometrist was on 
vacation so one of their opticians arranged for an exam by another optometrist. The doctor 
examined the plaintiff Evers, discovered some "possible pathology", but never told the patient. 
Instead, he reported this finding to the optician and suggested referral to an ophthalmologist or a 
local hospital and prescribed glasses. The optician noted the "possible pathology" in the record, but 
did not tell the patient either. Approximately 120 days later the plaintiff went to a hospital and 
was diagnosed as having a papilloma of the choroid plexus and a tumor was removed. 
The Washington case of Gates v. Jensen 92 W.2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979) involved a 
similar situation where high lOP was not disclosed to the patient, nor was the risk of glaucoma or 
the necessity for a dilated fundus exam or fields. The patient was myopic and 54 years old. Her 
complaints included difficulty in focusing, blurring and gaps in her vision. By the time her 
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glaucoma was discovered two years later, her vision had diminished from 20/20 corrected to 
20/200 corrected. This case also involved misdiagnosis which will be discussed later. Some states 
have defined, specifically, informed consent duties by statute. 
Washington RCW 7.70.050{1 )-(4) provides: 
(1) The following shall be necessary elements of proof that injury resulted from health 
care in a civil negligence case or arbitration involving the issue of the alleged breach of the 
duty to secure an informed consent by a patient or his representatives against a health 
care provider: 
(a) That the health care provider failed to inform the patient of a material fact or 
facts relating to the treatment; 
(b) That the patient consented to the treatment without being aware of or fully 
informed of such material fact or facts; 
(c) That a reasonably prudent patient under similar circumstances would not have 
consented to the treatment if informed of such material fact or facts; 
(d) That the treatment in question proximately caused injury to the patient. 
(2) Under the provisions of this section a fact is defined as or considered to be a material 
fact, if a reasonably prudent person in the position of the patient or his representative 
would attach significance to it deciding whether or not to submit to the proposed treatment. 
(3) Material facts under the provisions of this section which must be established by 
expert testimony shall be either: 
(a) The nature and character of the treatment proposed and administered; 
(b) The anticipated results of the treatment proposed and administered; 
(c) The recognized possible alternative forms of treatment; or 
(d) The recognized serious possible risks, complications, and anticipated benefits 
involved in the treatment administered and in the recognized possible alternative 
forms of treatment, including nontreatment. 
(4) If a recognized health care emergency exists and the patient is not legally competent 
to give an informed consent and/or a person legally authorized to consent on behalf of the 
patient is not readily available, his consent to required treatment will be implied." 
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis. Inc. 98 W.2d 460 at 470-471 
With respect to use of a drug, the courts have held that informed consent requires that the patient 
be told of medical risks that are significant and likely. Smith v. Shannon 100 W.2d 26, 666 P.2d 
351, (1983). 
Fraud and Altered Records -- Unfortunately the body of law pertaining to malpractice claims 
developed around claims against physicians, largely not involving ophthalmologists, and in the 
early years it had a checkered history involving many instances where medical records were 
altered after a malpractice event occurred to either cover-up or fasely create evidence for the 
defendant. 4 Most of these schemes backfired because in most instances there was an outside person 
or an outside portion of the transaction that could be subpoenaed to prove that the record entry did 
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not reflect what actually happened. In addition, in this day and age, nurses and technicians can no 
longer be intimidated into silence and plaintiff's attorneys sue them too if they think they are lying 
and may agree to settle with them separately at no cost if they agree to testify about false record 
entries. It is important to remember that under the law, fraud is both a civil and criminal misdeed 
which means that if caught, the defendant will not only lose his malpractice suit, but may also go to 
jail for criminal fraud. Plus, jail time is also meted out for perjury when the false entries are 
presented in court. 3 
By far the most important reason not to be tempted to alter records is the old judge's maxim, 
"fraud vitiates all". What that means is that if you are caught in one significant lie, the judge and 
jury can decide that all the other evidence that you have put on is not credible and can be ignored. 
The practical effect is to virtually give a blank check to the opposing party in the lawsuit. On the 
other hand, a good set of records reflective of the events that happened can be the most valuable 
evidence in the defense of a malpractice claim. Even if there is something in the record that is 
damaging, a good lawyer can deal with the worst fact situation if he knows in advance the details of 
the negative evidence. 
A simple example of how an altered record that is discovered can cost you everything that is 
won in a case is that of Lanqaqer v. Lake Community Hosojtal 688 F.2d 664 (C.A.9, 1982). The 
case was tried in the Arizona state courts and the defendant doctors and hospital won. A highly 
unusual second suit was filed in federal court. Again, the defendant won based on the statute of 
limitations which in Arizona revolved around a so-called discovery rule which means the statute of 
limitations time period does not begin to run until the patient discovers his injury or had all the 
facts to discover the injury. The plaintiff appealed the federal district court decision to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals judge discovered that the defendant doctors and hospital had 
altered their records to falsely indicate that they had given the plaintiff knowledge of his injury at a 
much earlier date than was true. Thus, they had misled the federal district court into believing that 
the statute of limitations had run, when in fact it had not. Upon discovery of this fraud by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals, the judge was so furious at the doctors and the hospital that he reversed both the 
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state and federal judgments in their favor and gave the plaintiff virtually everything that he 
wanted. 
An example of a conspiracy to cover-up an easily corrected act of malpractice is the case of 
Rudek v. Wright M.D. & Helena Medical Clinic 704 P.2d 621 (Su. Ct. Mont., 1985). In this case 
the surgeon left a sponge in the patient after the operation. Every employee of the medical center 
and the doctors involved when this was discovered, referred to it as the missing sponge. The 
operation in question was a simple hernia operation. The plaintiff was seen 34 times by Dr. Wright 
in the first 90 days post-op and no cause of the continuing infection in the area of the operation was 
ever determined. Twenty days post-op an x-ray was taken which was read and supposedly showed 
nothing. When caught in this lie, both Dr. Wright and a radiologist said that they had misread the 
same x-ray. Finally, the patient was taken to another hospital, x-rayed and the missing sponge was 
found in the second x-ray. The so-called sponge was actually a lap mat measuring 30x30 em 
equipped with an x-ray tag so it would vividly show up in an x-ray should it ever be lost. Of 
course, the first x-ray was subpoenaed and to put it mildly, a radiologist with 20/200 visual 
acuity could have seen it, yet a trained radiologist and the surgeon involved in this case misread this 
x-ray. However, tragically the patient was 7 4 years old and even after the mistake was finally 
discovered, the infection could not be treated successfully and she died 4 1/2 months post-op. 
Obviously, if there had not been a 90-day cover-up, reopening when there was little infection 
immediately after surgery could probably have been accomplished with little risk. Montana is a 
state that is notorious for extremely small judgments. The Montana Superior Court held that the 
surgeon was the "captain of this ship" and was liable for this entire charade, and awarded the lady's 
relatives $75,000. It is obvious that in other states the award could have been many times that 
amount in such an outrageous case. 
The case of Emory Univ. v. Houston 185 Ga. App. 289, 364 S.E.2d 70 (C.A. Georgia, 1987) 
involves a situation where the faculty of the Emory University Medical School formed a partnership 
to practice medicine for their own profit in the university hospital, an arrangement very similar 
to the University of Washington Hospital. The chairman of the Ophthalmological Department of the 
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hospital who was also a faculty member of the medical school operated on a patient's eye and 
performed the surgery on the wrong eye. Under Georgia law, medical peer review committees of a 
certain nature cannot have their records subpoenaed at least until they have prepared their report 
on the surgical procedure being reviewed. Immediately after the operation and in realization of the 
mistake, the doctor sent all of the records to the peer review committee so the patient could not get 
them and prove the mistake. The records of pre-op visits to the surgeon where any recommended 
surgery to one eye (the one not operated on) were altered to indicate that the recommendation was 
for the other eye. In addition, the surgeon extracted the portion of the records of the operation 
itself that indicated proper surgical procedures from the peer review committee, while leaving the 
incriminating portions of the records with the peer review committee where the patient and his 
lawyer could not obtain copies. The surgeon then had the favorable portion of the records 
anonymously printed in the Atlanta Journal/Constitution newspaper, while also keeping the 
damaging portion of the record from public view. 
The Georgia Court of Appeals was not impressed and they decided the records in the hands of the 
peer review committee were not privileged from discovery by the patient no matter what the 
statute on the subject said in the face of such outrageous conduct. The court said that there is " ... no 
reason ... for allowing ... (the surgeon) ... to use the positive findings of the committee to its public 
advantage against the patient while not allowing the injured patient to review them. The privilege 
is meant to be a shield, not a sword or a weapon of offense." 364 S.E.2d 70 at 75. Obviously, the 
moral of the story is that if you are faced with a bad malpractice case, do not turn it into a toal 
disaster by such outrageous conduct. This Court of Appeals decision was handed down before the 
malpractice case was tried. It is quite likely that more people in Atlanta who were prospective 
jurors in the malpractice case read about the court's decision in the Journal/Constitution or heard 
about it on TV than the number of people whose minds were swayed by the propaganda planted in the 
newspaper earlier by the doctors. This is an entree to a record-breaking jury verdict. 
Exceeding Your License-- In a lecture presented a few years back to an AOA meeting by Dr. 
Guillette, chief medical officer of Aetna Insurance Co. and John Pecorino, one of their chief 
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lawyers, these two particularly urged optometrists not to be tempted to engage in activities which 
are not permitted by the optometric licensing laws in their state. There have been instances where 
optometrists have prescribed drugs in a non-TPA state through an arrangemnt with an M.D. who is 
not in a "controlled environment clinic" with the optometrist. If there is an injury, the first effect 
is that as to that case all malpractice insurance is void and he will have to pay that claim or suit 
out of his own pocket. All of the insurance policies provide that they only insure acts which are 
legal under the local licensing law. Secondly, the courts decide in the malpractice case that he is to 
be tested by medical malpractice standards, not optometric standards, so it is much easier to lose 
the malpractice case. In some states, not having the proper license (M.D.} means an automatic loss 
of the malpractice case. Finally, many optometric licensing laws provide that the license can be 
cancelled for gross negligence or malpractice and practicing medicine without a license (M.D.) 
constitutes these, so you also lose your license. The all-over effect is that you lose a malpractice 
case that an M.D. might have been able to win, you have a huge judgment against you with no 
insurance to pay it which may cost you your home and clinic, and lastly, you have no license to 
carry on your own livelihood. 
For example, these points are covered in Kime v. Aetna Casualtv & Suretv Co. 66 Ohio App. 
277, 33 N.E.2d 1008 (C.A. Ohio, 1980}, Kahn v. Shaw 16 S.E.2d 99 (C.A. Georgia, 1941) and 
Everett v. State of Washington. 99 W.2d 264, 661 P.2d 588 (1983}. The last cited case, Everett. 
involved a licensed dentist who for years had been a professor of anesthesiology at the University of 
Washington and had participated in open-heart surgery as an anesthesiologist. Dentists are not 
allowed to practice anesthesiology except in connection with tooth extraction even though he had 
become famous for anesthetizing children during open-heart surgery. 
In the case of Fairchild v. Brian 354 S.2d 675 (C.A. La., 1977), the defendant optometrist, Dr. 
Brian, (who was employed by an HMO) was found guilty of malpractice for failure to timely refer 
a patient to an ophthalmologist. At the HMO when patients called for appointments, a receptionist 
with no medical training decided from the sound of the complaint whether or not it was serious 
enough to be sent to a specialist. In the eye clinic the doctors were listed on a bulletin board with no 
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distinction as to who was an optometrist and who was an ophthalmologist. The appointment makers 
were instructed not to point out these differences to patients either. In December 1973, the 
plaintiff, Mrs. Fairchild, suddenly realized she was having difficulty out of her right eye. She 
called and asked to see an "eye doctor". She was given an admitting slip for January 1974, 
indicating that she was to see a "specialist" who was, in fact, the optometrist, but nothing on the 
paper indicated that he was such. He gave a thorough eye exam and found an opacity in the lens 
which he noted on the chart as "lens changes OD". He saw nothing wrong with the retina of the right 
eye and he diagnosed her condition as early senile cataract. He passed this diagnosis on to the 
plaintiff. She challenged the diagnosis and told him she also had problems with sensitivity to 
sunlight so he recommended that she buy dark glasses. He further advised her that if the cataract 
got worse, it would have to be removed surgically. He testified that he did not examine the 
plaintiff's eyes with a slit lamp because it would require dilation that was prohibited by law. 
There was only one ophthalmologist in the eye clinic of the HMO and because the HMO did not 
want to add another ophthalmologist, there was an internal rule, kept secret from the patients, that 
no patient would be referred to the ophthalmologist until the visual acuity had dropped below 
20/50 or 20/60. He did not refer Mrs. Fairchild to the ophthalmologist. After the January visit, 
she suddenly realized she had no vision at all in the right eye. This time she called in and asked to 
see an ophthalmologist so they changed her regular March appointment accordingly. At that time 
she once again received a slip stating that she was to see a "speciailist". The ophthalmologist told 
her that she did not have a cataract, but that she was in deep trouble; in fact, she had a retinal 
detachment that required immediate surgery. The ophthalmologist then sent her home with 
instructions not to drive, bend, stoop or lift anything over 3-4 lbs. He testified at the trial that 
time at the HMO did not allow him to see any patient with early senile cataracts and that he would 
have normally had the optometrist refer this patient to him within the next 3-6 months, 
considering her visual acuity. 
Mrs. Fairchild underwent surgery for the long-standing (ascertained by the demarcation lines) 
retinal detachment and was also treated for von Hippei-Lindau disease. The latter condition caused 
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another detachment which required a second surgery. However, some residual detachment still 
existed and the plaintiff was unlikely to ever regain normal vision in that eye. The court found that 
the optometrist had exceeded his license when he had diagnosed cataracts and "treated" them with 
dark glasses and had failed to refer her to an ophthalmologist. By this action he was, therefore, 
subject to the same rules relating to the duty of care and liability as the ophthalmologist. This 
negligence caused a retinal detachment to not be discovered until it was too late to save the sight of 
the eye. The point this case makes is that the scope of optometry permitted under the particular 
state's licensing laws cannot be exceeded without potentially being found to be practicing medicine 
and held to those standards, instead of an optometric standard, should a claim be made. 
General Practical Hints 
The remaining sections of this paper discuss various general practical hints that may help 
minimize the possibility of a claim in a number of aspects of optometric care. They are offered 
merely as suggestions, not as a statement of how to practice optometry or manage the office. The 
following discussion mentions potential sources for claims and suggestions to help bolster a defense 
in the event of litigation. This paper does not purport to list every detail nor to discuss every 
potential area where a claim could be made. These sections are not necessarily based upon any 
particular cases or decisions made within any specific jurisdiction. Rather, they are ideas 
presented to the reader for consideration and to stimulate thought on the reader's part of how he 
might minimize or eliminate possibilities of claims being made within his own office. Illustrative 
cases in certain areas are included to give the reader an idea of how courts have ruled in the past 
and to help identify the major problem areas up to this point in time. 
Contact Lenses -- Potential liability is associated with every aspect of the fitting, follow-up care 
and continued regular vision service for the contact fens patient and the optometrist should keep 
this in mind as he manages this patient population. Proper patient selection is very important in 
terms of minimizing risks of liability. Before recommending contact lenses to a patient the 
optometrist needs to evaluate all of the information obtained during the examination to ensure that 
contact lenses are, in fact, an advisable option for the patient. Does the individual display 
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reasonable dexterity to be able to handle contact lenses? Are there any significant indications that 
the patient would disregard lens hygiene altogether or fail to comply with minimum lens handling 
and cleaning and cooperation to permit necessary follow-up services? Does the patient work or 
spend a significant amount of time in an environment where contact lenses are inappropriate such 
as a chemical lab with noxious fumes or an outdoor occupation in dry, dusty environs? Has the 
exam revealed any current ocular conditions that contraindicate the use of contact lenses or make a 
certain lens design a poor choice for refractive correction? Any systemic disease or medication 
elicited in the case history that may affect the eye or be exaggerated by contact lens wear must be 
considered. It should also be established whether there has been any prior sensitization or allergy 
to an ingredient (preservative or cleaning agent) in a solution necessary in the care of the lenses to 
be prescribed. 
Fitting -- The fitting process can also be fraught with potential sources for litigation. First 
of all, the patient should be instructed about the risks and benefits of contact lens wear in general 
and certain types (hard, soft, gas permeable} in particular, the responsibilities he will have to 
assume as a patient, the time involved in follow-up care and a brief description of what will happen 
during the fitting process (when a diagnostic trial fit is performed}. Also, the realistic probability 
of success with contact lenses, any prevalent conditions or borderline findings found during the 
exam and other alternatives to contact lenses (such as spectacles and bifocals) should be discussed 
with the patient prior to contact lens fitting. If bifocal contact lenses are to be prescribed, the 
patient needs to be informed of the different types, the risks and benefits as compared to bifocal 
spectacles and particularly in the case of monovision contact lenses, the individual must be warned 
about the likely decrease in depth perception, peripheral vision and compromised visual acuity 
(especially while driving or operating equipment). 10 Tinted contact lenses, particularly when 
they cover the pupillary area, can diminish night vision and this information must be passed on to 
the patient. In the case of extended wear lenses, the increased risks of corneal infections, ulcers 
and other corneal complications with these lenses should be impressed upon the patient. 11 • 12 In 
any of these situations, whether it be regular daily wear or a special lens design, avoid making 
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direct or implied guarantees of either the materials or services. If the optometrist does, he may be 
held to it by a court. Hence, do not promise the patient a successful contact lens fit. 
If the practitioner is a registered clinical investigator for a contact lens company, he needs to 
obtain an informed consent from the patient. 13 The purpose and procedure must be adequately 
described, the experimental nature explained, the potential risks, discomfort and benefits expected 
need to be stated, as well as the alternative procedures that are available and the fact that the 
patient may withdraw consent and not continue with the project at any time. In this case there 
should be a signed written informed consent and one copy given to the patient while the other is 
retained in the patient's file. In the other instances, a written informed consent is not necessarily 
mandatory (although there should be documentation in the record that the risks and benefits were 
discussed with the patient and patient responses should be noted), but it is advisable. These written 
forms should not contain any statements waiving the patient's legal rights or any other exculpatory 
language. In addition, they should be written in layman's terms and not in optometric jargon so no 
question can be posed as to whether there was valid, understandable informed consent (examples of 
contact lens forms are included in Appendix A). Another form specifying the fee schedule, refund 
policy and what services will be provided and signed by the patient is recommended to avoid any 
possible misconceptions regarding payment. 14 Finally, a fitting technique and/or lens selection 
that is too individualistic can potentially be considered as too great a departure from the accepted 
methods and should be utilized with caution. 13 
The potential liability that may be incurred during the diagnostic fit include corneal abrasions, 
injury to the cornea or sclera during lens application or removal or an allergic or chemical 
sensitivity to a contact lens solution ingredient. The best way to minimize this potential source is 
to inform the patient of the remote possibility of this occurring and also making sure that visual 
acuities and any prior ocular conditions, particularly any staining or corneal scars, are 
documented as present before any contact lens is applied. 
Disoensing -- The crucial aspect during dispensing is patient education and failure to 
adequately carry this out can have serious legal implications. To begin with, an appropriate 
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wearing schedule designating the number of hours the contact lenses are to be worn each day and the 
appropriate increase in wearing time need to be stated verbally, as well as in written form on a 
fitting agreement so the patient can refer back to it. Instructions on application and removal of the 
contact lenses are mandatory and it is best to have the patient demonstrate reasonable proficiency 
in lens handling before he leaves the office. The appropriate lens storage, cleaning and disinfecting 
systems should be discussed and it is advisable to have the patient repeat the procedure back to the 
practitioner or assistant to ensure proper patient understanding. 
The patient should also be informed that utilizing solutions and cleaners other than those 
recommended for his lenses may cause lens damage and eye irritation and he should consult his 
doctor before substituting any of these preparations. The additional risks of unpreserved saline, 
particularly homemade saline, and the possibility of Acanthamoeba infections should be 
emphasized. 15 Daily wear soft patients should be informed that their lenses are not to be used as 
extended wear lenses and doing so may potentially compromise the health of their eyes. The 
warning symptoms, including any unusual redness or pain and a decrease in vision, should be 
described and the patient needs to know that he must remove the lenses, call the optometrist and 
come in for an exam before continuing to wear the lenses. Providing the patient with the office and 
an emergency or home phone number are a good idea. 
The importance of follow-up exams should be stressed and appointments made and written down 
for the patient before he leaves. The patient needs to understand that he may experience contact 
lens complications that may go undiagnosed with serious consequences if he does not cooperate with 
the follow-up care. The contact lens patient is involved in a comprehensive long-term treatment 
program and he should be made aware of this responsibility. The contact lenses are not merely a 
consumer item, and rather, require a cooperative relationship between doctor and patient over a 
period of time to ensure successful wear. The possible complications should be discussed with the 
patient so he has an idea of what can go wrong and the importance of returning to the office should 
any of these develop. All of the above need to be written down on a fitting and follow-up care 
agreement form, signed and dated by the patient and a copy retained in the record. Another copy is 
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given to the patient for his reference. 14 Patients often remember only a small portion of the 
information presented to them and a written form with the wearing schedule, solutions to be used, 
an outline of the care system, warning symptoms requiring attention and the follow-up 
appointments is essential. Failure to do so would expose the optometrist to an unnecessarily high 
risk of potential malpractice and little means of proving that he exercised due care in dispensing 
the lenses. 
Extended wear lens patients should be instructed not to exceed the recommended continuous 
wearing time, informed of the greater risk of complications they incur due to extended wear and 
that they should not sleep in their lenses. If they experience cloudy or foggy vision, pain, redness, 
or a decrease in vision, they should report back to the optometrist immediately. In addition, the 
possible necessity of returning to daily wear, the unpredictability of extended wear lens life and the 
potential need to replace the lenses more often than anticipated must be explained to the patient. All 
of this should be in writing on the fitting agreement form. Bifocal, especially monovision, contact 
lens patients should have a warning given both verbally and in written form regarding decreased 
depth perception, peripheral vision, possible problems in the intermediate range and reduced 
visual acuity. A demonstration of these effects by wearing the contacts in the office is a good idea. 
Patients who drive or operate dangerous machinery should be particularly warned and alternatives 
such as spectacles over the contacts or a third contact lens for distance in such circumstances 
should be discussed with the patient and documented. 
Prepaid seNice agreements are advisable and they provide specified seNices at no additional 
charge for the covered period and often a lower lens replacement cost. 14 Since the patient has 
already prepaid, he is more motivated to return to the office in the event of any difficulties with the 
lenses and can promote cooperation with the follow-up regime. 
Disoosables -- Disposable contact lenses pose a new area for additional risks. With these 
lenses, improper lens care that often leads to deposit buildup and infections is theoretically 
eliminated since the lenses are disposed of in 1-2 weeks.16 Also, patients do not have to comply 
with lens cleaning and disinfecting instructions since the system is based on replacement rather 
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than care. However, how can the practitioner be certain that the patient is adhering to the 
replacement schedule? This, together with shipments to the patient without requiring the 
follow-up care prior to receipt spell potential disaster. Retaining these lenses for longer periods 
of time than prescribed, along with no patient education on cleaning or disinfecting can create a 
potential breeding ground for infection. 16 • 17 In the event of complications and litigation 
proceedings, the optometrist would find himself with a poor defense since he neglected to perform 
follow-up exams and failed to monitor the patient adequately. This does not mean that the 
disposalens system should never be utilized, but a word of caution needs to be given. Keen attention 
to follow-up care and stressing to the patient the importance of adhering to the replacement 
schedule, along with a description of possible complications if they do not, are vital. Having this 
information printed on the fitting agreement form and signed by the patient is, once again, highly 
advisable. 
Follow-Up Care -- As can be inferred from the above discussions, failure to provide 
follow-up care nearly invites a liability claim. Although many contact lens patients experience no 
complications and successfully wear the lenses, one cannot rely on this. 18• 19•20,21 ,22 After all, 
the famous addage of Murphy's Law, "if anything can go wrong, it will", is not so often quoted 
without reason. The patient needs to be informed of the reason why follow-up exams are vital and 
ideally, they should be scheduled prior to the patient leaving the office. Providing an appointment 
card with the date and time, as well as including it on the fitting agreement are excellent ideas. 
Also, provide the patient with the office and an emergency or home phone number to encourage the 
patient to phone the optometrist in the event of any experienced difficulties. If the patient fails to 
appear for the appointment, this fact should be documented in the record. 
A number of practitioners feel that their responsibility ends here and although it may be 
adequate in some cases, there is no assurance that a jury will view it in the same manner. An 
attempt should be made to phone the patient, ascertain the reason why he failed to return and try to 
persuade him to come in by discussing the reasons why it is so important. The phone call and notes 
on comments made on both sides of the conversation should be included in the patient's file, 
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probably on an extra sheet of paper and dated. Failure of the optometrist to be available during this 
follow-up period should the patient experience symptoms and calls unexpectedly may be considered 
"abandonment of the patient" and would be deemed as professional negligence. The patient may wait, 
continue attempting to reach the optometrist and allow the symptoms (and potentially the damage) 
to increase or seek another eye care professional and in both instances, the practitioner exposes 
himself to a likely count of malpractice. 
Another area that has in the past led to a malpractice claim where the eye care practitioner lost 
the case is failure to provide regular comprehensive exams. Follow-up care and fitting when new 
lenses are dispensed are crucial, but a regular exam that examines overall eye health, visual fields 
and tonometry are just as important. There is one case on record where a practitioner only 
provided contact lens care and neglected to perform tonometry over a number of years until finally 
another professional discovered that her symptoms were due to glaucoma and not contact lens 
problems. Therefore, never neglect performing regular comprehensive visual exams and 
potentially allowing a pathological condition to go undiagnosed. This is an unnecessary exposure to a 
malpractice claim that can be avoided. 
Product Liabilitv -- The product liability issue in the past has not applied to contact lenses 
since hard contacts were not finished products provided to the public in regular channels of trade 
and were not themselves defective. 11 The same will probably hold true for gas permeable lenses 
because they are also modified to fit the individual patient. Soft contact lenses, however, are 
dispensed without making any modifications and may apply to this rule. The verdict remains to be 
given in the courts. This would allow the contact lens manufacturer to be named a defendant, along 
with the practitioner, and the jury or plaintiff-patient may name either or both as being held 
responsible in the event the patient wins. Usually the "deep pocket rule" is followed, but there is 
no guarantee this will be the case every time. 
The responsibility of the practitioner is to provide continuous care periodically as necessary to 
all patients, including contact lens patients. If the optometrist wishes to terminate care or the 
patient leaves the practice, the patient must be notified, referred to another doctor and a complete 
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copy of the patient's file sent to the new doctor. 13 The reason for termination, to whom the patient 
was referred and the date the records were sent must be documented. Failure to adhere to this 
procedure may result in a claim involving "abandonment of the patient". 
A case involving contact lenses is that of Barbee v. Rogers 425 S.W.2d 342 (Su. Ct. Tex., 
1968). Here a plaintiff alleged injury to his eyes from improperly fit contact lenses. They had 
been refit several times, but they still bothered his eyes. The status of the three defendants is a 
little unusual. Texas State Optical, Inc. is a manufacturing corporation in the business of making 
contact lens blanks. Most or all of the stock of this company is probably owned by defendants Jay 
Rogers and S.J. Rogers, both of whom are licensed optometrists. These two optometrists have a 
partnership under the name of Texas State Optical (unincorporated). Texas State Optical (the 
partnership) is the largest optical retailer in the state of Texas and employs legally 125 
optometrists, in addition to the owners. Thus, in effect, its appearance would be different and its 
size is much larger, so in reality it could be said to be the largest optometric clinic in the state. 
The plaintiff went to one of their outlets seeking contact lenses. He was fit with lenses, the 
blanks for which were made by Texas State Optical, Inc. with the finishing done by the optometrists 
employed by Texas State Optical (unincorporated). The essence of the plaintiff's complaint was that 
the curvature of the contact lenses did not match the corneal curvature. Texas State Optical refit 
them several times without charge, but the lenses still did not fit properly. After 16 months they 
were still not fit properly and the plaintiff stopped wearing them and moved to California. He 
experienced various continuing ocular symptoms. He then went to an ophthalmologist in California 
who determined that his eyes were permanently damaged, whereupon he sued Texas State Optical, 
Inc. and the two Rogers brothers as partners in Texas State Optical (unincorporated). The fitting 
had been done by optometric employees of the partnership, not the Rogers brothers personally. 
Basically, the plaintiff sued all the defendants on all possible theories of legal liability. He sued 
Texas State Optical, Inc. as a manufacturer of a defective product for breach of warranty. On this 
theory, he would not have to prove negligence on the part of the defendant, but just that they had put 
a defective product out on the market. 
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His real problem was that he did not know what specific act of negligence made the contact 
lenses fit so poorly. He sued Texas State Optical (unincorporated) on a breach of warranty theory 
for putting the defective product out on the market as a retailer and as an alternative, sued them for 
negligence in actually doing the fitting of the contact lenses. 
After a full trial, the jury found that Texas State Optical, Inc. did not put out a defective product 
on the market since the blanks were not defective and thus, there was no ground to sue them and 
they were dismissed. It should be noted that all of the specific acts alleged by the plaintiff that he 
had some evidence for related directly to either the prescription, the actual fitting, refitting or 
modification of the lenses. As against Texas State Optical (unincorporated) the jury found that the 
lenses did not properly fit the plaintiff's eyes and they were negligently modified, but that this was 
not the cause of the plaintiff's injury. The jury also found that the lenses were not within the 
warranty for reasonable fitness of use which caused his injury (breach of warranty theory --
negligence need not be proven, but the product must be defective) and awarded him $10,000 from 
Texas State Optical (unincorporated). 
The defendants appealed to the Texas Court of Appeals and this court held that the case was a 
malpractice case and the contact lenses were not defective and therefore, the jury verdict was 
illegal because the plaintiff had not proven negligence or breach of the professional duty of care of 
optometrists. The plaintiff appealed to the Texas State Supreme Court and they decided that the 
Court of Appeals was correct and affirmed the judgment. The only right way to try this case would 
have been as a malpractice suit for optometric care which the plaintiff failed to prove on every 
possible alternative. Furthermore, the Texas Supreme Court decided that contact lenses were not a 
product which could be a subject of a breach of warranty suit (unless possibly the blank itself was 
defective). Therefore, the plaintiff received nothing. 
You may be wondering how far the optometrist must go in doing all the contact lens 
modifications himself. In order to answer this question a careful examination of the licensing laws 
in the particular state you are interested in and the relevant cases is necessary. For example, in 
Illinois the Supreme Court has held that contact lens fitting and modification must be done by 
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someone licensed to practice optometry or medicine and surgery. People v. House of Vision 77 
ALR.3d 809 (Su. Ct. Ill., 1975) Compare this to Pennsylvania where in the case of Commonwealth 
v. Stemet 21 Pa.2d 295 (Pennsylvania, 1959) the court held that this matter is not a professional 
function and can be performed by opticians. A third approach to this problem is that used in the 
state of Massachusetts. In the case of Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. 
Kenco Optical. Inc. 340 N.E.2d 868 (Massachusetts, 1976) it was held that duly licensed 
dispensing opticians can fit and modify contact lenses. Therefore, one has to consult the particular 
state laws pertaining to this matter of whether only optometrists and physicians or also opticians 
can fit contact lenses. 
Use of Pharmaceutical Agents -- As of 1989, nearly half of the states authorize optometrists to 
use therapeutic pharmaceutical agents (TPAs) and all the states now permit the use of 
pharmaceuticals for diagnostic purposes. In the past malpractice claims primarily involved 
misdiagnosis and the failure to use diagnostics resulting in a pathological condition going undetected 
and untreated. There is a potential for liability in misuse of the drugs, but more often than not, 
claims were made based on failure to use. 23 In the realm of therapeutics, future claims will 
probably be associated with misdiagnosis and the application of the right treatment for the wrongly 
diagnosed condition. This does not mean that a suit involving an inappropriate treatment regime is 
not possible. Misdiagnosis, along with drug complications (especially those involving topical 
steroids and miotics) were the leading causes in a study reviewing claims in ophthalmology. 24 
The passage of the TPA laws are rather recent in most states and therefore, if there are pending 
claims, enough time has not elapsed for a judgment to be made, the decision to be appealed and the 
case to be listed in the law references. We must instead look at the experience of ophthalmologists 
for an idea of potential sources of litigation. 
Diagnostic Agents -- Let us first focus on these drugs, since some of these can potentially be 
more toxic and more harmful than the therapeutic agents. The risks with the use of topical 
anesthetics are rather small, but should not be overlooked. 25•26 A history of any prior adverse 
reactions should be elicited and this information or a note stating a negative history should be 
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documented in the record. Applying the anesthetic with the knowledge of a known previous adverse 
response opens the door for a potential claim. An anesthetic with a different chemical structure 
should be utilized instead. If an allergic response occurs with no prior history and no possibility 
for the doctor to have known, then no liability is likely to be incurred. The reaction should be 
documented and the particular anesthetic should be avoided in any subsequent exams. Repeated 
application of the anesthetic or permitting the patient access to its continued use over a period of 
time is an invitation for liability. 
In the case of mydriatics, a thorough case history should be taken to ascertain whether there 
have been any prior adverse reactions, including any prior angle closure. Anatomically narrow 
angles should be dilated with caution and the patient informed of the potential consequences and the 
symptoms of angle closure. However, the risk of not dilating and allowing a retinal disease to go 
undiagnosed is generally considered an even greater danger so this condition does not preclude 
dilation. 2 7 With cardiovascular conditions the practitioner would probably be well advised to 
avoid the use of phenylephrine. 27 Any known allergic response, of course, indicates the use of a 
different mydriatic. Prior to instillation, a discussion with the patient regarding the reason for 
dilation, the procedure, the adverse effects of blurred vision, decreased accommodative abilities and 
photophobia, duration of these effects and the potential for angle closure needs to be made. The 
patient should be warned not to drive while the pupils are dilated and vision is somewhat impaired, 
and ideally, try to have someone else take him home. In the event of a vehicular accident where the 
patient drove while dilated, the optometrist will in most instances be held liable. 
Before drug instillation, the depth of the anterior chamber and the lOP should be measured and 
documented in the record. Following the dilated fundus exam, it would be recommended to recheck 
the lOP and enter it into the record. If the lOP is significantly elevated, the patient should be asked 
to remain in the office to enable monitoring of the pressure. The patient must be informed of the 
warning symptoms of angle closure and be given a number to call if they should experience any of 
them. The elderly and handicapped should be given special assistance until they leave the office and 
cautioned to be careful while walking or moving around until the mydriasis wears off. Should they 
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stumble and fall, the injury will be considered due to the impaired vision during dilation and the 
optometrist will be liable. [A side note here needs to be added regarding falls or tripping. If a fall 
is found to be due to inadequate instructions concerning the proper use of a new prescription, 
liability could also ensue. This includes the first time bifocal wearer or a new high cylinder 
correction. Both require adaptation and potential difficulty in the beginning and the patient must be 
so informed.) 
With regard to cycloplegics, once again pre-instillation visual acuities, case history, anterior 
chamber angle evaluation and lOP should be documented and any contraindications should be taken 
into consideration. Be careful as to dosages and concentrations with very young children, especially 
should atropine be used for some reason. 28,29,30 
One case illustrating failure to dilate with diagnostics in order to obtain an accurate spectacle 
prescription for a young child is that of Kahn v. Shaw 16 S.E.2d 99 (C.A. Georgia, 1941 }. A 
ten-year-old boy was seen by an optometrist who prescribed corrective lenses which were worn 
by the plaintiff for several weeks. The boy developed severe headaches, nausea and a deep-seated 
pain in his eye so he returned to the optometrist and was reexamined. The doctor reconfirmed his 
findings and told the patient to continue wearing the glasses and within a short time the headaches 
and nausea should subside. The boy wore the glasses for an additional week to ten days, but the 
symptoms continued. 
The mother then took him to an ophthalmologist who dilated and found that a significantly 
different prescription was needed. He testified that the glasses prepared by the defendant were not 
suited to the plaintiff's eyes, were not corrective and were highly injurious. He further stated that 
for any person of the age of the plaintiff it was necessary to dilate in order to prepare corrective 
glasses. He went on to say that the boy's eyes were injured permanently and the proximate cause 
was the defendant's careless and negligent acts. The jury did return a verdict for $200 in favor of 
the plaintiff, but the amount was very small and in essence, reimbursed the plaintiff for the 
improper glass prescription. 
Another case involving the use of diagnostic agents is that of Graham v. Whitaker 282 S.C.3d 3, 
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321 S.E.2d 40 (Su. Ct. S.C., 1984}. The 77-year-old plaintiff went to an ophthalmologist to be 
examined for glaucoma. She was called into the exam room where the doctor instilled drops in her 
eyes and then left the room with no explanation or warning as to the possible side effects of the 
drops. The lady was left in the hands of an assistant with no medical training and also did not warn 
her about the side effects. The patient sat in the chair and then noticed that her vision was 
extremely blurred. She called out and at the same time stood up and fell. She struggled up, but fell 
twice more because her foot was wrapped around the chair. Her husband took her to the hospital 
emergency room and an x-ray showed that she had a fractured hip. A pin was inserted, but the bone 
eroded and a second operation was necessary for a total of 101 days in the hospital. 
In court the packing slip for Mydriacyl, which warned of blurred vision and possible dizziness 
(the extent of which varied from individual to individual} provided evidence that the plaintiff 
should have been warned of the potential side effects of the drops. It was also determined that none 
of Dr. Whitaker's "nurses" had any medical training prior to joining his staff and this lack of 
training included any rudimentary knowledge of first aid, as well as any knowledge in the field of 
ophthalmology. Another issue was whether leaving an elderly person with possibly blurred vision 
in the care of an unskilled medical attendant would constitute reckless conduct for which punitive 
damages could be awarded. The jury found that there was negligence in the failure to disclose 
potential side effects, as well as reckless conduct when the patient was left with untrained 
assistants and the verdict included $10,000 for actual damages and $10,000 for punitive damages. 
The judge also announced that he would grant a new trial unless the defendant agreed to an additional 
amount of $67,000 for a total of $87,000. This case illustrates the importance of explaining to 
the patient the potential effects he may experience upon dilation. 
Therapeutic Agents -- Let's now focus on therapeutic drugs. As was mentioned earlier in this 
paper, drug complications constituted the leading category among a study of claims against 
ophthalmologists. Of these, the majority involved steroids, miotics and carbonic anhydrase 
inhibitors. 24 The following will briefly point out some of the adverse effects and cautions in the 
use of typical TPAs. It is in no means to be considered exhaustive, but it should give an indication 
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of what types of problems to look out for and above all, the need for caution. Of course, allergy and 
medication history are extremely important and must be elicited prior to the start of any treatment 
regime. 
Corticosteroids can cause potential adverse effects with all preparations and with all routes of 
administration and the incidence of these effects is usually related to dosage and length of 
treatment. Steroids should be used with extreme caution in patients with diabetes, infectious 
disease, congestive heart failure, chronic renal failure, hypertension and glaucoma. 27,31,32 
Drugs such as rifampin, barbituates, phenylbutazone and phenytoin reduce the anti-inflammatory 
and immunosuppressive effects of steroids. In turn, steroids reduce the effectivity of 
anticoagulants. Practitioners need to be aware of these interactive effects and inform patients 
accordingly. 
Adverse effects of anti-infective agents need to be kept in mind as well before instituting them 
in a treatment program. Allergic reactions are the major drawback of the penicillins and in such 
cases, consider substituting erythromycin unless contraindicated. Cephalosporins cause 
hypersensitivity reactions in 5% of patients and excessive doses can potentially cause renal 
damage. 31 Bacitracin should only be utilized topically due to its severe nephrotoxic effects if used 
systemically and the same is true for systemic use of polymyxin B. Systemic administration of 
aminoglycosides can potentially produce ototoxicity and nephrotoxicity. 31 Neomycin often causes 
hypersensitivity reactions with topical administration and frequently it is wise to substitute its 
use with a comparable, less sensitizing drug. Avoid the use of tetracyclines during pregnancy, as it 
can cause depressed bone development in the fetus and discoloration of the permanent dentition.27 
Chloramphenicol has been known to depress bone marrow and cause aplastic anemia in some 
instances and substitution of other equally effective drugs is highly advisable. The major cautions 
with the sulfonamides are hypersensitivity reactions, exacerbation of Stevens-Johnson syndrome 
and the contraindication if a marked purulent infection is present. 
The antivirals and antifungals should be used with caution just like with the antibacterials 
above. Avoid the use of vidarabine during pregnancy due to its potential mutagenic and carcinogenic 
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considerations. 27•31 Acyclovir may be a good alternative since it is associated with minimal side 
effects and does not interfere with corneal healing. The antifungals, nystatin and amphotericin B, 
are both nephrotoxic, must be utilized with caution, and are strongly contraindicated in patients 
with renal insufficiency. 27,31 
Anti-glaucoma agents all have potentials for complications. Timolol, the most commonly 
prescribed beta blocker, is contraindicated in cases of congenital glaucoma, narrow angles, 
diabetes, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and heart block. 27·31 ·32 Betaxolol is safer for 
patients with respiratory problems, but often these individuals, along with those with 
cardiovascular difficulties, should be placed on alternative anti-glaucoma agents. Prescribing 
without consideration of these contraindications is an invitation for adverse consequences and 
liability. Miotics have frequently been involved in claims. 24 Patients with high myopia, prior 
retinal detachments or lattice degeneration should not be treated with miotics unless absolutely 
necessary. 27·31 ·32 In that event, the patient needs to be informed of the possible complications, 
the warning signs of detachment and to immediately seek professional attention if that occurs. A 
dilated fundus exam both initially and periodically during treatment are very crucial. Failure to 
heed these precautions once again constitutes negligence. Miotics can also potentially precipitate 
asthmatic attacks and therefore, warn susceptible patients accordingly. Patients using miotics in 
general should be informed of potential decreased visibility at night, particularly while driving. 
Carbonic anhydrase inhibitors are yet another group of drugs eliciting a number of claims.24 
Individuals with hypersensitivity to sulfonamides should not take carbonic anhydrase inhibitors. 
Those with impaired renal function, cirrhosis of the liver, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 
sickle cell hemoglobinopathies and pregnancy are contraindications. 27•31 •32 These inhibitors 
also prolong the effect or increase the activity of amphetamines, quinidine, tricyclic 
antidepressants and salicylates, and the patient should be so informed. 
In regard to all the therapeutic drugs, the patient needs to be informed concerning the reason 
for its use, any necessary precautions the person should take, potential side effects and their 
severity and a reasonable prognosis. Any drug contraindications need to be taken into account prior 
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to any treatment. Any deviation from the recommended uses and amounts listed in the Physician's 
Desk Reference or utilization despite known contraindications need to be documented regarding the 
reason why and should be explained to the patient. Make sure that the benefits do indeed outweigh 
the risks. Failure to utilize the drug properly or lack of an adequate informed consent will result 
in liability should litigation ensue. 
The following case involves a treatment situation where the doctor won. In Winkjer v. Herr 
277 N.W.2d 579 (Su. Ct. N.D., 1979) an unusual set of facts and a difficult decision-making 
posture for a treating ophthalmologist or optometrist in a TPA state (allowing optometrists to treat 
glaucoma) is presented. The ultimate issue here is whether or not the ophthalmologist in this case 
was negligent in concluding that the patient had glaucoma and instituting treatment with drugs {1% 
pilocarpine, 0.03% and 0.06% phospholine iodide) which had a side effect of causing cataracts and 
in fact, did later cause cataracts. He had the following facts available to him at the time he made the 
decision to begin treatment. The patient had chronic high lOP, but no observable damage, the 
patient was myopic, and the patient's mother had suffered from glaucoma. The drug treatment began 
with pilocarpine 1% and then was switched to 0.03% bid phospholine iodide. After that it was 
changed to 0.06% qd phospholine iodide and then back again to 0.03% bid phospholine iodide. 
Eventually this drug treatment did cause cataracts which were removed surgically. The 
plaintiff received a second opinion from a glaucoma specialist at the Mayo Clinic after the drug 
treatment had been going for a considerable amount of time and before the cataracts were 
significantly developed. His opinion was that the drug treatment should be completely discontinued 
and the patient simply monitored as an ocular hypertensive. In a deposition he stated that his 
opinion was based on the following -- namely that the patient had combined difficulty from taking 
phospholine iodide and the development of cataracts. He felt it was better to take a chance on 
glaucoma and let the plaintiff see better until such time as cataract surgery might be necessary. He 
specifically stated that he did not disagree with the diagnosis of glaucoma made by the defendant, 
although it was uncertain at the time made. The defendant ophthalmologist elected to adopt the 
reverse treatment, of course. However, he vacillated in his medical opinion. At the same time he 
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had diagnosed the plaintiff as having glaucoma based on the facts reviewed above, he also wrote a 
Jetter to the Federal Aviation Administration (the plaintiff was a pilot) stating that his diagnosis of 
the plaintiff's condition had changed from chronic open angle glaucoma to ocular hypertension. If 
that were true, he should have probably dropped the drug treatment. 
Although the case was eventually decided upon some legal technicalities, the Supreme Court of 
North Dakota stated that in this situation a medical professional could not be held liable because he 
had prescribed the correct drug for the actual condition, although his diagnosis was erroneous. The 
conclusion to be drawn from this case is that if the treatment is correct for the actual condition 
shown to have occurred over the passage of time, it does not matter that the doctor made a 
misdiagnosis in the course of prescribing the drug. 
An area where an optometrist may be vulnerable is in cases where systemic drugs present 
ocular symptoms. Let us now look at several examples of such a situation. In the coincidental event 
case of Bailev v. Sturm 59 Wis.2d 87, 207 N.W.2d 653 (Su. Ct. Wise., 1973) the 
patient-plaintiff had a reaction to novocaine given by a dentist which caused pain in the left eye, 
diplopia and blur. The patient then went to an ophthalmologist 18 days later complaining of trouble 
with her eyes, but no abnormalities were found and a clip-over prism was prescribed. Three days 
later she went to a family physician due to headaches, blur and diplopia and three days after that, 
she consulted a neurologist because she had ptosis, was unable to move the left eye and had decreased 
sensitivity in that eye. The neurologist thought it might be due to a toxic neuritis and prescribed 
vitamin 8 supplements. Sixteen days later she was still experiencing headaches, diplopia and 
reduced visual acuity so Darvon was prescribed and she was scheduled for elective surgery in two 
weeks. Instead, she went to see a surgeon and nine days later she was hospitalized due to lost sight 
in the left eye, proptosis and the fact that the eye was now fixated for 40 days. The surgeon, as well 
as the neurologist, examined her and decided to have a neuro-ophthalmologist (Dr. Sturm) come in 
for a consultation. Eight days later, Dr. Sturm operated to remove a mass behind the eyeball and in 
the process, severed the optic nerve. Later it was found to be a pseudotumor due to inflammatory 
swelling. 
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The patient sued for improper care and treatment in the hospital, for surgery and severing the 
optic nerve, but not for the office work outside the hospital. The lower court jury decided that Dr. 
Sturm was not guilty of malpractice, but the surgeon was found negligent for not differentiating 
between a tumor and an inflammation. The trial court gave a verdict for $15,000 and the decision 
stated that there had been a failure to have the tumor examined by a pathologist before the optic 
nerve was severed, a failure to properly treat the condition discovered during the surgery and 
negligence in not consulting with the dentist. 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin on appeal determined that in reality the neurologist had 
misdiagnosed the condition in his office when he thought it was toxic neuritis and had prescribed 
vitamin B supplements. The patient had only sued for the hospital work, not the office work. The 
surgeon shared an office with the neurologist, but partnership could not be proven. He had 
corrected the misdiagnosis of the neurologist, but he went on to make the mistake that the bulge was 
a tumor. An expert witness stated that the basic negligence here was the failure to try drugs 
(steroids) prior to surgery based on the symptoms of proptosis, paralysis and continued loss of 
vision. It was held that there was no causal connection between the loss of sight which occurred 
nine days before and the severing of the optic nerve (sight had already been lost nine days prior). 
Secondarily, it was found that the surgeon should have either performed a biopsy or put the patient 
into the hospital earlier on an emergency basis. The Supreme Court affirmed what the trial court 
had found. 
Another case of ocular symptoms caused by a systemic drug is the case of Reed v. Church 8 
S.E.2d 285 (Su. Ct. Vir., 1940). Here the plaintiff's injuries were caused by negligence of the 
doctor (general M.D.) in carrying out a long course of treatment of injections of tryparsamide for 
hypertension. The problem here was that the drug was injected every 4-5 days over a long period 
of time, but after the third injection, the plaintiff had told the doctor that the treatments were 
affecting his eyes. The doctor had told him that when they were through, the symptoms would clear 
up. The plaintiff repeated this complaint on many subsequent visits to the doctor's office for 
injections. The doctor had literally told him that "your blindness will clear up". Reed v. Church 8 
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S.E.2d 285 at 287 Tryparsamide was a new drug as of 1937 and was extensively reviewed in the 
medical literature (as the expert witness revealed) which all stated that the drug was to be 
discontinued if ocular symptoms occurred. The packing slip furnished with the drug devoted two 
full pages to ocular disturbances which also recommended discontinuation immediately if ocular 
symptoms appeared. 
After approximately seven weeks of injections, 4-5 days apart and continued decrease of 
vision, the plaintiff went to an optometrist, as well as an optometric neurologist and a third doctor, 
an EENT specialist. All three informed him that he had permanent atrophy of the optic nerve. The 
EENT specialist called the general M.D. and not only suggested that he discontinue the drug (nine 
injections to date), but that he undertake another drug treatment designed to offset effects of 
tryparsamide and stop further deterioration of the optic nerve. Unfortunately, by this time the 
patient had "gunbarrel vision" (only a central island of vision) with no prospects of improving. 
The patient was unable to work or to get to the doctor's office by himself (he was almost blind 
according to the court), and a review and examination of the patient by the Johns Hopkins Hospital 
in Baltimore confirmed all this and indicated that there was no hope of improving vision. 
Dr. Reed (the general M.D.) had been his doctor for over 20 years and knew the plaintiff had 
syphilis 20 years before. The doctor told the plaintiff some 14 years before this course of 
treatment that he had been cured of syphilis. At trial it was claimed that the syphilis was the cause 
of the loss of vision 14 years later and that a fainting spell two weeks before the tryparsamide 
treatment was begun was caused by syphilis. However, Dr. Reed furnished a written medical 
opinion at that time stating the cause was hypertension. 
The significant issue in this case is whether the treatment with the drug or syphilis caused the 
atropy of the optic nerve and blindness. The doctor encouraged the plaintiff to ignore the symptoms 
he complained of repeatedly when injections were given and even tried to tell him that the blindness 
would go away upon completion of the course of treatment. Under the contributory negligence law 
then applicable in Virginia, the plaintiff would not have recovered anything if his actions partially 
caused the blindess. At trial the jury found the doctor liable because he had failed to discontinue the 
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treatment after the first or second complaint, that he knew or should have known, from the medical 
literature alone, to watch out for ocular symptoms when using the drug and to discontinue 
treatment immediately if any ocular symptoms appeared. The plaintiff was induced to become 
virtually blind due to the doctor's reassurances that the eye condition was reversible. It is 
interesting to note that this doctor never claimed that during the nine visits for injections and six 
instances of complaints of ocular symptoms that the symptoms were caused by anything besides the 
drug. The syphilis seems to be an invention shortly before trial. 
The trial court awarded a judgment to the plaintiff for his blindness and after a thorough 
review of the evidence, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed this judgment. It is important to 
note that in so doing the Supreme Court of Virginia made a special point of stating that a doctor's 
duty includes being familiar with the medical literature (in this case pertaining to drugs), but that 
he is not an insurer or even held to the highest degree of care known in his profession with respect 
to the medical treatment of his patients. The court went on to say that "the mere fact that he has 
failed to effect a cure or that his treatment has been deleterious will not raise a presumption of his 
negligence. He (the doctor) must only exhibit the degree of skill and diligence employed by an 
ordinary prudent practitioner in his field and the community ... ". Reed v. Church 8 S.E.2d 285 at 
288 This is a universal rule applied in all states whether the "community standard rule" or the 
reasonable physician standard rule is used. In this case, the doctor testified that he had read the 
medical literature on the drug and was aware of the warnings of ocular symptoms contained therein, 
and further that, he had read the packing list with the two pages of ocular symptoms prior to this 
course of treatment. He also admitted being aware from both sources the importance of immediate 
discontinuation of treatment if any ocular symptoms appeared. Not only did he not do so after the 
six complaints, but he affirmatively told the patient that at the end of the course of treatment the 
ocular symptoms would reverse themselves. At the time of that statement the patient was nearly 
blind and nine treatments had been given. The defendant was a general practitioner, who it could be 
said with respect to this drug, was in a similar position to optometrists who went to school prior to 
consideration of TPAs, although this doctor claimed to have read the literature on the subject. It is 
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important to remember that 2/3 of all medical malpractice cases actually tried are won by the 
doctors. In this case where the doctor lost is a clear example of outrageous conduct during the 
course of treatment. There were plenty of opportunities to stop the treatment when ocular 
symptoms could have been minimal, instead of after near total blindness. 
As the reader can see, an area that optometrists should be gravely concerned with are ocular 
reactions to systemic drugs prescribed by a non-eye care professional. This is exactly what 
happened in the case of Johnson v. Winthrop Laboratories 190 N.W.2d 77 (Su. Ct. Minn., 1971 ). 
The plaintiff went to an ophthalmologist stating that she needs glasses, but she made no correlation 
to the drug (Aralen or chloroquine) that she was taking and her ocular symptoms. For 12 years a 
dermatologist had prescribed Aralen for lupus erythematosis. Her visual difficulties had been first 
noticed in 1960, although they were minor at that time. By 1962 the symptoms were a little 
worse and by 1963 she had blurred vision to the point that she could not recognize people. She had 
consulted Dr. Sterner, an ophthalmologist, on three occasions in 1960 and then Dr. Schmidtke (an 
ophthalmologist) on two occasions in 1963. The glasses prescribed by the first ophthalmologist did 
not improve her vision and therefore, she switched to Dr. Schmidtke. The plaintiff had been treated 
by Dr. Lynch, the dermatologist, for the same skin condition with chloroquine from May 1954 to 
March 1964. She had complained about the declining vision in 1960, 1962 and 1963, but he did 
not stop the chloroquine till March of 1964. It is important to note that on many occasions in this 
ten-year course of treatment she had an appointment with Dr. Lynch, but on arrival she would be 
transferred to another doctor in the office. 
No action was taken on the visual complaints till March of 1964 which was one year after she 
could no longer identify people she saw on the street. At that time, Dr. Lynch did discontinue the 
chloroquine. Fourteen days later Dr. Lynch on the phone told her he was releasing her to her 
general physician and did not want to see her again. Two years later in 1966 the plaintiff went to 
Dr. Cora Ruhr, an optometrist, and asked for glasses. Dr. Ruhr told her when the glasses did not 
solve her problem that her difficulties were caused by chloroquine or something else of that nature. 
After being told this by the optometrist, the plaintiff went to an ophthalmologist who saw her in 
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October and November of 1966 and who diagnosed her condition as retinopathy. He told her to 
discontinue the chloroquine and he also called Dr. Lynch and told him not to prescribe it anymore. 
The case was actually decided on legal technicalities relating to the specific working of the 
Minnesota statute of limitations which is not relevant to this paper. This case is a good example of 
an optometrist who did the right thing, but it appears to also be an example of how a medical center 
can find itself juggling patients between doctors when it is trying to see too many patients per day 
with the result that none of the doctors think about the repeated serious side effect complaints of the 
drug treatments -- in this instance, over a ten-year period. 
An interesting side note is that in the case of Sterling Drug. Inc. v. Yarrow 408 F.2d 978 (C.A. 
8, 1969} the U.S. Court of Appeals held that the manufacturer of Aralen was liable for a permanent 
eye condition sustained by a lady as a result of using Aralen (chloroquine) because the drug 
company had failed to warn the public, the lady involved in this case, her physician and the retail 
drug stores in general about the potential danger or permanent injury to vision caused by this drug, 
all in violation of the Food and Drug Act. The warnings in this case should have been given to this 
particular patient between January of 1958 and October of 1964, although it could have been given 
as early as 1951. This case occurred essentially on or after January 1958 and was not concluded 
in the U.S. Court of Appeals until March 12, 1969. A lower federal court had previously held 
against the drug company (see 263 F. Supp. 159). Undoubtedly, this case resulted in the two pages 
of ocular effect warnings in the revised packing slip referred to in Johnson v. Winthrop Labs 
above. 
The last case to be discussed in this section involves Collins v. A.O.A. 639 F.2d 636 (C.A. 7, 
1982). The AOA had run a specific set of advertisements stating that optometrists as a group were 
qualified to detect eye diseases, specifically glaucoma. In January 1977 the plaintiff began 
experiencing vision difficulties. He went to see four different optometrists between January and 
October of 1977 and in December of 1977 he went to Dr. Washington, an ophthalmologist. After 
examining him, the ophthalmologist determined that he had an advanced case of glaucoma and was 
losing his vision. In May of 1979 he sued three of the four optometrists and the AOA. His ground 
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for suit against the AOA was that AOA's advertising concerning the qualifications of optometrists to 
detect eye diseases and specifically glaucoma, was negligent and the statements therein were false. 
He quickly settled with the three optometrists for unspecified amounts (probably very minimal). 
In the Federal District Court, Judge Holder granted summary judgment in favor of the AOA without a 
trial. 
The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals saying, in effect, that he had read the 
advertisements of the AOA with respect to detecting glaucoma and other diseases and from them 
concluded that optometrists were sufficiently well-qualified to take care of all his vision needs. 
One AOA ad did specifically state "that optometrists were educated and qualified to detect glaucoma 
and give the best vision care possible." Collins v. A.O.A. 639 F.2d 636 at 638 The plaintiff 
claimed that other AOA ads made statements to the effect that optometrists were capable of giving 
preventive care when, in fact, they were not so qualified in the plaintiff's opinion. From all this, 
he concluded that the AOA caused the progression of his condition from a non-impairing and 
controllable glaucoma to that of a disabling, irreversible near blindness. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the AOA which is the subject of review 
by the Appellate Court. The trial court had found: 
1. "as a matter of law that AOA's representations were neither false nor misleading", based 
upon both advertisements and 73 brochures given out by the AOA. 
2. "that AOA's representations are not misleading because the Optometry Code of Indiana 
"establishes as a matter of law that optometrists are educated, licensed and qualified to 
detect (but not treat) signs of eye diseases such as glaucoma." " 
3. "in the case before us, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the representations made 
by the AOA, regardless of their accuracy, were not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries." The court then defined proximate cause under Indiana law as a cause which in 
a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces 
the result, and without which the result would not have occurred. 
4. The court even went so far as to look at the case as a suit for misrepresentation, instead 
of a suit for personal injuries (even though it had found no misrepresentation by the AOA 
finding (2) above) and decided that the AOA owed no duty to the plaintiff specifically with 
respect to his eye care. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision in favor of the AOA. 
Collins v. A.O.A. 639 F.2d 636 at 639 
Documentation -- The optometrist's best defense in a litigation case is complete, thorough 
documentation. Time spent in proper recordkeeping (before any claim is made) can determine the 
difference between a successful or unsuccessful defense in court. Therefore, documentation is 
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among the optometrist's best routes for "preventive medicine". The following discussion includes 
points to consider and suggestions that the practitioner may utilize. 
Complete documentation of exam results is vital. Findings not recorded are presumed to have 
not been performed in the first place. Tonometry is a very important test to administer on all 
patients, not just those over 40 years of age, as demonstrated by the Helling case. The fact that 
those below 40 seldom have glaucoma does not protect the practitioner from liability. Those 
patients with a measurement of 19-22 mmHg should be informed that they are on the upper limit 
of the normal range and need to have their ocular pressure checked regularly. Most patients fail to 
realize the importance of high lOP, and the possibility of glaucoma, its vision-threatening effects 
and the fact that in most instances it is painless and symptomless all need to be discussed with the 
patient. This discussion should be documented, along with the pressures and any comments or 
questions the patient makes. 
Ocular health is another area that needs to be carefully documented. Notations such as "within 
normal limits (WNL)" and "no apparent pathology (NAP)" indicate that the health was assessed, 
however, if th is is written in all the patients' records, the finding may be questioned in court. 
Regarding ophthalmoscopy, the C/D ratio, AN ratio, Elschnig classification, macular integrity and 
any abnormalities or pathological conditions should be recorded to help establish that a thorough 
examination was performed on the particular patient. Similarly, biomicroscopy findings should 
include anterior chamber depth, media clarity, presence of any opacities or scars, any pathology 
evident and a description of any abnormality of the eye and adnexa. Normal benign abnormalities 
should not be disregarded and omitted from the record since the notation can help establish that the 
optometrist made thorough observations and maintained detailed, accurate records. A drawing or 
photograph of any unusual findings during ophthalmoscopy or biomicroscopy should be included in 
the record for documentation and monitoring purposes. They may prove to be invaluable in court. 
Forms with a general fundus or eye and adnexa outline provide a quick and efficient way to 
pictorially document findings. 
Probably the best means of recording visual fields is a graphical display indicating 
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constrictions, scotomas, reduced thresholds and other defects. The date, lenses utilized and a 
written note stating the defects considered significant are necessary. Inclusion of what was 
discussed with the patient and the patient's responses are highly advisable. If any defects appear 
that cannot be explained by the patient's age, known pathological condition or medications, further 
testing is indicated to ascertain the underlying cause. Entries like "WNL" or "no apparent defects" 
may or may not be considered sufficient in court and the above method is far superior and provides 
concrete evidence that fields were taken properly and analyzed appropriately. Confrontation fields 
should be done on everyone, but of course, are not sufficient for glaucoma patients and in any cases 
of suspected field defects. 
Dilated and cycloplegic exams require special documentation. Before any pharmaceutical agent 
is instilled, document all relevant findings (even if no allergic responses or adverse reactions were 
indicated) so it is apparent that all appropriate questions were asked of the patient. In addition, the 
lOP and anterior chamber depth need to be performed and recorded prior to administration. Failure 
to do these things with subsequent adverse consequences will be deemed as negligence. The patient 
should be informed of the reason for the procedure and the pharmaceutical, as well as the possible 
side effects they may experience. Patient comments should be written down. An entry must be 
made listing the name of the drug, concentration, amount, time and date of instillation. Any drops 
added later must also be entered. lOP measurement and recording after completion of the procedure 
is recommended. 
Observations during binocular or monocular indirect ophthalmoscopy need to be recorded and 
preferrably illustrated on a fundus drawing. Certainly any pathological condition should be 
documented, including size, description, location and severity. Benign changes or those that are not 
currently a problem should also be noted. The latter include bear tracks, nevi, drusen, optic disc 
or vessel anomalies, peripheral lattice degeneration, pigmentary changes, cilioretinal arteries and 
any benign deviations. These should be documented to permit monitoring and immediate recognition 
should they alter in their form or revert to non-benign conditions. If nothing abnormal is found, 
the notation should indicate that the various structures were evaluated and found normal. Do not 
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leave the record blank because that implies that the procedure may never have actually been 
performed. Any pathology or condition requiring periodic monitoring should be discussed with the 
patient and the relative risks and prognosis should be included. 
Similar advice is relevant for gonioscopy. The visible structures should be noted, as well as 
the grading of the angle in the full circumference. A plateau iris or angle recessions need to be 
recorded. The patient should be informed if there is a risk of angle closure, glaucoma or if 
pupillary dilation may pose a substantial risk. Document the discussion and any significant 
comments made by the patient. 
In general, documentation must be detailed and complete. Try to avoid entries that merely read 
"WNL" or "NAP" or general statements that the risks were discussed with the patient. In a court 
case other patient records may well be subpoenaed and if the same entry is found in all the records, 
a question as to the validity of the finding will be raised. More descriptive, individualized findings 
will promote believability and bolster the defense. Furthermore, any test results not documented 
will be viewed as not having been performed. Therefore, include notation on all procedures 
administered. 
In regard to corrections or changes made in the patient's record, make sure it is done in a 
fashion that will not be construed as falsifying or altering the record. Never erase or scratch out 
the initial entry so that it can no longer be read. Probably the best method is to draw a line through 
it, add the corrected entry, date and sign it and also state the reason for the correction. Needless to 
say, if a claim is made by a patient, any changes made in the file will be considered as an alteration 
of the record. 
Computerized recordkeeping is a new trend in the optometric practice. Although it can 
substantially add to the ease of filing and retrieving patient information, it does pose an interesting 
legal issue. Information stored in a computer can be easily altered and the admissability of a 
computerized patient record as evidence in court is extremely doubtful. 33 One way around this 
obstacle is to keep a hard copy on hand (for each patient) that the optometrist dates and signs. This 
means having duplicate records, one computerized and one in a patient's folder, and continued need 
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for space to store the patient records, but should litigation occur, it can mean the difference 
between having a defense or none at all. 
Failure to Diagnose and Refer -- The largest category of the malpractice claims involves the 
failure to diagnose or failure to refer in a timely fashion. 5 •34 If an ocular pathology goes 
undiagnosed or is misdiagnosed, and particularly if the condition causes vision Joss, liability due to 
negligence will probably ensue. Even if the pathology is correctly identified, but the condition 
mandates a timely referral for the proper treatment, testing or precautions and no referral is 
made, then negligence has occurred. Another way to incur liability is a failure to disclose to a 
patient with a given condition any substantial risk factors that he has which can lead to a higher 
probability of adverse consequences than an individual without those risk factors. 4 All in all, 
this is a large area for claims made in the past and will probably continue to be in the future. The 
following is a brief discussion of some common conditions that if undiagnosed or not treated in the 
appropriate fashion will result in liability. 
Glaucoma -- Glaucoma has appeared in a number of cases in the "law books" and therefore, it 
necessitates special attention. First of all, do not fail to perform tonometry, even if the patient is 
young and unlikely to have glaucoma. In the rare event that the person does have the condition and 
is subsequently diagnosed after some damage has occurred in the meantime, no successful defense 
will be possible. If glaucoma is suspected, make sure that several lOP measurements are made, the 
optic nerve head is extensively evaluated including with a 900 or Hruby lens, visual fields are 
plotted (preferrably threshold), gonioscopy is performed to view the angle structures and a careful 
case history is documented, including risk factors, family and personal ocular history and a listing 
of any medications that the patient is taking. 35 ·27 •36 Based on all this information, make a 
correct decision as to whether the patient should be monitored or treated. In either case, ensure 
that an adequate follow-up schedule is instituted and that the patient complies. If a patient fails to 
appear for a follow-up, phone the patient (preferrably twice) and document the matter and the 
communication on both sides in the record. Furthermore, explain to the patient the nature of the 
disease, whether he is an ocular hypertensive or in fact has glaucoma, the reason for the 
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follow-ups, the adverse consequences if he fails to comply and in the event of treatment, the 
potential side effects, the proper way to instill the drops and once again, the need for follow-ups. 
Glaucoma is frequently painless and symptomless and patients often fail to understand that a 
condition that has no visible manifestations to them can have such dire consequences if not attended 
to in the appropriate manner Thus, it is essential to impress upon the patient the above delineated 
points and make the proper documentation in the record. 
There are a number of illustrative cases involving failure to diagnose glaucoma, the most 
famous of which is, of course, Hellina v. Carev. (see Appendix B). Another case is of Saunders v. 
Lischkoff 137 Fla 826, 188 So. 815 (1939) where an EENT specialist had diagnosed plastic iritis 
and prescribed atropine. The result was badly deteriorated vision and extreme pain and the patient 
had asked the doctor to make a house call because she was in so much pain, but he had refused. She 
went to another eye specialist who found that she had glaucoma. The first doctor was found to be 
negligent based on the failure to follow-up. 
In Gates v. Jensen 92 W.2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979} the plaintiff was a 54-year-old 
myopic woman who came into an ophthalmologist's office. Her lOP was 24 and she complained of 
gaps in her vision, fogging and blurring. The ophthalmologist did not perform a dilated exam or 
fields and he told her when she had inquired, that her lOP was "ok". This ophthalmologist saw her 
12 times in the next two years and during all this time, he made no further tests. On the twelfth 
visit she had very severe vision loss and glaucoma. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed a 
judgment in her favor holding that the doctor had violated the informed consent rules because she 
had a right to know any abnormalities that he had discovered (i.e. lOP of 24) nor did he tell her of 
the availability of fields and dilation to help with the diagnosis of glaucoma. It also held that the 
doctor's treatment did not meet the professional standard of care because he had failed to do fields, 
dilation or even repeat tonometry over the 12 visits in the two-year time period. 
A further case involves Holmes v. /was a & Berklev Bio-Engineering Int. et a/ 104 Idaho 179, 
657 p .2d 476 (Su. Ct. Idaho, 1983}. Or. lwasa, an optometrist, saw the plaintiff twice. On the 
first visit he had examined the plaintiff, prescribed glasses for her and had failed to diagnose 
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glaucoma. On the second visit he fitted the glasses with no re-examination. However, on this visit 
the plaintiff complained of headaches and sensitivity to bright lights. It should be noted that 15 
months before the first visit, the plaintiff had a previous exam where she had complained of light 
sensitivity and headaches. This is strong evidence that whatever the condition was, it had existed 
for at least 15 months. Later, an exam was made by an ophthalmologist and she was found to have 
glaucoma with severe vision loss. Dr. I was a really was lucky. The two-year Idaho statute of 
limitations ran after the first visit and before the second one, and therefore, any injury resulting 
from his failure to diagnose during the first visit could not be a basis of a lawsuit. The interesting 
question is that the second visit which was within the statute of limitations period was only fitting 
of glasses. There was no exam during the second visit, however, if he had been under a legal duty to 
re-examine when he fitted the glasses, he could have been sued for all of her injuries. In reviewing 
the case, the Idaho Supreme Court held that he did not have a legal duty to re-examine and 
therefore, his negligence (that undoubtedly resulted in glaucomatous damage) during the first visit 
was barred by the statute of limitations and during the second visit he was not legally required to 
re-examine. Thus, the patient could not sue the person, who in fact had caused her injuries. The 
judgment went in favor of the optometrist. The decision for this case is included in Appendix C. 
In Harrjs v. Groth 99 W.2d 438, 663 P.2d 113 (Su. Ct. Wash., 1983), the plaintiff had an 
intermittent history of recurring iritis and saw the first ophthalmologist who made a diagnosis of 
iritis. He prescribed systemic and topical steroids and atropine drops. Two months after her last 
visit to this ophthalmologist, she saw flashing lights, wavy lines and within weeks experienced a 
sensation of ocular pressure. She returned to the ophthalmologist and he increased the dosage of the 
steroids, but her symptoms persisted. She returned again and was seen by a second ophthalmologist 
who diagnosed acute glaucoma. He performed emergency surgery and there was a further 
hospitalization, but vision continued to deteriorate. The plaintiff sued the first ophthalmologist and 
the pharmacist. The atropine prescription had erroneously been filled with lsopto-carpine 
(pilocarpine}. The court held that the pharmacist was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. 
The case went to trial against the first ophthalmologist only. When the plaintiff's problems 
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became serious, the ophthalmologist had delivered an intensive amount of treatment over a short 
period of time in order to save her vision. Although he had never suspected that the prescription 
had been improperly filled and one of his partners made the actual diagnosis of an acute glaucoma 
attack, the jury found that he was not negligent and this decision was affirmed by the Washington 
Supreme Court on appeal. 
Finally, McMahon v. Glixman 393 N.E.2d 875 (Su. Ct. Mass., 1979) involves a case that is 
only a preliminary hearing which under Massachusetts procedure determines whether or not there 
is sufficient evidence to justify the time and expense of a full trial. The court found that there was 
enough evidence to go to trial. The unusual facet of this case is that the defendant is an optometrist 
and the expert witness for the plaintiff who testified against him as to the applicable professional 
standard of care, was also an optometrist. Unfortunately, most defendant optometrists are opposed 
by an ophthalmologist as an expert witness. The plaintiff's evidence in this case showed that the 
defendant had examined him and prescribed glasses many times, the last of which was made in 
197 4. In March and June of 1975 he returned twice complaining of blurred vision. On each 
occasion the defendant dilated his eyes and assured him there was no problem. On October 31, 
1977, the plaintiff was examined by an ophthalmologist due to complaints of blur in the left eye, 
frontal headaches, seeing halos around street lights and watering of the eyes. The ophthalmologist 
diagnosed his condition as bilateral glaucoma. 
The glaucoma was far advanced in the left eye and its optic disc was irreversibly damaged. The 
right eye was not as far advanced, but did have glaucoma. In January 1978 the ophthalmologist 
operated on the left eye. The plaintiff contended that an experienced, trained optometrist could have 
seen the presence of glaucoma as early as June 1975. The ophthalmic surgeon who operated on the 
left eye said in his written report that in his opinion, "precious time had been lost by the 
optometrist not recognizing or having an index of suspicion for the plaintiff's symptoms which are 
classical for glaucoma. In addition, he (the plaintiff) was lulled into a sense of security by having 
diagnostic drops instilled and by having been given unwarranted reassurance. Ophthalmological 
consultation should have been sought in any event immediately." McMahon v. Glixman 393 N.E.2d 
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875 at 877 In addition to this report by the ophthalmologist, the plaintiff called as an expert 
witness Dr. Ceavey who was an optometrist. He reviewed the hospital records, the written report 
of the ophthalmologist and concluded in court that "the optometrist is morally and ethically 
obligated to refer a patient with suspicious symptoms or clinical data to an ophthalmologist if 
glaucoma is suspected. In my opinion, Dr. Glixman did not conform to the standards of his 
profession. If glaucoma was suspected by history, symptoms or clinical data and the patient was not 
informed and referred to the ophthalmologist of his choice," then there was negligence. In addition 
to these defects in the treatment rendered and reviewed by this optometrist (expert witness), the 
defendant had by dilating implied that he had made a thorough examination when he had not and also 
orally assured the patient that nothing was wrong on several occasions. The Massachusetts Court 
sent this case out for full trial. 
Retinal Detachment -- The next substantial area for potential litigation is the failure to 
diagnose a retinal detachment or a delay in the diagnosis. 5 ·37 Whenever a patient comes in 
complaining of flashing lights, light streaks, a black dot in their field of view or a curtain, veil or 
mist in their vision, one needs to rule out a retinal tear or retinal detachment. A thorough fundus 
examination is necessary with pupillary dilation and utilization of binocular indirect 
ophthalmoscopy, preferrably with scleral depression. Check all quadrants of the fundus and 
examine all the way out in the periphery to the ora serrata. If a retinal tear or detachment is 
missed and later it is established that it must have been present due to evidence such as successive 
demarcation lines, then the practitioner will be deemed negligent based on failure to diagnose. In 
the event of one of these two conditions, refer in a timely fashion to a retinal specialist for 
treatment. If the cause is a posterior vitreous detachment, reassure the patient, but inform him 
that he has an increased risk for a retinal detachment and he should have regular eye exams. Also, 
inform him of the warning symptoms of a retinal detachment. Documentation should include the 
fact that a thorough peripheral fundus exam was performed with any problems noted, to whom the 
patient was referred and when (if a referral is indicated) and what was said to the patient. One 
important point is that a failure to dilate a patient with these symptoms will be held as negligent as 
60 
an adequate view of the peripheral fundus would not be possible. If the media is unclear and does not 
permit a good view, seriously consider referring the patient for ultrasonography. 27·36 As a side 
note, an asymptomatic patient that is highly myopic, an aphake or a pseudophake is at higher risk 
for a tear or detachment and should have a thorough dilated peripheral fundus exam on a regular 
basis. Be on the lookout for a possible retinal detachment within six months to one year after 
cataract surgery. 27•36 Furthermore, let these patients know that they are in a higher risk group 
for these conditions. 
One case illustrating the importance of a timely referral of a retinal detachment, Fairchild v. 
BrJWJ, 354 S.2d 675 (C.A. La., 1977), was discussed earlier in this paper. Another case involves 
King v. Harrington 411 S.2d 912 (Ct. App. Fla., 1982) where an opthalmologist repeatedly failed 
to timely diagnose and refer a retinal detachment for surgery. More details on this case are 
presented later in this section. Thus, it is vital that an existing detachment be diagnosed and 
referred for treatment immediately. 
Diabetic Retinooathv -- Diabetic patients, of course, are at risk of developing retinopathy and 
need to be followed regularly. Take a careful history and find out if the patient has his blood sugar 
level under control. If you find that the visual acuity has significantly changed, this is probably a 
good indication that the blood sugar is not under control and the patient should be referred back to 
his internist. 38 Check pupils, motilities and lOP. With the slit lamp look for rubeosis iridis or 
lens opacities. Rubeosis indicates neovascularization, can cause glaucoma and necessitates referral. 
A dilated fundus exam is mandatory to look for signs of background retinopathy or progression 
towards the proliferative stage. If the background signs become too severe or encroach upon the 
fovea, refer to a retinal specialist. Neovascularization of the disc or elsewhere, macular edema, 
vitreal or pre-retinal hemorrhages or retinal breaks or detachments also need to be referred. If a 
significantly differing degree of diabetic retinopathy is noted between the two eyes, the optometrist 
should suspect a concurrent case of glaucoma or carotid artery disease in the eye with the lesser 
retinopathy. 38 Once again, make the appropriate documentation in the patient's record. 
A case illustrating a failure to diagnose diabetic retinopathy is that of Fallon v. Loree 136 
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A.D.2d 956, 525 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Supre. Ct. App. Div., 1988). Here the defendant ophthalmologist 
failed to use indirect ophthalmoscopy as compared to direct and did not diagnose cataracts, as well as 
diabetic retinopathy. Had he used indirect ophthalmoscopy, he would have been able to diagnose the 
retinopathy and would have attributed the vision loss to this, rather than to the cataracts. At trial 
the plaintiff's theory was that because the defendant did not use the best practice method available, 
namely indirect ophthalmoscopy, this violated the professional standard of care. The court 
disagreed. The case was tried and the verdict was for the defendant ophthalmologist. 
The defendant had successfully argued to the lower court that 30-40% of the ophthalmologists 
in the community did not routinely use indirect ophthalmoscopy. This same argument was adopted 
by the Appellate Court and they held that as long as the doctor used one of the methods that was 
generally accepted by the medical community, he did not violate the professional standard of care 
and could not be held liable for malpractice. (Unfortunately, the subsequent cataract surgery in 
this case rendered the plaintiff legally blind.) In the future this may well change and it is likely 
that indirect ophthalmoscopy will be considered the standard of care. 
Hypertensive and Cardiovascular Changes -- Hypertensive patients are another group needing 
thorough dilated fundus exams. Whenever one sees hypertensive changes in the retina, check the 
patient's blood pressure and let the patient know he should consult his internist concerning 
potential cardiovascular problems. If the person has already been diagnosed as hypertensive and 
extensive retinopathy is discovered with retinal and/or disc edema, hemorrhages, cotton-wool 
spots and/or a macular star, he should return to the internist to ensure that his blood pressure is 
being controlled adequately.36 Those with a grade Ill or IV retinopathy in the 
Keith-Wagener-Barker classification system have a poor prognosis and a short mean life 
expectancy. 36 The internist should be made aware of the ocular findings so every effort can be 
made to control the hypertension and enhance the life expectancy. 
When patients complain of amourosis fugax and cerebral symptoms of transient ischemic 
attacks (transient hemiplegia of the opposite side of the body, weakness, tingling or paresis of the 
arm, leg or hand, etc.) or have ischemic signs of the retina (including CRAO or BRAO), venous 
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stasis retinopathy, signs of arteriosclerosis in the retina, history of arterial occlusive problems, a 
retinopathy more pronounced in one eye or a significantly lowered lOP in one eye, it is advisable to 
suspect internal carotid artery disease. 39 Ophthalmodynamometry and listening for bruits are 
indicated to help with a diagnosis. However, do not perform ODM on those prone to a detachment, 
patients with new, fragile vascularization and possibly glaucoma. 39 Should either ODM or the 
presence of bruits be positive, or if you suspect ICA disease regardless, refer right away to a 
cardiovascular specialist. Patients with carotid insufficiency are at risk for a serious stroke. If a 
patient has a stroke and it is established that the optometrist should have reasonably suspected 
carotid insufficiency, he could well be held liable for failure to inform the patient and refer to the 
appropriate specialist. 
The above indicates the importance of assessing the status of the retinal vasculature and 
therefore, indirectly obtaining an idea of the status of the cardiovascular system. If a significant 
compromise is noted, make sure a prompt referral is made for a medical workup, as this may 
potentially save the patient from considerable damage or even his life. Retinal venous and arterial 
occlusions can be visually debilitating, as well as necessitate a medical investigation as to the 
underlying cause. CRVO has a variable visual prognosis and no medical treatment (anticoagulants 
or steriods) can guarantee improvement or even maintenance of vision. 40 However, some attempt 
is still advisable and therefore, refer these patients for this treatment. Also, in the ischemic 
variety, referral for panretinal photocoagulation can minimize the chances of developing 
neovascular glaucoma. 40 In addition, a prompt referral for blood studies and a cardiovascular 
evaluation is mandatory. CRAOs require immediate initiation of treatment (within 1-2 hours) to 
try to dislodge the embolus in order to improve the visual prognosis. 41 Once again, a medical 
work-up to establish and manage the underlying cause is essential. 
A frequent cause of sudden vision loss in the elderly patient is ischemic optic neuropathy. 
Correct diagnosis with prompt and proper referral can help the patient in an attempt to retain 
useful vision. Make sure you rule out the possibility of temporal arteritis by taking a careful 
history, examine and palpate the temporal arteries and refer for an erythrocyte sedimentation rate 
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(ESR). If the ESR is elevated, refer for a temporal artery biopsy and probably high-dose systemic 
steroid treatment in the attempt to improve the visual prognosis. The idiopathic variety is often 
associated with hypertension, arteriosclerotic changes, occlusive artery disease, diabetes and 
migraine and therefore, refer the patient promptly for an appropriate work-up. 42 Failure to 
refer would constitute negligence. 
Macular Degeneration -- As the reader is probably aware, this is a leading cause of new, 
permanent visual disability in the U.S. In 90% of the cases, the degeneration is of the "dry" 
variety and there is no available treatment at this time. However, the remaining 10% is of the 
"wet" or exudative type and prompt referral for treatment in the early stage can potentially keep 
the condition from deteriorating further. 43 Therefore, look carefully for any signs of exudative 
degeneration (subretinal neovascularization, subretinal hemorrhages, serous detachments or 
disciform scars), check for any central scotomas and perform an Amsler grid test. In a "suspect" 
patient, instruct him on the use of an Amsler grid, send him home with one and have him call 
immediately if any changes are noticed. Refer patients with exudative changes, questionable 
ophthalmoscopic findings, metamorphopsia and decreased visual acuity right away for fluorescein 
angiography and possible krypton laser treatment. Failure to do so will eliminate the chance for a 
favorable visual prognosis and result in permanent central vision loss. Needless to say, this may 
well lead to a claim and probable liability. 
Tumors -- The final area to be discussed in this section concerns tumors. If any nevus or 
retinal lesion appears suspicious and may possibly be malignant, refer for a consultation to be on 
the safe side. Any nevus should be examined closely regarding possible elevation or any changes in 
its appearance. A thorough exam, of course, requires a dilated fundus exam. In addition, be on the 
lookout for cysts in other areas of the eye, such as the iris, ciliary body and adnexa. Keep in mind 
that the eye is a frequent location for metastatic tumors. 36 A thorough visual field can aid in the 
detection of an intracranial lesion and unilateral exophthalmus can indicate an orbital tumor. 36 
The diagnosis of a tumor can often be a difficult one, but every attempt should be pursued should you 
have any reason to suspect one. This can help in minimizing or perhaps eliminate an adverse 
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judgment should a patient be subsequently found to indeed have a tumor with resultant damage, loss 
of an eye or in a catastrophic case, loss of the patient's life. Above all, proper documentation is 
crucial. Two cases involving a failure to diagnose a brain tumor are Wills v. Klinqebeck and Evers 
v. Buxbaum , both of which are discussed in detail in other portions of this paper. 
Throughout this discussion certain points are extremely important to keep in mind. First of all 
is the obvious one of making every attempt to correctly diagnose any existing ocular pathology. If 
any condition is found, adequately inform the patient. The law requires that you do so in layman 
terms so there is full communication with the patient and he fully understands the condition, the 
risks and any further tests or treatment that might or are necessary. Then either institute the 
appropriate treatment or refer to the necessary specialist in a timely fashion. The timeliness is 
critical, as a delay in referral can sometimes mean potential disaster. The delay can be a cause for 
futher deterioration for which you can be liable. Of great importance, of course, is complete, 
thorough documentation. Failure in any of these critical areas will be likely to impose liability and 
little opportunity for a successful defense should a lawsuit ensue. 
Failure to Refer -- Regarding the duty to refer, the following are several cases that illustrate 
the importance of an appropriate and timely referral. The case of Tempchin v. Sampson, 262 Md 
156, 277 A.2d 67, 51 ALR.3d 1286 (1971 }, involves a patient-plaintiff who went to an 
optometrist for an exam. The optometrist noticed some pathology and told the patient she had some 
spots on the lens or "incipient cataracts", but that it was no real immediate problem. The plaintiff 
testified that she had asked him whether she should see an ophthalmologist and was told that it was 
not necessary because they were very early changes, indicating that a cataract will occur later on. 
There was an 11-day delay before she sought an ophthalmologist due to complaints of extreme 
vision loss. The ophthalmologist had diagnosed uveitis and testified that if he had seen the patient on 
the same day as the optometrist had and had begun treatment, the condition would not have 
progressed to the acute phase which caused the loss of vision. The state of Maryland has the 
community rule and the judge's decision was that the optometrist had the duty to detect diseases of 
the eye, but not to treat them. He had the duty to refer, which this optometrist failed to do, and 
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therefore, the judgment went in favor of the plaintiff. The court held that the 11-day delay was the 
proximate cause of the near total vision loss as a result of the misdiagnosis. Had the optometrist 
indicated that the patient should go ahead and see the ophthalmologist who would have initiated 
treatment, the judgment would have been minimal or none at all. 
Another case, Wills v. Klingenbeck 455 S.2d 806 (su. Ct. Ala., 1984) involves a plaintiff's 
complaint against an optometrist stating that he failed to inform the plaintiff of the consequences of 
an eye condition and failure to refer him to an ophthalmologist or neurosurgeon. It was alleged that 
"the defendant (doctor) negligently failed to diagnose a brain tumor in the head of the plaintiff and 
negligently failed to inform or properly advise the plaintiff that the papilledema is a symptom of a 
brain tumor." Wills v. Klingenbeck 455 S.2d 806 at 806 (Su. Ct. Ala., 1984) The plaintiff 
stated that he was told that he had papilledema, but was not told what to do about it, whereas the 
defendant claimed that he did not find papilledema, but that he did determine that the patient's blood 
pressure was very high and that he told the patient he should consult a physician about that at once. 
The optometrist further claimed that since the patient was already under the care of a physician and 
ophthalmologist, it would have been futile to refer. However, the court felt that, regardless, the 
optometrist had the duty to refer. The patient was later diagnosed as having a brain tumor by a 
neurosurgeon. The major points, as the reader can see, involve the duty to refer, as well as provide 
an adequate informed consent. 
Not only does the optometrist have the duty to refer, but also in a timely fashion. In King v. 
Harrington 411 S.2d 912 (Ct. App. Fla., 1982), an ophthalmologist had failed to timely diagnose a 
retinal detachment. Two months after the patient had initially presented the doctor with a drawing 
of the black spot in his field of vision and described symptoms of floaters, did the doctor dilate and 
examine the fundus, but he only found floaters and an absence of retinal tears or detachments. At 
this point in time, the doctor was given yet another drawing of the field defects. Only 24 days later 
the patient returned with no vision at all in the right eye, yet the ophthalmologist still adhered to 
his original findings. It was not until 38 days after this that the doctor admitted that he found a 
retinal detachment and referred the patient to another ophthalmologist for surgery. This case is a 
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clear example of multiple periods of failure to take timely action. 
A further example of a failure to timely refer is illustrated in the case of Steele v. U.S., 463 F. 
Supp. 321 (USDC, Alaska, 1978). Here the optometrist diagnosed accommodative esotropia in a 
four-year-old boy for which he prescribed glasses, and he also observed a vitreous hemorrhage in 
one eye. The optometrist did not refer and saw the patient again approximately one month later. At 
this time he recorded "no good reflex" in that one eye, did not refer and prescribed different glasses. 
Five months later the vision in that eye was limited to light perception and at this time, the 
optometrist referred the child to an ophthalmologist. The boy was then examined by a number of 
ophthalmologists who speculated that the condition might be either a retinoblastoma or toxocara 
canis. The eye condition made it impossible to distinguish between these two and due to the potential 
danger of retinoblastoma, the eye was enucleated. The court held that the optometrist should have 
informed the parents of the ocular abnormality and referred the child to an ophthalmologist on the 
first visit. It also stated that the optometrist most definitely should have referred on the second 
vision when a poor reflex in the eye was noted. The court stated that if a timely referral had been 
made, an ophthalmologist might have concluded that an inflammatory reaction was present and 
probably would have diagnosed toxocara. Steroid treatment would have been initiated and possibly 
would have prevented further vision loss and would have saved the eye. The point made here was 
that a delay in diagnosis and institution of treatment allowed further damage to occur which might 
have otherwise been prevented. The lesson to be learned in all of these cases involves the 
optometrist's duty to refer in a timely fashion. 
Vision Theraov -- In the area of vision therapy, there have been no specific litigated cases, but 
this does not mean that there is no possibility for one to occur. Whatever claims have been made 
were settled out of court or not appealed and thus have not appeared in the legal sources. Basically, 
there are a few precautions one should keep in mind. Any possible pathology (tumors in 
particular) should first be ruled out before any program of visual training is instituted. If a 
patient undergoes VT and during this period a pathological condition goes undiagnosed and hence 
untreated, causing injury to the patient, the optometrist will be liable for negligence. Any 
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pathology that is present prior or during VT must be detected and treated in the appropriate fashion. 
The above could well be pertinent in a case of amplyopia. Before institution of a vision therapy 
program, make sure a dilated fundus exam and probably a VER are performed and any potential 
pathology cause is ruled out. Furthermore, be careful if patching is utlized in the program. If the 
eye with the better visual acuity is made to also be amblyopic, then likely liability will result. 
Another area requiring caution relates to the breakdown of an adaptation. Many strabismics 
have adapted to their problem and are capable of functioning in some manner in their environment. 
If VT is provided, the adaptation is broken down, but the patient is left with intractable diplopia, 
the practitioner can expect liability. The type of visual behavior and the probability of a favorable 
prognosis need to be assessed before any therapy is pursued. The patient should also be forewarned 
about potential undesirable outcomes, their probability and any discomfort (such as headaches) 
they may experience during the program. Postsurgical strabismics may have a cycle component 
and should be identified. These patients are frequently poor candidates for successful VT or may be 
untreatable and the patient should be so informed. 
A final note regards the misdiagnosis of a visually-related learning disability. Make certain it 
is an accurate diagnosis or the consequence may be a subsequent claim based on the loss of 
educational opportunities and career options. Since a child is involved, this could well result in a 
substantial judgment. 
A general word of advice for all visual training is to never guarantee total cures. Realistically 
advise the patient on the nature of his problem and the reasonable prognosis for improvement that 
VT may provide. Also, do mention the other alternatives for treatment, including surgery, and 
discuss the pros and cons of each with the patient. Failure to disclose all the alternatives can 
potentially involve the optometrist in a claim. 
Conclusion 
Now that we have extensively discussed the various legal theories applicable in professional 
liability, the major potential areas for a claim, a number of illustrative cases from the "law books" 
and general practical hints you might incorporate into your own practice, it is hoped that the word, 
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malpractice, no longer brings forth to mind visions of a horrible nightmare. However, the reader 
should resist the temptation to use this paper to "solve" a particular pending claim or case. 
Basically, proper documentation, exercising due care and upholding the standards of the "prudent 
practitioner" and above all, common sense and a genuine concern for the patient can not only help 
avoid claims in the first place, but also substantially bolster a defense should an eye care 
professional be unfortunate enough to be named in a suit. Keep in mind that typically two-thirds of 
all professional liability cases are won by the defendant doctor. However, do not simply rely on 
this fact and neglect to build a good defense until a claim is made, at which time it will be too late. 
Instead, start now by incorporating good judgment and practice methods into the day-to-day 
activities within your own office. Let's seize this opportunity and not repeat the same mistakes 
made by the medical profession in the past. 
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APPENDIX A 
The following are several examples of forms, variations of which the 
eye care professional may wish to include in the record of contact lens 
patients. These were excerpted from John Classe's articles. 12,14.44 
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CONTACT LENS FITTING AGREEMENT 
0 Spherical 
0 Gas Permeable 
0 Extended Wear 
0 Ast igmatic (Toric) 
0 Astigmatic !Custom Toric) 
0 Aphakic 
::::::1 Sofot:a' 
0 Kera:oconus 
I understand the tota l fee for my contact lens serv ices and materials isS----- -----
AT LEAST ONE -HALF THE TOTAL FEE MUST BE PAID BEFORE LENSES ARE ORDER · 
ED. FULL PAYMENT IS REQUIRED BEFORE LENSES ARE DISPENSED. 
This fee includes th e services and materials as c ircled on the Contact Lens Fee Schedule . The 
only add itional charges that may be incurred dur ing t he six month fitting agreement pe~iod a re 
as follows: 
I. If you haye to be switched to a more expensive lens in order to accomp lish a successfu l 
f it , you wil l only be charged the lens cost dilfe rence . 
II. If the refit is a spec ial lens as listed on the Fee Schedule the~e will be an add itional $ __ 
for services. If this fee was included orig in ally there wil l be no add itional charge . 
Ill. If ycu are initially placed on a cold disin fectant system and hzve to be switched to a thermal 
system, the fee for the heat ing unit will be s __ . 
IV . If a lens is lost or damaged dur ing the fitting period , r'! DI Jcement cost is as circled on the 
Fee Schedule next to the type of lens that you are weartng. 
REFUND POLICY : 
In the event that the patient o r doc•or dec ides that it is necessary to discontinue wearong the 
lenses for any reason. the Contact Lens SPrvice fees as circled on the Fee Schedu le are not 
refundable. The cost of the com act lenses fci rc :ea ur.d~r Cont ar.t Lens Materials} willl:>e refunded 
in fu ll. If a Therma' Un it is ret urned an adrlitio:"'~ ! S __ will be rdundcd. 
Six months after :he lenses are rlispcnse<J th •s aqreemenl ends. no rofunds are given and al l 
profess ional services and mate rials will be at ou' usua l arod customary fees an effect a t that time. 
I fu lly understand and accept this ~gr~ernent. 
(pat 1en1 sagnature } (date} 
Figure 1: Sample fitting agreement (Courtesy UAB School of Optome-
try). 
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Soft Contact Lens Care and Handling 
Proper car< is n<C<"-1!)' for succtuful we or, normal lens life, and 1ood •yc health. You will I>< provid<d wioh producu 
to clean, disanfcct ~nd uorc your s.of, lcnies. Us.c 1hrm as in~tructcd . 
Your daily l<ns clean<r is 
Your wrckly cl<an<r (if pr<>cril><d) is 
Your lem disinfecnon mcohod is 
0 Hear 0 Solurion 
Your ovrmi&ht wakm& solution is 
Your rinsing soluuon JS 
[yt drops to ust whr:n len)o arc: on 
NOTE: These producu have b«n prescribe<! speCJfically for ')I'Our knots and cya. Do no1 change or sub51itut< brands 
unltU YOU chtd Wilh W first. l!~ of Improper s.olutiOIH aay rcsuh in Jtru damaJC Of eye: irritation. 
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS 
I!\' THE BEGIN!';ING IT IS NORMAl If: 
1; Your kn= i1<h or fe<l funny. 
2) One- lens is more noocc:able than rhc: oth-=r. 
) } Your visJon ~ms h.::zz1cr th.an w1rh &Ia~ . 
4 ) One eye sees bentr than the othez. 
5; You have trouble handlinE your len~ 
WEARII"G SCHEDULE 
2 
3 
7 
Houn 
,c,.r appomrmcn t 
10 
11 
12 
13 
H 
Houn 
REMOVE YOUR LENSES If: 
I) You devdop unusual pain or redness . 
2) You cxperirnce a decrease in vision thar does nor clear up . 
3) You S<lipe<r j,()m<thJn& ;, wrong . 
Dart -------------------------------
Figure 2: Sample patient information form (Courtesy Hayes Marketing, 
Inc., Copyright 1983). 
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Extended Wear Lens Care and Handling 
Pr~r care is ntc<Sur)' for •ucctssful wear , normal len• life, and sood eye heol th . You will b< provided with product> 
to clc~n . disinfccl and stort your tXltndtd wcJ.r lcn~a . Usc them as inurucccd . 
Your ltn!. clca n~r is 
Your lrns di,inftctan t is 
Your 50okin& >Diurion is 
Your rinsing solurion n 
Eyedrops ro US<' b<fore •l«p and upon wok ing 
NOTE: The!.C l"'oducu have b<rn pr.,.crib<d specifically for your let! so and eyes . Do nor change or sub<titul< brands 
unltss you chcck with w fim. Usc of improper 50luriom moy tc:uh in lens damage or eye irritation . 
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:---------------------------------------------
Plu.c Dote that ahhoush certain brands of lenses ma) be FDA appro•ed for 7, 14, or ncn 30 days of wtar, the 
adaptability of your t'ya is the I.e)' factor in detrrmining wearing time. Trust us to re<ommcnd a schedule 
suited to your individual accds. And remember ,like Jn)· medico I de>·icc contaoltnscs muu be monitored on a 
r<JUiar basis. Profnsional follow-up care is the moH imporront dement in succe.,fullona term kns wear . 
IN THE BEGINNING IT IS NORMAL IF: REMOVE AND DO NOT SLEH IN YOUR LENSES IF : 
1) You r lenscs itch or fctl funny. I ) You develop unusual po m or rrdne<s . 
2) One lens is mort noriccoblc rhan the other. 2) You d"clop unusuall) cloud) or fogg ,· •·ision . 
3) Your vision l«:ms fuzzier than with glos"' 3) You txprntnce il dccr~~ sc m vision rh~ t does not clear up . 
4 ) One cyc s.«s b<t«r thon rhc other. 4 ) You su spect some thmg is wrong 
5) You hov. trouble h•ndhng your lenstS . 
\I' EARING SCHEDULE 
O a!r -------------------------------
Nrx r appoint mrnr: -----------------
Figure 5: Instructions for extended wear lens care and handling (Cour-
tesy Hayes Marketing, Inc., Copyright 1984). 
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Follow-Up Care Agreement 
For Patients Wearing 
Extended Wear {Overnight) 
Contact Lenses 
With extended-wear contact lenses come addit1onal care requirements . You must 
adhere to the recommended lens care procedures and you must return to this office 
for periodic progress evaluat1ons. 
We require the following progress evaluation schedule: 
• After 24 hours of extended wear 
• After 3 days of extended wear 
• After 1 week of extended wear 
• After one month of extended wear 
• After each 6 month period of extended wear 
It is impossible to determine. 1n advance. whether you will become a successful user 
of extended· wear contact lenses. Certa1n personal, phyS1olog1ca1. and enwonmental 
fac:ors may adversely aHect the success of extended-wear contact lenses and may 
necess1tate a change 1n the recommended weanng schedule or term1nat1on of lens 
wear These factors 1ndude: 
• Poor lens hygiene 
• Inability or unwillingness to return for follow-up vis its 
• History of allergic reactions 
• Manual dexterity problems which would prevent 
periodic lens removal and cleaning 
• Severe emotional stress 
• Use of certain medications 
If you experience d1scomfort. redness. extre"Tie sens1t1vity to light. or blurry v1sion. 
remove your contact lenses at once ana call tt'11s ott1ce. Do not 1gnore these 
symptoms. 
If a !ens accumuiates depos1:s sue~ as prore:n. calcium . n'cotine e:c .. wnc1 cannot 
be removed. that le:Js mus: be replaced In some 1nstances a tens may become diS · 
placea from the eye and get los: or aamaged. requ~ring a rep lace.'':l€nt 
Your cooperat1on 1s v1ta! to your success w1th extended-wear con:ac: lenses. 
BI.J?NES-HIND' 
I unders:and the importance of adhering to the proper 
lens care procedures. of periodiC follow-up examinat1ons 
and agree to keep scheduled appointments and follow 
the doctor's advice for continued safe extended-wear. 
(pat:enl's SJgnalure) (dale) 
f 198~ BARI<ES HIND INC 2!59!>-A ~IN TEO"' us A . \ 28~ 
Figure 1: Sample agreement form for extended wear patients. (This form is copyrighted and is available only 
from Barnes-Hind, Inc.) 
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UNIVERSITY or· UlLI'UKl'IIA 
CONTACT LENS CLINIC 
SCHOOL OF OP'IOMETRY 
Berkeley. CA 94720 
415/642-2404 
Extended Wear Lens Care and Handling 
Patient 
Lens Care Instructions 
Proper care is ntccssary for successful wear. normal lens life, and good eye health. You will be provided with products to dean, 
disinfect and store your extended wear lenses. Use them as instructed. 
Your lens cleaner is --------------------------
Your lens disinfectant is --------------------------
Your soaking solution is --------------------------
Your rinsing solution is --------------------------
Eyedrops to use before sleep and upon waking --------------------------
~OTE: These products have bei!n prescribed specifically for ~·our lenses and e~es. Do not change or substitute 
brands unless you chtck with us first. l'se of improper solutions may result in lens damage or eye irritation. 
Please note that although certain brands of lenses may be FDA approved for 7, 14, or ~en 30 days of wear, the 
adaptability of your eyes is the ke)' factor in determining wearing time. Trust us to recommend a schedule suited 
to your individual needs. And remember, like any medical dl"·ice, contact lenses must be monitored on a regular 
basis. Professional follow·-up care is the most important element in successful long term lens wear. 
In the beginning it is normal if: •••••• 
I) Your eyes itch or feel funny. 
~) One lens is more noticeable than the other. 
3} Your vision seems fuzzier than with glasses. 
4} One eye sees better than the other. 
5) 'You have trouble handling your lenses. 
RemoH and do not sleep in your lenses if: -
I) You develop unusual pain or redness . 
1) You develop unusually foggy or cloudy vision. 
3) You e:\perience a decrease in vision that does not clear up. 
J) You suspect somethmg is wrong . 
X 
P.atient's Signature D1spensed By 
\\earing Schedule 
~e<t Appointment : 
Date 
Figure 2: Sample written instructions to extended wear patients for proper lens care and handling. (This form 
is copyrighted and is available only from Hayes Marketing, Inc., Vicksburg, MS.) 
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(X) 
0 
__ CONTACT LENS SERVICE AGREEMENT 
Our policy is to examine ____ contact lens wearers at least twice a year, 
in order to evaluate their eyes anct the ____ lenses themselves. At all 
examinations we review care and cleaning of the lenses, evaluate the patient's 
progress in general, and try to prevent problems from occurring. We want our 
ratients to have the freedom to call upon us whenever they experience 
difficulty or have questions, and to repl~ce contact lenses or get additional 
ones at the lowest cost possible. 
For these reasons we utilize a ____ Contact Lens Service Agreement, which 
Includes the following: 
l --Semi-annual examination of eyes and------Contact lenses . 
2 --Periodic checkup of eyes and _____ contact lPnses whenever 
difficulty is encountered. 
3 -- Purchase of __ contact lenses at laboratory costs plus a 
minimum handling charge. 
4 -- Cleaning of _____LOntact lenses when needed. 
5 -- Minimum charges for the exchange of ____ contact lenses. 
Although we cannot extend the _____ Cont~ct Lens Service Agreement to 
patients whom we have not examined, we are happy to examine, establish, and 
maintain a patient record for persons now wearing soft contact lenses, and who 
wish to use our services. 
Our ____ Contact Lens Service Agreement covers a period of one year. 
Renewal may be ~ccomplished annually provided we make an examination nf the 
patient during the twelve month period. The _____ Contact Lens Service 
Aqreement may be renewed anytime within thirty days of expiration. It may be 
reinstated thereafter if we have examined the patient within the preceding 
twelve months, for a $ fee, or upon completion of a current examination of 
eyes and lenses . 
We agree to provide with the following services : 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Perform two contact lens examination per year . 
No charge for office calls during the yea r. 
Purchase of ad~itional lenses at $ per lens. 
Exchange of lense s for any reason~ per lens . 
Cleaning of lenses as required at no c~ 
have read and understood the above agreement. l agree to pay $ as 
consideration for the services enumerated above. 
P3Tient 'RT[nes s 
Figure 3: Sample prepaid service agreement (Courtesy Drs. Mc-
Eachern, Cannon, and McClay). 
FOLLOW-UP CARE AGREEMENT FOR EXTENDED 
WEAR CONTACT LENSES 
With extended-wear contact lenses come add itional care requirements . You must adhere to the 
recommended lens care procedures and you must return to this office for periodic proqreu 
evaluations. 
We ~e_q_u~ th~ .!_o~lc_>~~~~progress_ ev~I:'.~!'Or\ sc~edule : 
• After 24 hours of extend~ wear 
• After 3 days of extended wear 
• A her 1 week of extended wear 
• A her each month of extended M!ar 
for the fi rst 6 months 
• After each 6 month period of extended 
wear 
It is imposstble to d~termine, in advance, whether you will become a successful user of extended· 
wear contact lenses . Certain personal, physiological, and environmental factors may adversely 
affect the success of extended -wear contact lenses and may necessitate a change in the recom-
mended wearing schedule or termination of lens wear . These factors include: 
• Poor lens hygiene 
• Inability or unwillingness to return 
for follow-up visits 
• History of Allergic reactions 
• Manual dexterity problems which 
would prevent periodic lens removal 
and cleaning 
• Severe emotional stress 
• Use of certain medications 
If vou cwperience discomfort. redness. extreme scnsot ivitv to liqht, or blurry vision . remove 
your contact lenses at once and call this office . Do not ignore these symptoms. 
If a lens accumulates deposits such as protein, calcium. nicotine. etc., which cannot be removed . 
that lens must be replaced . In rare instances a lens may cf islodgc from the eye and be lost or 
damaqed . re(]uiring a replacement. Lens life •s unprpfli c table ; frequent lens replaceme'lts should 
bl' expected . 
Your coorcration is vital to your success with extended-wear contact lenses. 
I understand the importance of periodic follow up exammations and agree to keep sched· 
uled appointments and follow the doctor's artvice for contmued safe extended -wear . Non 
compliance will be grounds for termination of Hten(fed-wear program. 
~iem'S Signatu-;-~;------ - (date) 
Figure 4: Sample extended wear fitting agreement (Courtesy UAB 
School of Optometry). 
INFORMATION ON EXTENDED-WEAR (OVERNIGHT) CONTACT LENSES 
Contact Lens Clinical Services 
School of Optometry I The Medical Center 
The Universtty of Alabama at Birmingham 
Birmingham, AL 35294 
205/934-5668 
205/934-3411 (after hours) 
With extended-wear contact lenses come special responsibilities and requirements. You must adhere to the 
recommended lens wear and care pucedures and you must retmn to the Clinic foc periodic pugress evaluatiom. 
We require the following Progress Evaluation Schedule: 
.t 24 hours after beginning overnight wear of the contact lenses 
.t 3 days after beginning extended wear of the contact lenses 
.t 1 week a1kr beginning extended wear of the contact lenses 
.t 2 weeks after beginning extended wear of the contact lenses 
.t 4 weeks after beginning extended wear of the contact lenses 
.t Eacll13 week period after beginning extended wear of the contact lenses 
It is impossible to determine in advance whether a patient will have a successful response to extended-wear contact 
lenses. Certain personal, physiological, and environmental factors may adversely affect the success of extended-wear 
contact lenses and may neressitate a cllange in the recommended wearing schedule or tennination of lens wear. These 
factors include, rut are not limited to: 
+ Poor lens hygiene 
+ Inability or unwillingness to return for follow-up visits 
+ Manual dexterity problems which would prevent periodic lens removal and cleaning 
+ Severe emotional stress 
+ Use of certain medications 
+ Inability or unwillingness to follow instructions 
As with any other drug or device, the use of extended-wear contact lenses is not without risk. A small, but significant, 
percentage of individuals wearing extended wear lenses develop potentially serious complications whlch can lead to 
permanent eye damage and vision loss. 
IF YOU HAVE ANY OF THE FQLWWING: 
THEN, 
Eye pain or Irritation 
Watering of or discharge from the eye 
Redness of the eye 
Cloudy or decreased vision, or 
Sensitivity to light, 
REMOVE YOUR LENSES AND CALL THE CLINIC IMMEDIATELY. WE 
WILL ARRANGE TO HAVE YOU EXAMINED AS NEEDED. DO NOT 
RESUME LENS WEAR UNTIL ADVISED TO DO SO BY US. IF YOU ARE 
UNABLE TO REACH THE CLINIC, CALL AN EYE DOCfOR. 
Figure 1: Informed consent agreement for disposable lenses. 
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You have betn fitted with the following type of extended wear cootact Jcnses: 
_ soft contact lenses 
_ gas penneable contact lenses 
_ _ disposable soft contact lenses 
MANUEACIURER/BRANP 
Each typ! of extended wear contact lens requires somewhat different methods of care and handling. 
LENS CARE INSTRUCTIONS 
Proper care is necessary for successful wear, proper vision, good eye health and normal lens life. You have been 
instructed in the proper methods of lens care and handling. You have been provided with products to clean, disinfect 
and store your extended wear lenses. Use them as instructed. Please refer to your instruction sheet entitled: 
CONJACI LENS CARE AND HANDliNG FORM for your prescribed lens care productJ. The products which 
have been prescribed are specifically for your eyes and lenses. Do not chan~e or substitute bra.TJds unless you check 
with us flrst. Use of imp-oper solutions may result in eye irritation or lens damage. 
Please note that certain brands of lenses may be approved by the FDA for 7, 14, or even 30 days of wear. Patients 
should not wear extended-wear lenses for more than 7 consecutive days. Lenses must be left off overnight and in the 
prescribed disinfection system before lens wear may be resumed. Please refer to your instruction sheer entitled: 
CONTACT LENS CARE AND HANDliNG FORM for your prescribed lens wearing schedule. 
PROGRESS EVALUATIONS 
Like any medical device, contact lenses must be monitored on a regular basis. Professional follow-up care is the most 
important element in successful long-term lens wear. Regular examination by an eye doctor is necessary to evaluate 
your eye's response to extended wear. 
It is important for the health of your eyes that you carefully follow the schedule recommended by the Clinic for wearing, 
cleaning, and disinfecting your lenses. If a lens accumulates deposits such as protein, calcium, nicotine, etc., which 
cannot be removed, that lens must be replaced. In some instances a lens may become displaced from the eye and 
berome lost or damaged, requiring a lens replacement. 
DISPOSABLE EXTENDED-WEAR CONTACT LENSES 
If you are wearing disposable contact lenses, you must remove your lenses and discard them according to the schedule 
prescribed for you. Disposable le!lSes should not be used after removal from the eye. Only new lenses should be 
worn during the next wearing period. Patients should not wear disposable extended-wear lenses for more than 7 
consecutive days. We are advising you to follow the wearing schedule: 
Remove lenses after days of wear. 
Keep the eyes free of any lenses for hours. 
If no problems are encountered, repeat the above schedule for _____ weeks, after which time you will rerum 
for a progress evaluation and a new supply of lenses will be dispensed. 
Figure 1: Continued. 
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PATIENT RESPONSIBILITY 
Signed 
Signed 
I understand that my cooperation and compliance is vital to my success with 
extended-wear contact lenses. 
I have been instructed in the proper methods of lens care and handling. I 
understand tbe importance of adhering to proper lens care procedures and the 
need for periodic follow-up examinations. I agree to follow the recommended 
wearing schedule and to keep scheduled appointments. I agree to follow the 
Clinic's advice for safe extended-wear as indicated on this form and in my clinic 
record. I will notify the Clinic immediately if any eye or vision problems occur. 
If I am unable to reach the Clinic, I will call an eye doctor immediately. 
I understand that extended-wear contact lenses have many benefits but, as with 
any other drug or device, they are not without possible risks. A small 
percentage of wearers develop serious complications including corneal ulcers 
which can lead to permanent eye damage and vision loss. I agree to follow the 
advice and instructions given to me by the Clinic. I will remove my lenses and 
seek care immediately if I experience any eye pain, redness, or decrease in 
vision. 
I have been told the nature, purpose and benefits of extended-wear contact 
lenses. I have also been told the possible risks, consequences, and side effects 
of extended-wear contact lenses, which are greater than those of daily-wear 
contact lenses. I know there are feasible alternatives, including daily-wear 
contact lenses and spectacles. I understand that I may not be able to 
successfully wear extended-wear contact lenses. I will be able to ask any 
questions that I have concerning the Clinic's policies and contact lenses prior to 
the ordering of lenses. 
By my signature, I acknowledge that I have read, understood, and received a 
copy of the INFORMATION ON EXTENDED WEAR CONTACT LENSES, 
the CARE AND HANDLING FORM and the UABSO CONTACT LENS 
FITTING AGREEMENT. I understand the Clinic's current policies, fees and 
refund schedule. 
Patient 
Parent or Guardian if patient is a minor 
Contact Lenses Dispensed by _____________ _ 
Date ________ _ 
Figure 1: Continued. 
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APPENDIX 8 
The case of Helling v. Carev is an often cited example of failing to 
perform tonometry and allowing a glaucomatous condition to go 
undiagnosed. A copy of the decision made by the Washington Supreme 
Court in this case follows and is included for the reader's interest. 
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circumst8ncPs, collective bargaining is not always futile 
and is frequently successfuL As the saying goes, one can 
lead a hors~ to w:1tcr but. cannot make it drink; but it is 
better to lP:td it <~s fnr ClS it will peaceably go than not to 
make the cflort. Thus. the stCl tute ( RCW 49.32.020) should 
be interpreted to mean that, while the courts cannot man-
date the <H.:h i.evemcnl of a fi11al agreement nor dictate its 
terms, they c:m, however. under their equity powers, apply 
the statute by ordering at le;:~st that the parties bargain 
collecbvely in good faith, for a rc<~son8ble time, and until it 
is reason;lbl:v clenr th<:~t furtl1er negotiations must neces-
sarily be futile. Th::-~t is all that plaintiffs ask for here and 
that, I think. they ;1re entitled to receive under RCW 
49.32.020. 
I No. 4277"•. En Tlcmc. Mnrch 14, 1974.) 
MoRRISON P HELLING rt. ol , Petitioners, v. THOMAS F. CAREY 
r>(. crl.. RPsp(mdents . 
Ill Ph:vsir.hn" ;l.n£1 Surg-f'O!ls-M~Ipradirr.-Standard or Care-Stan-
da.r£1 or J'rofro;~ion-ln.,nffic· ien•· ~·-EITcct. A physician may be guilty 
'of ll~'!~l i~•' ll''", (' Vf' n ltu ·•I H~h lw adlwres t.o l.h:1t. standard of care :md 
~ki ll r:{llf'!'l r•d nf 1 h·· :n rr:11!P p r:1'-'l i I ion('r in the clas~ to which he 
brlrmt~~- ;r l'l'<l:,onahk p rnr.lcncc requirr•~'> a higher degree of care. In 
dctcnn irlin.£; whcUwr r c:1sotwb h' prurlcnce requires care not ordi-
naril y r·xr·t·r'i~cd b~· I lw n V<' rag(' p1·nct itioncr, the court will consider 
the con1plr•xi l.v nn d cost of the nctdili<Jnal care, its risks i! any, Its 
rel inhilit:.·. :mrl I he con ::(:quenccs of failure to exercise the care. 
[Sr·r· An n. 21 A .f .. R.:lcl !l!i:J; fil Am. ,JUJ·. 2d, Physicians, Surgeons, 
and ()IIH•r 1li';11PJ"S ~~ 110, JJ<I . I 
r21 Physirian~ and Surg·rons--Malpraf'tict~-Standard of Care-Stan-
dan'! of l'roff'ssion-.(;lauroma. A skilkrl and qualified ophthalmol-
ogist i :; ''"f!li~f'n t iP not routirwly ~iving n test for glaucoma to nil 
pcn,nm: <: uf'ff'l"itlJ! :m.v <'.n· disenmfnrt, notwithstanding that the 
slrlflrl;n·d n f lhr prnfp~:,ion rlo<':' nol !"!.'quire the routine givln,:: or 
such lr•sl In prr~ons nnd r·r 11w nr.c" of 40, since althou~h glaucoma 
is fn1md in onl _v on r• 11111. nf <'very 2;) ,000 persons under the agC' ot 
40, tlw I'''' i!' simp!<'. itH·xp<·nsiv('. a nd h:umless, and the con5c-
QUPnc<· nf lhf' disr:lH' 1'.ning unrl<'t.<'d~Cd is i!·rcvcrsible blindness. 
UTTER, FtNu·v. "l"i li!\ Mtl.rn·"· .1.1 .. C'onr·ur· by s('pnrate opinion. 
''i 
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Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals. February 5, 
1973, 8 Wn. App. 1005. Reversed. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed, by unpublished opinion, a 
judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 
714089, Howard J. Thompson, J ., entered December 18, 
1970. The appellants (pbintiffsl petitioned the Supreme 
Court for review. 
Action for medical malpr<1ctice. The plaintiffs appealed to 
the Court of Appeals from a judgment entered on a verdict 
in favor of the defendants. 
Olwell, Boyle & Hattrup and Lee Olwell, for petitioners. 
Williams, Lanza. Kastner & Gibbs and Henry E. Kastner, 
for respondents. 
HUNTER, J.-This case arises from a malpractice action 
instituted by the plaintiff (petitioner), Barbara Helling. 
The plaintiff suffers from primary open angle glaucoma. 
Primary open angle gl<1ucoma is essentially a condition of 
the eye in which there is 811 interference in the ease with 
which the nourishing fluids can flow out of the eye. Such a 
umdition results in pressure gradually rising above the 
normal level to such an extent that de~mage is produced to 
the optic nerve and its fibers \\'ith resultant loss in vision. 
The first loss usually occurs in the periphery of the field of 
vision. The disease usuall:'·: has fe\v symptoms and, in the 
absence of a pressure test, is often undetected until the 
damage has become extensive and irreversible. 
The defendants (respondents J, Dr. Thomas F. Carey and 
Dr. Robert C. Laughlin, are partners who practice the med-
ical specialty of ophthalmology. Ophthalmology involves 
the diagnosis and treatment of defects and diseases of the 
eye. 
The plaintiff first consulted the defendants for myopia, 
nearsightedness, in 195!1. i\t thil t time she was fitted with 
contact lenses. She next consu lted the defendants in Sep-
()) 
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tember 1963, concerning irritation caused by the contact 
lenses. Additional consultations occurred in October 1963; 
February 1967; September 1967; October 1967; May 1968; 
July 1968; August 1968; September 1968; and October 1968. 
Until the October 1968 consultation, the defendants consid-
ered the plaintiff's visual problems to be related solely to 
complications associated with her contact lenses. On that 
occasion, the defendant, Dr. Carey, tested the plaintiff's eye 
pressure and fie ld of vision for the first time. This test 
indicated that the plaintiff had glaucoma. The plaintiff, who 
was then 32 years of age, had essentially lost her peripheral 
vision and her central vision was reduced to approximately 
5 degrees vertical by 10 degrees horizontal. 
Thereafter, in August of 1969, after consulting other phy-
sicians, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defend-
ants alleging, among other things, that she sustained severe 
and permanent damage to her eyes as a proximate result of 
the defendants' negligence. During trial, the testimony of 
the medical experts for both the plaintiff and the defend-
ants established that the standards of the profession for 
that specialty in the same or similar circumstances do not 
require routine pressure tests for glaucoma upon patients 
under 40 years of age. The reason the pressure test for 
glaucoma is not given as a regular practice to patients 
under the age of 40 is that the disease rarely occurs in this 
age group. Testimony indicated, however, that the 
standards of the profession do require pressure tests if the 
patient's complaints and symptoms reveal to the physician 
that glaucoma should be suspected. 
The trial court entered judgment for the defendants fol-
lowing a defense verdict. The plaintiff thereupon appealed 
to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of 
the trial court. Helling v. Carey, 8 Wn. App. 1005 (1973). 
The plaintiff then petitioned this court for review, which 
we granted. 
In her petition for review, the plaintiff's primary conten-
tion is that under the facts of this case the trial judge erred 
in giving certain instructions to the jury and refusing her 
Mar. 19741 HELLlNG v. CAH.I!:Y 
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proposed instructions detiniug the stat1danl of care which 
the law imposes upon an ophthalmologist. As a result, the 
plaintiff contends, in dlect, that she was unable to argue 
her theory of the case to the jury that the standard of care 
for the specialty of ophthalmology Wcls iJJadeq uate to pro-
tect the plaintiff from the incidence of gluucoma, and that 
the defendants, by reason of their speciul ability, knowl-
edge and information, were negligent i11 failing to give the 
pressure test to the plaintil'f at an earlier point in time 
which, if given, woulJ have Jetcdecl her condition and 
enabled the defendants to have ~.vertecl tbe resulting sub-
stantial loss in her vis ion. 
[1, 2] We find this to be a un1clue u.:,e. 'l'lte testimony of 
the medical experts is undi::;puted conc..:ruing the standards 
of the profession fo1· the S]Jeci;dty of upbthalrnology. It is 
not a question in this case of the dd<:ndants having any 
greater speci<d ability, k11ow ledge and iulormation than 
other ophthalmologists whid1 would rt:quin.: t he defendants 
to comply with a higher duty uf care tli<tll "Lhat degree of 
care and skill which is expected of tht: ••verage practitioner 
in the class to which be belongs, acting .in the same or 
similar circumstances." Pederson 'V. Dwnow.:hel, 72 Wn.2d 
73, 79, 431 P .2d 97:3 t19o7). The is~;ue is whether the de-
fendants' compliance with the standard uf tb~ profession of 
ophthalmology, which does nut require Lhe giving of a rou-
tine pressure test to persons under 40 years of age, should 
insulate them from liability w1der t lle facts in this case 
where the plaintiff has lost a suusL.tntial umo w1t of her 
vision due to the failure of the deJemlctnts to timely give 
the pressure test to the plaintiff. 
The defendants argue that the stand<:u·d of the profession, 
which does not require the g1ving of a routi11e pressure test 
to persons under the age of 40, is adequate to insulate the 
defendants from liability for negligertce because the risk of 
glaucoma is so rare in this age group. The testimony of the 
defendant, Dr. Carey, however, is l·eve<tlitlg u::> follows: 
Q. Now, when wc.L<; it, actually, the Jir::;t lime any com-
plaint was made to yd'u by her of any iield or visual field 
(X) 
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problem? A. Rea11~'. the first time that she really com-
plained of a visual Jield problem was the August 30th 
date. 11968] Q. And ho\V soon before the diagnosis was 
that? A. That was :10 davs. We made it on October 1st. Q. 
And in your opinion, !;ow long, as you now have the 
whole history and analysis and the diagnosis, how long 
had she l1acl this glaucoma'? A. I would think she proba-
bly had it ten years or longer. Q. Now, Doctor, there's 
been some reference to the matter of taking pressure 
checks of persons over 40. What is the incidence of glau-
coma, the statistics, \\·ith persons under 40? A. In the 
instance of glaucoma under the age of 40, is less than 100 
to one per cent. The younger you get, the less the inci-
dence. It is thought to be in the neighborhood of one in 
25,000 people or less. Q. How about the incidence of 
glaucoma in people over 40? A. Incidence of glaucoma 
over 40 get;.; into the two to three per cent category, and 
hence. that's where there is this great big difference and 
that's whv the standards around the world has been to 
check pressures from 40 on. 
The incidence of glaucoma in one out of 25,000 persons 
under the age of 40 may appear quite minimal. However, 
that one person, the pbintifl' in this instance, is entitled to 
the same protection, as aflorded persons over 40, essential 
for timely detection of the evidence of glaucoma where it 
can be arrested to avoid the grave and devastating result of 
this disease. The test is a simple pressure test, relatively 
inexpensive. Tlwre is no judgment factor involved, and 
there is no doubt that by giving the test the evidence of 
glaucoma can be detected. The giving of the test is harm-
less if the physical condition of the eye permits. The testi-
mony indicates that although the condition of the plaintiff's 
eyes might h<1ve at times prevented the defendants from 
administering the pressure test, there is an absence of evi-
dence in the record that the test could not have been timely 
given. 
Justice Holmes stated in Tc.ras & P. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 
U.S. 468, 470,47 L. Ed. 905,2:3 S. Ct. 622 (1903): 
What w3uall~· is done m:1~' he evidence of what ought to 
be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard 
Mar. 1974] HELLING v. CAHEY 
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of reasonable prudenee, wJ,etber it ustwlly is complied 
with or not. 
In The T.J. HoopeT, 60 F.2d 737 1 2d Cir. 1932), Justice 
Hand stated on page 740: 
ll]n most cases rec.lsonable prudence is in fact common 
prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole 
calling may have unduly Jagged in the adoption of new 
and available devices. It never rn<tY set its own tests, 
however persuasive be its usages. ('c)/1 rts mnst in the 
end say what is ?'eqniTecl.; there u re JYrecuu tions so imper-
ative that even their nniversnl clisrclfUrd will rrot excuse 
their omission. , 
(Italics ours.) 
Under the facts of this case reason;thle prudence required 
the timely giving of the pressure tt'st to this plaintiff. The 
precaution of giving this test to detect the incidence of 
glaucoma to patients under 40 years of age is so imperative 
that irrespective of its disregard hy the standards of the 
opthalmology profession, it is the duty of tLe courts to say 
what is required to protect patients under 40 from the 
damaging results of glaucoma. 
We therefore hold, as a matter of bv~', that the reason-
able standard that should have been followed under the 
undisputed facts of this case was the timely giving of this 
simple, harmless pressure test to this plaintiff and that, in 
failing to do so, the defendants \Vere negligent, which prox-
imately resulted in the blinchwss sustained by the plaintiff 
for which the defendants are liable. 
There are no disputed facts to submit to the jury on the 
issue of the defendants' liability. Hence, a discussion of the 
plaintiff's proposed instructions would be inconsequential 
in view of our disposition of the case. 
The judgment of the trial court and the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for 
a new trial on the issue of damages only. 
HALE, C.J., and RosELLINI, STAFFOHD, VlHIGHT, and BRACH-
TENBACH, JJ., concur. _ ... 
CX> 
CX> 
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UTTER, J. (concurring) -I concur in the result reached 
by the ma,iority. I believe a greater duty of care could be 
imposed on the defendants than was · established by their 
profession. The duty could be imposed when a disease, such 
as glaucoma, can be detected by a simple, well-known 
harmless test whose results are definitive and the disease 
can be successfully arrested by early detection, but where 
the effects of the disease are irreversible if undetected over 
a substantial period of time. 
The diflicu lty \Vith this approach is that we as judges, by 
using a negligence anal:'sis, seem to be imposing a stigma 
of moral blame upon the doctors who, in this case, used all 
the precautions commonly prescribed by their profession in 
diagnosi s and treatment. Lncking th_eir training in this 
highly wphistic:1ted profession, it seems illogical for this 
court to S<i :V they failed to exercise a reasonable standard of 
care. It seems to me we: <H·c, in reality, imposing liability, 
because, in choosing bel\\·een an innocent plaintiff and a 
doctor, who acted reasOJ wbly according to his specialty but 
who could hnve prevented the full e fl'ects of this disease by 
administeri ng a simple. harmless test and treatment, the 
plaintifl should not have to bear the risk of loss. As such, 
imposition of liability approaches that of strict liability. 
Strict liabili ty or liability without fault is not new to the 
law. Historically, it predates our concepts of fault or moral 
respons ibilit;v· as a basis of the remedy. Wigmore, Responsi-
bilit71 joT Tortious Arts: Its HistoT~J, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 315, 
383, 441 I 1894\. As noted in W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 
74 (3d ed. 1964) at pages 507, 508: 
There are many situations in which a careful person is 
held liable for nn entirelv reasonable mistake. . . in 
some eases the defendant may be held liable, although he 
is not only charged with no moral wrongdoing, but has 
not even df~parted in any way from a reasonable stan-
dard of intent or care. There is "a strong and 
growing tendency, where there is blame on neither side, 
to ask, in view of the exigencies of social justice, who can 
best be~1r the loss and hence to shift the loss by creating 
liabil i t~' \'.•here there has been no fault." 
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(Footnote omitted .) Tort law il;1s contitlllally been in a 
state of flux. It is ''not always neat and orderly. But this is 
not to say it is illogical. lts centra l logic is the logic that 
moves from premises- its objectives-that are only partly 
consistent, to conclusions-its rules-that serve each objec-
tive as well as may be while serving others too. It is the 
logic of maximizing service and minimizing disservice to 
multiple objectives. " Keeton, Is There u PLace for Negli-
gence in Modern Tort Luw?, 53 Vn. L . H.ev. B86, 897 (1967). 
When types of problems rather tll<.:lll numbers of cases 
are examined, strict liab il ity is ;1ppliecl more often than 
negligence as a principle which detel'mines liability. Peck, 
Negligence and Liahibty Withrmt. Fanlt in Tort Law, 46 
Wash. L. Rev. 225, 2:39 ( 1971). There nre mnny similarities 
in this case to other cases of strict liability. Problems of 
proof have been a common feature in situations where 
strict liability is applied. Where eve11ts are not matters of 
common experience, a juror's ab ility to comprehend 
whether reasonable ca re has been followed diminishes. 
There are few ureas as difllcult for jmors to intelligently 
comprehend as the intricate questions of proof and stan-
dards in medical malpractice cases. 
In applying strict liability there are many situations 
where it is imposed for conduct which can be defined with 
sufficient precision to insure that application of a strict 
liability principle will not produee miscarriages of justice 
in a substantial number of cases. If the ~·ctivity involved is 
one which can be defined with su fTi cient precision, that 
definition can serve as an accounting unit to which the 
costs of the activit,v may be ;lllucated with some certainty 
and precision . With th is poss iblC' , strict liability serves a 
compensatory functio11 in situatinn!:i where the defendant is, 
through the use of insurance, the fina ncially more responsi-
ble person. Peck, Neyl.iqence ancl Liuhility W'ithont Fault in 
Tort Law, supm at 240-41 . 
If the standard of a reasonabl~· prudent specialist is, in 
fact, inadequate to alTer reasonable protection to the plain· 
tiff, then liability can b«!""imposed without fault. To do so 
co 
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under the narrow facts of this case does not offend my 
sense of justi ce. The pressure test to measure intraocular 
pressure with the Schiotz tonometer and the Goldman ap-
planometer takes a short time, involves no damage to the 
patient, and consists of placing the instrument against the 
eyeball. An abnormally high pressure requires other tests 
which would either confirm or deny the existence of glau-
coma. It is generally believed t hat from 5 to 10 years of 
detectable increased pressure must exist before there is 
permanent damage to the optic nerves. 
Although the incidence of glaucoma in the age range of 
the plain t iJT is approximately one in 25,000, this alone . 
should not be enough to deny her a claim. Where its pres-
ence can be detected by a simple, well-known harmless 
test, where the results nf the test are definitive, where the 
disease c;m be successfully arrested by early detection and 
where its efl'ects nre irreversible if undetected over a sub-
stantial period of time, liabi!ity should be imposed upon 
defendants even though they did not violate the standard 
existing with in the profession of ophthalmology. 
The fa il u re of plaintiff to ra ise this theory at the trial 
and to propose instruct ions consistent with it should not 
deprive her of the right to resolve the case on this theory 
on appc~d . Where this court has authoritatively stated the 
law, the parties are bound by those principles until they 
have been overruled. Acceptance of those principles at trial 
does not constitute a waiver or estop appellants from 
adapting their cause on appeal to such a rule as might be 
declared if the earlier precedent is overruled. Samuelson v·. 
Freeman, 75 Wn.2d 894, 900, 454 P.2d 406 (1969). 
FINLEY and HAMILTON, JJ., concur with UTTER, J. 
Petition for rel1earing denied July :31, 1974. 
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AETNA LIFE lNSUHANn: CoM PANY et ol., .tlppeUants, v. 
WASHINGTON LIFE AND .LhsAUll. lTY l NSUHANCE 
GuAHANT Y A s soc iATioN e r. (1/., 
Hesponde nl s. 
111 Statutcs-Validiiy--Judieial Ht~ vit•w .. l ud tcial r•·\ ' iPw of the validity 
of a properly ('il<ll'lcd st.a t li ll' is lt n tilv d 1o p;l:<:-;ill g on its constitu-
tionality. Cou r tc: h;1ve no st tbsla n tiu: po we rs l " re v iew for purposes 
of approving or ctisapprov in.r:: a ny le .t~i sh 1 t i yc prJ] il' y. 
(2] Statutes-Validity- Prt•sumptions. S 1:11 \I LPS <•l'l' presumed to be 
constitutional, will not be clPdared in v;tlid un l ss shown beyond a 
reasonable doub : to IJ,. uncon:;1i tnt ion.d. :n:d will be upheld if a 
state of facts suf ticic nl to jus1ify an c n<ttl rnt.• nl c<• n reasonably be 
assumed to exi,; t. 
[3J Constitutional Law- b;u:tl ProLeetion-C'Iassiti<'ations-In General. 
While constitutinn:d provi sions f" r ,., p1 :.J pr«l< 'l'tion assure all per-
sons the pro1ect ion n f ,_•q ua I I<~ w s, llwy do no I prevent reasonable 
legislative dist inct ions !JdwcPn cl :•sscs w hi c h :ltrt ·L·c one class to a 
greater degree titan annll~t · r wlt,•n ,, w ·h i:; tlf 't'l'ssary to promote the 
general welfare. T IH• 11wr c possi h illl y th ut cxP rci se of the legisla-
ture's wide disC'rf'tion h a s r·csulted in : ;n :wb it rary clossification is 
insuJTicient to invoke t he l"q ua l proteC'l ion c l<li!Sc'.;. 
[4] Insurance-Guaranty A:.•;ociation-Sblutury l'rovisions--Validity. 
RCW 48.32A, wh i l'l1 d i s1iw; ui sl)('~ lit> 1\\' <'<' n dom es t ic and foreign 
insurance compan ies <ts to ;·,ss u nl) . .t i .. n. r<·l tt:·.fJl·:• nce, or guarantee of 
policies of dPfuncr i ll:;u ra ncl~ carri r·r::. :1nol i11 til'· a p po intment of a 
majority of the din.TI'>r:; o f' t l,c Iii <· nnd di.~ a bi lil y insurance guar-
anty association, is r , <~sonab k, rc~h on :r r< tl tnn al ba se, and is not 
violative of thL· cqu:d protccti () il c i <~U S< ;; "f tilt: state and federal 
constitutions. 
[See 43 Am. Jur. :.!d, Insur·ancc• ~ 12.1 
(5] Constitutional Law- Hue l'rocess-F:I'onumie Regulations-In Gen-
eral. Constitu!ional du,. proct:ss pr·(Jtcct Hms , w lt ile ;;ufficient to in-
voke certain limit:1tions upon th e ::1at c·'s f•Xerc ise of its police 
powers, will not be utilized by the court s ;;;; a nwans of substitut-
ing their judgnwnt f(lr that of t he ll' gisl a turc m economic regula-
tory policy making . 
(8] Statutes-Construction- J>rosJ11'eth·e A!IJIIication-Antecedent Fact 
-Effect. Statutes wh ich utilize f<l <: t s <HltPd nti n •~ the effective date 
of the enactment nre n ot l'l!lltlc-rf'd rdro~'pediv f ~ merely by such 
utilization. 
L?] Statutes- Construetion - Pros pedive Appli1·at.ion- Precipitating 
Event-Origin. An event prec ip it a ting t he <ipplication of a statute, 
-""' 
APPENDIXC 
The reader may be wondering how a case might read in the "law books" 
and therefore, the following case of Holmes v. lwasa is included to 
satiate the reader's curiosity. 
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REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY 
Had the legislature purported to make 
the shortened time applicable to accrued 
rights-which it did not do--and had it 
enacted as legislation that which the Court 
now establishes by judicial fiat, it would be 
difficult to uphold forty-five days as a rea-
sonable time within which to bring a claim. 
Although it is uncontroverted that legis-
latures have the power to shorten or length-
en statutes of limitation, the majority fails 
to recognize that courts in turn will make a 
determination of the reasonableness of the 
new time allowed to assert a claim when 
applied retroactively to a previously ac-
crued right. Indeed, several cases cited bv 
the Court in support of its conclusion ~)r~­
scribe such an examination. In OJi1·as v. 
Weiner, 127 Cai.App.2d 597, 274 P.2d 476 
(1954), the court qualified its application of 
a new statute of Limitation to an accrued 
cause of action: "It has repeatedly been 
held that the Legislature may reduce a 
statute of limitations and that the new peri-
od applies to accrued causes of action pro-
vided a reasonable time is allowed within 
which to assert the cause." 274 P.2d at 478 
(emphasis added). In that instance, a new 
limitation of six years was held not unrea-
sonable. After adopting almost identical 
language as found in Olivas, the Supreme 
Court of Utah in Greenhalgh v. Payson 
City, 530 P.2d 799, determined a new one-
year limitation to be reasonable. See also 
Day & 1\'ight Heating Co. v. Ruff, 19 Ctah 
2d 412, 432 P.2d 43 ~1967) (new one-year 
limitation held reasonable); Earle v. Froed-
tert Grain & Malting Co., 197 Wash. 341, 85 
P .2d 264 (1938) (new six-month limitation 
held reasonable). 
The lack of any holding by the majority, 
or any discussion whatever, regarding the 
reasonableness of the time period allowed 
for filing , in contravention of the very au-
thority cited in support of its position, com-
pels me to address the question, albeit in 
dissent. I am wholly unable to see that a 
forty-fi\'e day statute of limitation is a rea-
sonable amount of time to assert an accrued 
2. The 120-day hm1tation of the Tort Claims Act 
is frequently condemned as unreasonablt. To 
further shorten it to fifteen days, as to existing 
clam1s, would bt tht: equ1v<Uent of l.t;t ma;on-
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claim which at the time of its accrual wa~~ 
subject to a one-year limitation.2 Forty-
five days is not a long time in most circum-
stances. It is an exceedingly short period 
of time in which to by happenstance Jearn 
that the legislature has without fanfare 
shortened a one-year statute to a bare for-
ty-five days. It cannot be said as a matter 
of law that the appellants' filing on Novem-
ber 5, 1976, approximately two and one-half 
months after the expiration of the forty-
five day period as creatively applied by the 
Court, is unreasonable. Certainly, four 
months is not an excessive amount of time 
to allow a plaintiff who thinks he has one 
year to discover a change in the law and file 
a claim or notice. The Court's opinion ha~~ 
impermissibly, but effectively, foreclosed 
the appellants' opportunity to recover the 
benefits statutorily due medical indigenL~. 
yet no fault has been found against them. 
104 Idaho 179 
William HOLMES, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
George IW ASA, Optometrist; Berkle) 
Bio-Engineering International, a corpo-
ration, or Berkley Bio-Engineering, Inc.; 
Does I through XV; Does XVI through 
XXX; Does XXXI through XL; Black 
Corporations I through XV; White Cor-
porations I through XV; and Green Cor· 
porations I through XV, Defendants, 
and 
George lwasa, Optometrist, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
No. 13459. 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
Jan. 13, 1983. 
Patient brought action against optomt.'-
trist for alleged professional malpractice. 
ty's cutting 365 days to forty-five days, and 
hence "acceptable"-a proposition even pro!X• 
nent's of the 120-day limitation would W·* 
._eytn=·'u t I,, ' ·ttt Sf am· • 
HOLMES v. IWASA 
Cite a!>, Idaho, 857 P.2d 476 
Idaho 477 
'lr,, Drstrict Court, Third J uc!Jcial District, 
h,_,l'lt.c County, &!ward J. Lodg-e, J., en-
t.-:r~·d summary judgment for optometrist, 
and patient appealed . Th., Suprl·me Court, 
Hahe~ . J ., held that althoug-h date~ on which 
"l'lomdrist ordered bifocals for patient and 
fitted them to patient's head fell within 
t" v-year period of limitations set by profes-
~loJJal malpractice statute, whert· there was 
iw c\'idenct: that optometrist had a medical 
liUl,\ to reexamine or ret.e:st patient's eyes 
ui, L!.use dates, and earlier datt:s on which 
''' olid examine patient's l',Y es were out.>idc 
pcnod of limitations, Oj.Jtometrist was not 
rc,ponsible for any occurrence, act. or omis-
~JurJ, I.e., fa ilure to diaguo:sc patient\ glau-
, ••• n.a, on ;, dak within two-year period of 
iiH.Jl al.iuns, and patient 's chuw fur prufes-
~'"ual malpractice was !Jarred. 
Affirmed . 
Shepard, J ., dissentt:d and fi leJ O],inion 
,,, ''hid; Bistline, J., eCJ!l<:Ul'l'ed. 
I. Ph)'liicians and Surgeons ~ 18.15 
Although dates on wluch optometrist 
•mkred bifocals for patient and fitted them 
Lu patient's head fell within two-year period 
uf limitations set by professional mal-
l•r<•l.'llre statute, where tht:rt \'>as no evi-
•ll r<~·L· that optometrist had a rnedica l duty 
l• · rL·t:xamine or retest pali,'nt', eye~ on 
lJ,,.,,. date~. and earlier daLes con which he 
did examine patient's eyes were outside pe-
n••i of limitations, optometrist was not re-
•l•unsihle for any occurrence, act or omis-
DI"'' · i.e., failure to diagnose patient's glau-
(.'l,mi.l, on a date within two-year period of 
lilloitatiuns, and patient',; claim for profes-
~"'llal malpractice was lmrred. !.C. § 5-
:.:l~~. ~ubd. 4. 
:!. Limitation of Action!! G::.> 13 
},, a pruper ease, a dcf cndaut may be 
"''·1•1"-'d frum. r~·lying on a statl.tl' of limi-
l.atl"'" a~ a Lar to an aniuro c.g-•• inst him . 
l'i .t ll\ll li, "'r .. , wa~ appruxun<ttdy 47 ~·~"r' old 
• l U1~ lllltt: , l t::~lltitd tllal ht Ildd SUilt:ft:o.J !rum 
3. Limitation of Actions c= 13 
Estoppel may prevent a defendant 
from asserting the statutory bar when his 
representations or conduct dissuade a plain-
tiff from prosecuting his cause of action 
during the period of limitations. 
4. Limitation of Actions c= 13 
Optometrist, against whom patient al-
leged professional malpractice for failur~ to 
diagnose glaucoma, was not estopped from 
relying on two-year period of limitations as 
a bar to action where, aside from fact that 
there was no evidence that optometrist 
made any statements or took any action in 
an effort to induce patient to delay in 
bringing action, there was no evidence th(lt 
patient relied on statements made by o~ 
tometrist in waiting to file his action. I.C. 
§ 5-219, subd. 4. 
5. Constitutional Law cg;:,249(3), 308 
Physicians and Surgeons 13=2 
Statute setting forth a two-year period 
of limitations for professional malpractice 
actions is violative neither of due process 
nor of equal protection. I.C. § 5-219, subd. 
4; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
A.L. Lyons, of Lyons, Bohner & Chasan, 
Boise, for plaintiff-appellant. 
Michael Moore, of Imhoff & Lynch, Boise, 
for defendant-respondent. 
BAKES, Justice. 
Plaintiff appeals from a summary judg-
ment entered in favor of the defendant in 
this professional malpractice action. 
The sequence of events is virtually undis-
puted. The dispute arises over when the 
plaintiff's cause of action accrued and when 
the statute of limitations began to run in 
this case. The evidence before the district 
court indicated that plaintiff, William 
Holmes, initially went to the defendant, Dr. 
George Iwasa, an optometrist practicing in 
Weiser and Cambridge, Idaho, on July 24, 
1974, for a routine eye examination. Plain-
tiff complained of headach~s and sensitivity 
to bright lights,1 Lut defendant found that 
these problems for years . 
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plaintiff's glasses were at that time the 
correct prescription. However, the defend-
ant anticipated that bifocals might be nec-
essary in the future. 
Holmes returned to defendant's office on 
November 19, 1975, again complaining of 
problems with bright lighL~ and headaches, 
and that his vision wa.-; blurred. Defendant 
took a history from the vlaintiff, conducted 
an eye examination, including a test for 
glaucoma which Wll.S accomplished by mea-
suring eye pressure with a tonometer, and 
prescribed bifocals for plaintiff's problems. 
Plaintiff delayed ordering his bifocals 
from Dr. Iwasa until December 22, 1975, 
when he returned to defendant's offic€. 
Plaintiff's eyes were not examined on that 
date; he merely chose the frames and or-
dered the already prescribed bifocals. The 
purpose of plaintiff's next visit to Dr. lwa-
sa's office was to pick up his bifocals on 
, January 21, 1976. At that time, Dr. lwasa 
did not examine plaintiff's eyes but merely 
fitted the new bifocals to plaintiff's head. 
When the new bifocab failed to relieve 
his symptoms, plaintiff went to see Dr. 
Howarth, an opthamolo1,rist, on January 23, 
1976. Dr. Howarth conducted eye examina-
tiom; and informed plaintiff that, in his 
opinion, plaintiff Wll.S suffering from glau-
coma.2 In his deposition, Dr. Howarth de-
scribed plaintiff's condition as marked opt:n-
angle glaucoma and explained that glauco-
ma grows progress in:ly worse the longer 
the condition is preser1t. D~ . Howarth esti-
mated that the glaucoma had been present 
in plaintiff for at lea.~t eight years prior to 
January 23, 1976. 
On December 21 , 1977, plaintiff filed 
complaint aga inst defendant and Berkeley 
Bio-Engineering International , the manu-
facturer of the tonometer u~ed by Dr. Iwa-
sa in measuring the pressure in plaintiff's 
eyes. B~;rkeley Wll.S subsequently dismissed 
from this action. Defendant, in hi:; motion 
2. Plamtiff had pre\iuusly seen Dr . Howarth on 
October 20, 1975, betweeu his visits to Dr. 
Iwasa, complaming of vanablt> vi~ion. Because 
plamliff told Dr. Howarth that h1s v1sion wa s 
improved upon eatmg, Dr. Howarth suspected 
hypoglycemia and told plamtJtt to have a gl u· 
cose tolerance test run. The record ind1cates 
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for summary judgment, alleged that certain 
counts contained in plaintiff's complaint 
were inapplicable to a malpractice action 
and that plaintiff's complaint as a whole 
was barred by the statute of limitation&. 
The lower court granted defendant's sum-
mary judgment motion, based on the stat-
ute of limitations, and plaintiff appealed. 
Although plaintiff appellant presented 
several issues on appeal, they all relate t.o 
the central issue of whether the district 
court erred in granting defendant's motion 
for summary judgment on the ground that 
the statute of limitations barred plaintiff'• 
claim. 
Prior to March 24, 1971, I.C. § 5--219(4), 
the statute of limitations applicable to pro-
fessional malpractice actions, in essen~ 
provided that an action had to be filed 
within two years of the alleged professional 
malpractice; the statute made no reference 
whatsoever to the interrelationship betw~n 
the accrual of a cause of action and knowl-
edge of a cause of action. Without the 
benefit of legislative guidance, this Court 
adopted the so-ealled "discovery exception" 
in cases in which foreign objects were negli-
gently left in a patient's body. In Billings 
v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 
389 P.2d 224 (1964), we held that ''the cauae 
of action (in such cases] does not accrue 
until the patient learns of, or in the exerciat 
of reasonable care and diligence should 
have learned of the presence of [the] for· 
eign object in his body." ld. at 498, a89 
P.2d at 232. In Renner ~·. Edwards, 98 
Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1969), aff'd on 
rehearing, we extended the discovery rule 
to cases of misdiagnosis and held that tht: 
statute of limitations did not begin to run 
Ui1ti) the patient knew Or should h11ve 
known of the physician's misdiagnosis. 
However, soon after our decision in &•n-
ner, and perhaps partly in response thero-
that the tests were run and that the resulu. 
dated October 28. 1975, were normal, which. 
according to Dr. Howarth, ruled out hypoglyc&-
mia as having an effect on plainliffs eyesij,'ht 
Plaintiff, however, did not return to Dr . Ho· 
wart.h until January 23, 1976. 
Cite u, ldabo, U7 P .2d 478 
lo,3 the legislature substantially amended 
l.C. § 5-219(4}.4 1971 Idaho St:ss.Laws, ch. 
!!S(J, § L By amending J.C. § 5- 219(4}, the 
lt:g.i.slature narrowed the scope of Renner 
1md, in large part, defined when a cause of 
action accrues for the purpo-ses of applying 
tht · statutory period of Jimitatioli~> in profes-
blllnal malpractice actions . Under amended 
U ·. § 5-219(4), the discovery exception 
f r r~t recognized by this Court in Billings v. 
Sl~!tm; of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 389 
I' .~ 224 (1964), is limited to cases involving 
fur·cign objects and frauduleJJl eoneeal-
tr ll:nt. ~ In al l other professional mal-
J•ractice actions, "the cause of action shall 
lot deemed to have aceru cd as of the time of 
the oecurrcnce, act or omission complained 
uf . " The action must be brought with-
HI two years of that t imt:. 
The alleged negligem aet, oecurrcnce or 
·•l!ilbbion complained of by the plaintiff is 
IJr I wasa's failure to d iscover plaintiff's 
~l.·u~oma. The undispuU:'d evidence estab-
lt~.r"'~ that Dr . Iwasa examined plaintiff's 
l. In ch. 180, 9 2, tht: ltgi~latun· declared that 
..,,, ~nu•rgency existed and that the amendment 
olrould become effective upon approval. 1971 
•dahu Sess.Laws, ch. 180, § 2 . 
•· A> amended, l.C. § 5--219 provides for a two 
·, rar limitation on: 
" (4) An act ion to recover damages fo r pro-
lr>~ional malpractice, or for an injury to the 
J.ICf>On, or for the death of one caused by the 
wrougful act or neglect of another, including 
d '' y ;uch action arising trom breach of an 
llr.plred warranty or implied covenant; pro-
'tdt'd, hc•wever, when th" acti<lll is for dam-
-~,., iln!>mg out of the pl&d•nwnt and mad-
' t' rltrH, accidental or uninteutwnal le&ving of 
~''} foreign object in the bod} of any person 
t•:• reason of the professiOn&! malpractice of 
.. n:. ho;pital, physician or otht'r person or 
rmtrtution practicing any or the healing arts 
ur v•h.::n the fact of damage has, for the 
purpos:: of escaping responsrbiht~· therefor, 
l>t·tr• f•audulently and know ingly concealed 
f"•m the injured party by ar. alleged wrong-
Out:r standing at the timt of l ht wrongful act, 
oq;lrct or breach in a profts~wnal or com-
uwmal relauonship with the i!ljured party, 
tt.r ~ilmt shall be deemed tc• dccnH:' when the 
rn)urtd party know~ or in tht· exercise of 
'~">(J!lablt care should havt- bet'll put on in-
~ ·llf) regardm~ the condiLWI• or md!ltr com-
1 ..• .:r,t'd ut; but m all othH actro:n,;, whether 
~ ::.If, ~ from p rc~feS~luna l malpra<'tlCt or oth-
<'"''" th<' cause ol aclwn sbc~ll hl' tlt:tmed 
;. c.u, t d~ <.rut:d a!-1 ut th t" ll Htr· ul tht· <"H • .:cu r-
eyes only on two occasions, July 24, 1974, 
and November 19, 1975, both dates falling 
outside the two year period set out in I.C. 
§ 5-219(4). No examinations were per-
formed on plaintiff's two subsequent vis-
its-December 22, 1975, when the bifocals 
were ordered, and January 21, 1976, when 
the glasses were fitted to plaintiff's head . 
Therefore, the question we must decide on 
appeal is whether, on this record, a material 
issue of fact exists concerning whether Dr. 
lwasa negligently failed to diagnose plain-
tiffs glaucoma on either December 22, 
1975, or January 21, 1976, the two appoint-
ment dates within the statutory period of 
limitations. 
In ruling on a summary judgmt!nt ,mo-
tion, the facts are to be liberally construed 
in favor of the party opposing the motion ; 
he is to be given the benefit of all favorable 
inferences which might reasonably be 
drawn from the evidence. Tu.rlor v. 
Choules, 102 Idaho 222, 224, 628 P.2d 1056, 
renee, act or omission complained of, and the 
limitation period shall not be extended by 
reason of any continuing consequences or 
damages resulting therefrom or any continu-
ing professional or commercial relat ionship 
between the injured party and the alleged 
wrongdoer, and, provided further , that an 
action within the foregoing foreign object or 
fraudulent concealment exceptions must be 
commenced within one (l) year following the 
date of accrual as aforesaid or two (2) years 
following the occurrence, act or omission 
complained of, whichever is later. The term 
'professional malpractice' as used herein re-
fers to wrongful acts or omissions in the 
performance of professional services by any 
person, firm , association , entity or corpora-
tion licensed to perform such services under 
the law of the state of Idaho. This subsec-
tion shall not affect the application of section 
5--243, Idaho Code, except as to actions aris-
ing from professional malpractice. Neither 
shall this subsection be deemed or construed 
to amend, or repeal section 5--24 1, Idaho 
Code." (Effective March 24, 1971). 
5. Legislative intent to confine the discovery ex· 
ception to cases involving foreign objects and 
fraudulent concealment is clear. See Owyhee 
County v. Rife, 100 Idaho 91 , 593 P.2d 995 
(1979) ; Martin v. Clements, 98 Idaho 906, 575 
P.2d 885 (1978); Johnson~·. Stoddard, 96 Idaho 
230, 526 P.2d 835 (1974); Johnson 1'. Gortun, 
94 Idaho 595, 495 P.2d I (1972). 
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1058 (1981); Huyck ~·. Hecla Mining Co., 
101 Idaho 299, 300, 612 P.2d 142, 143 (1980). 
The record contains the deposition of Dr. 
Howarth, the opthamologist who ultimately 
discovered plaintiff's glaucoma. In re-
sponse to questions regarding what consti-
tutes treatment, Dr. Howarth stated that if 
a doctor examines a patient one day and 
several days later writes a prescription, the 
latter "would be classed as a treatment, and 
. . . when you order the glasses, you are 
instituting the treatment when the glasses 
are delivered and fit to the patient's face, 
and you have then completed the trt!atment 
as far as the treating of his refractive error 
is concerned." The reeord also contains Dr. 
Howarth's affidavit in which he stated: 
"It is the opinion of this affiant that 
treatment of a patient commences with 
the first examination and continues on as 
long as tht problem of the patient is not 
corrected by the first procedure of the 
physician or the provider of health care. 
Eyeglasses themselves are . . . a facet of 
the treatment." 
Thus, the record indicates that Dr. Howarth 
felt that Dr. Iwasa's course of treatment 
continued throughout the series of appoint-
ments. The question, however, is nut one 
of continuing treatment, because I.C. § 5-
219( 4), as amended, expressly statt!s that 
any continuing professional relationship be-
tween the injured party and the alleged 
wrongdoer shall not extend the limitation 
period. 
[1] Dr. Howarth stated that Dr. lwasa's 
failure to diagnose glaucoma in July of 1974 
was an oversight. Howe\'t!r, the record 
contains no refer~nce by Dr. Howarth , or 
any other evidence, that Dr. I wasa had a 
medical duty to reexamine, or retest plain-
tiff's eyes on DeC€mber 22, 1975, or January 
21, 1976, the respective dates that the glass-
es were ordered and fitted, or that Dr. 
Iwasa's failure to do so was in violation of 
the applicable standard of health care of 
the community. See l.C. § &-1012. View-
ing all facts and inferences in favor of the 
plaintiff, anJ Las~:d upon th~: ~:xpres.:> decla-
ration of I.C. § 5--21~1. -lJ that any continu-
ing professional relationship between the 
injurt!d party and thl' a llt:g-t'd wrongdoer 
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shall not extend the limitations period, we 
conclude that there is no showing in the 
record that Dr. lwasa was responsible for 
any occurrence, act or omission, i.e., the 
failure to diagnose glaucoma, on a datA: 
within the two year limitation period sel 
out in I.C. § 5-219(4). 
Plaintiff further alleges that defendant ia 
estopped to assert the statute of limitationa 
as a defense. Plaintiff argues that he re-
lied to his prejudiC€ on Dr. lwasa's repre-
sentations that the bifocals should resolve 
his problems. 
[2, 3] This Court very recently recog-
nized that, in a proper case, a defendanl 
may be estopped from relying on a statuw 
of limitations as a bar to an action against 
him. Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital Bldg. "1'. 
Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 644 P.2d 341 (1982). 
Estoppel may prevent a defendant fro111 
asserting the statutory bar when his repre-
sentations or conduct dissuade a plaintiff 
from prosecuting his cause of action during 
the period of limitations. See Twin Falla 
Clinic & Hospital Bldg. v. Hamill, supra; 
see a.Jso, Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern Dist. 
Terminal, 359 U.s: 231, 79 S.Ct. 760, 3 
L.Ed.2d 770 (1959); Stafford v. Schultz, 42 
Cal.2d 1, 270 P.2d 1 (1954); BowmHn "1'. 
McPheeters, 77 Cal.App.2d 795, 176 P.2d 74b 
(1947). 
[4] The trial court found that "this ia 
not a proper case for invoking the estoppel 
doctrine." We agree. See McCoy v. W(JI;-
ley Hospital & Nurse Training School, 188 
Kan. 325, 362 P.2d 841 (1961}; Cent.r&J 
Heat, Inc. v. Daily Olympian, Inc., 74 
Wash.2d 126, 443 P.2d 544 (1968). A search 
of the record reveals no evidence that Dr. 
Iwasa made any statements or took any 
action in an effort to induce plaintiff to 
delay in bringing suit. Nor, viewing the 
facts and inferences most favorably toward 
the plaintiff, is there any evidence that the 
plaintiff relied on statements made by Dr. 
lwasa in waiting to file his action. Appar-
ently not satisfied that the bifocals hclpt.>d 
his condition, plaintiff went to see Dr. H()o 
warth on January 23, 1976, just two duyb 
after his last appointment with D~· lw.._ 
~·..;...-... . ..._. ..... ,....,.u.,.."•~ •- • ¥' 
Clte u, Idaho, 657 P.2d 476 
( ln tha'. date plaintiff wa::; informt·d that he 
~uffcrtod from glaucoma. Y d, he delayed 
until December 21, 1~77, ncarlj 2:.1 months 
,,ftt•r discovering his glaucoma. bdorc filing 
l hts aetion. This dclu.y cannot hc attributed 
t" th,~ defendant. Btot' .• tu~t the record does 
''"l di~cluse any l'Yid.:uee giving rist• to a 
lllillt,n<.tl issue e'mc;·rniug wht'ther Dr. lwa-
,,~ is esU1pped from a:;serting the statute of 
illnitatwns, we agree wi t h the trial court's 
t·um:lusion that this is not an appropriate 
ra"L' for estoppel. 
151 Plaintiff also J.lleges that l.C. § 5-
~l\1(41 is constitutional!) inftrnt and attacks 
till· statute as violative of both the due 
l'fot'ts~ and equal prolcction clau~es of the 
I· lllkd Statb Con~litution We find no 
,udi ,,,firmit ie~. Cf. Twin Palls Clinic Hos-
J•Ii,,J fJ!dJ4 \'. Hawi/1. w:J Idaho 1~. 644 P.2d 
:1.j 1 il\!i:l~) (finding ll<• v iolations of due 
pri~<'eso or equal pro tetlion in U'. § 5- 241, 
t l it· ~tatute of limitation;:; applicable to ac-
t 11111~ aris ing out of design or construction 
"f tnJprovements to real property). 
We affirm the district court's summary 
Judgment entered in favor of the defendant 
.. ,, tht:: basi::; that plai ntif f's claim was 
J,,,r rL'd by the st<ttut~c of limitations. Costs 
l•, rt·~j><Hldent. 
:1\d'ADDEN, J . (Ret.), and McQUADE, 
.I Pru Tern., concur. 
:-\Ht:f'ARD, Justice, dissenting, in which 
"i'''uun BISTLINE, Justie~e , l'oncur~. 
,.\, S<:t forth in the majc.rity opinion, it is 
""''matit that at the juncture of a motion 
1 .. r ~ummary judgnwnt all facts, together 
... dt. a ll reasonable inferetll'l:S ari::.ing there-
: t--Il>. mu~t bt: Yiew<·d in tht· light most 
: ,, . ui'id>tt: to the party oppu~ing summary 
, .• .:~Jill JiL l\ly I' lei\' of tit~: evidence and 
"·' iq;,timate inference~ arising therefrom 
,, ,,d Hk to a different com·lusiC>n than that 
., f tbt· majority. I also differ from the 
n .. ,Jonty's interpretation of tht applicable 
~~o.tuk of limitation~, l.C . § ;, 219(4). 
'l r,, n .... ;,, rit) focu~•·' \cry IJid'r'<JWly upon 
I·' d'',l ''r'!!ilurt: tu dia).."IJUSt vlaUt'(ifTllt on the 
... :., ,,f 7-~· 74 or ll 18 7G It c\iJently 
.·L r, tla: appo:utnH nt,. ;Jf 1:: 22 75 and 
1-21-76 as totally irrelevant. My view of 
the facts construed most favorably to 
Holmes indicates the following. Holmes 
consulted lwasa with a problem evidenced 
by headaches, vision blurring, and sensitivi-
ty to bright lights . It was ultimately deter-
mined that Holme~' problems were the re-
sult of glaucoma. Iwasa proceedt..>d to treat 
the problem, which he negligently ascribed 
to the need for bifocals. lwasa's treatment 
of Holmes continued through 1-21-76. 
Holmes testified of the January, 1976 ap-
pointment, "I asked him [Iwasa] if they 
would clear them- up the blurrinetis. And 
he said yes, they would." lwasa's testimo-
ny regarding that appointment appeart; to 
support the testimony of Holmes. The 
ophthalmologist, Dr. Howarth, stated his 
opinion that : ''Treatment of a patient com-
mences with the first examinatio11 and con-
tinues on as long as the problem of the 
patient is not corrected by the first proce-
dure ... eyeglasses themselves are ... fac-
et of the treatment." 
Hence, it is my belief that when the facts 
and inferences are viewed most favorably 
to Holmes, lwasa continued to treat Holmes 
through the January, 1976 appointment 
and, in failing to diagnose the glaucoma 
and instead attributing Holmes' problems to 
the need for bifocal eyeglasses, was negli-
gent through the January, 1976 appoint-
ment. 
Support for that view of the facts is 
found in a line of cases from the state of 
Washington, commencing with Samuelson 
v. Freeman, 75 Wash.2d 894, 454 P.2d 406 
(1969), wherein it is stated : 
"(l]f malpractice is claimed during a con-
tinuous and substantially uninterrupted 
course of treatment for a particu lar ill-
ness or condition, the statu{.(, does not 
begin to run until the treatment for that 
particular illness or condition has been 
terminated." ld., 454 P.2d at 410 (em-
phasis added). 
I believe that the majority's interpreta-
tion of I.C. § 5--21!:1(4) is erroneous. That 
statute provides that an action sounding in 
professional malpractice, unless it falls 
wi t hin certain exceptions not pertirwnt 
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here, accrues "as of the time of tht' occur-
rence, act or omission complained of, and 
the limitation period shall not bt_. extended 
by reason of any continuing consequcnees 
or damages resulting therefrom or any con-
tinuing professional or commercial refi;jtion-
ship between the injured parry and the 
alleged wrongdoer." (Emphasis supplied. ) 
It is my view that the majority's inter-
pretation of the statute would lead to tht: 
following result. Assumt: a patient is ha\·-
ing trouble with his elbow and consult.-; an 
orthopedic surgeon. The surgeon takes x-
rays, which, if examined properly, would 
indicate the presence of cancer in the elbow 
joint which, if immediately treated, could 
be totally cured. However, the doctor fa ils 
to so diagnose and prescribt>s a coun;t: of 
treatment for the patient involving hot 
packs, exercise regime, aspirin, cortisone 
shots, immobilization of tht: arm , etc. Ovt!r 
the next two years the patient gains no 
relief and continues to consult the doctor on 
a monthly basis who continues the same 
treatment. One month later the J.mtient 
sees another doctor who diagnoses canc<:r 
which has now sprell.d to the extknt that the 
arm must be amputated. I belie\·e that 
under the rationale of the majority, th ~c 
failure to diagnose would lx: I>inpointed 
during the patient's first visit and he wuulJ 
therefore be barred from an action regard-
less of the obvious wntinuing negligence. 
It would bt! my vit:w that a correct inter-
pretation of the statutory language of ''l·oiJ-
tinuing professional or commercial relation-
ship" should have application only to a situ-
ation where the cont inuing relationship had 
nothing to do with the patient's problem 
which was originally misdiagnosed tJy thl' 
doctor. If, for example, a female patient 
consulted a general practitioner with the 
same elbow problems outlined above and 
that doctor failed to diagnose the ('i;jncer. 
and the patient thereafter ne\·er con~ulted 
that doctor regarding the el bow prohll·m, 
but the doctor a year or so later examined 
the woman over a course of months relating 
to a pregnancy and lakr Jdivered a baby. 
clearly, that wuuld consti tute a continuint,e 
professiunal rt:lati unship, but nc\'l'rlhL·it·~~ 
would ha\'t.' nothin~ to do with <.t eont in uou~ 
course of negligent tre<.~Unt:m . 
Hence, although it might appear to the 
majority that Holmes' chances at trial for 
recovery is somewhat slim, neverthele~:~~~, I 
deem the granting of the motion for sum-
mary judgment to have been erroneous and 
the matter should be remanded f or trial. 
BISTLINE, J., concurs. 
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Parents of one-year-old killed when 
truck rll.n over her brought action against 
truck dri ver and others. The District 
Court, Sixth Judicial District, Bannock 
County, George W. Hargraves , J., entered 
j udgment upon jury verdict which assigned 
to parents 60% of comparative negligenC€, 
and parents appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Shepard, J., held that jury could find that 
parents were 60o/c causally negligent. 
Affirmed. 
1. Death 18=24 
In wrongful death action, negiigt!ncc of 
p<.trent~ of deceased one-year-old struek hy 
vt'hir.:k is affirmative defense. I. C. § 5- :·no. 
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